A Family Therapist for Life: Observations and Options

“Life” is used here in the chronological sense of years spent as a family therapist and in the existential sense of experiencing “life” in terms of satisfaction, meaning, and vitality in one’s living. In the 1950s, there were few guidelines for professionals recognizing the need for working therapeutically with families. Becoming and being a family therapist are discussed, along with lifetime learning about family and tolerance for ambiguity in understanding family and marital relationships and dynamics; flexibility in implementing therapeutic interventions; functioning in ways that fit with one’s personality, beliefs, and principles; working where one functions best; and what works at what stage for the family therapist and relating these to establishing and maintaining “life” in one’s living.     

Evidence for the criterion validity and clinical utility of the Pathological Narcissism Inventory

In this study, the authors evaluated aspects of criterion validity and clinical utility of the grandiosity and vulnerability components of the Pathological Narcissism Inventory (PNI) using two undergraduate samples (N = 299 and 500). Criterion validity was assessed by evaluating the correlations of narcissistic grandiosity and narcissistic vulnerability with established indices of normal personality traits, psychopathology and clinical concerns, and pathological personality traits. Overall, the pattern of correlations supported the convergent and discriminant validity of grandiose and vulnerable conceptualizations of pathological narcissism as measured by the PNI. Clinical utility was assessed by evaluating the extent to which clinicians without specific training in pathological narcissism as well as clinicians with expertise in pathological narcissism could accurately predict the correlates of PNI grandiosity and vulnerability with normal and pathological personality traits and psychopathology. The r(contrast-cv) coefficient provided a global index of accuracy in clinicians' predictions that was more fully elaborated by examining systematic discrepancies across groups. Overall, novice and expert clinicians were generally able to predict criterion correlations, with some exceptions (e.g., counter to predictions, pathological narcissism was negatively associated with treatment resistance). These results provide further evidence regarding the validity and utility of the narcissistic grandiosity and narcissistic vulnerability constructs as measured by the PNI.     

Abortion, Time-Relative Interests, and Futures Like Ours

Don Marquis (1989) has argued most abortions are immoral, for the same reason that killing you or me is immoral: abortion deprives the fetus of a valuable future (FLO). Call this account the FLOA. A rival account is Jeff McMahan’s (2002), time-relative interest account (TRIA) of the wrongness of killing. According to this account, an act of killing is wrong to the extent that it deprives the victim of future value and the relation of psychological unity would have held between the victim at the time of death and herself at a later time if she had lived. The TRIA supposedly has two chief advantages over Marquis’s FLOA. First, unlike the FLOA, the TRIA does not rely on the controversial thesis that identity is what matters in survival. Second, the TRIA yields more plausible verdicts about cases. Proponents of the TRIA use the account to argue that abortion is generally permissible, because there would be little to no psychological unity between the fetus and later selves if it lived. I argue that advocates of the TRIA have failed to establish its superiority to the FLOA, for two reasons. First, the two views are on a par with respect to the thesis that identity is what matters in survival. Second, Marquis’s FLOA does not yield the counterintuitive implications about cases that advocates of the TRIA have attributed to it, and the TRIA yields its own share of implausible judgments about cases.     

Visual object categorisation at distinct levels of abstraction: a new stimulus set.

We designed a new stimulus set with 269 line drawings of everyday artifacts and animals. The stimulus set contains several typical exemplars from a sample of 25 basic-level categories. We determined to what extent these stimuli were named at the basic level and at a more subordinate level. An additional experiment showed the validity of this calibration: typicality ratings were correlated significantly with the level of naming. In a final experiment we found that this effect depends largely on the global configuration of a stimulus as it was still apparent with degraded images obtained by locally shifting small fragments of the drawings.     

Deciding between accounts of the selection task: A reply to Oaksford (2002)

In this paper we report on our attempts to fit the optimal data selection (ODS) model (Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000) to the selection task data reported in Feeney and Handley (2000) and Handley, Feeney, and Harper (2002). Although Oaksford (2002b) reports good fits to the data described in Feeney and Handley (2000), the model does not adequately capture the data described in Handley et al. (2002). Furthermore, across all six of the experiments modelled here, the ODS model does not predict participants' behaviour at the level of selection rates for individual cards. Finally, when people's probability estimates are used in the modelling exercise, the model adequately captures only 1 out of 18 conditions described in Handley et al. We discuss the implications of these results for models of the selection task and claim that they support deductive, rather than probabilistic, accounts of the task.