Retrieval of bindings between task-irrelevant stimuli and responses can facilitate behaviour under conditions of high response certainty

Repetition priming can be driven by the encoding and retrieval of stimulus–response (S–R) bindings. When a previously encoded S–R binding is retrieved, and is congruent with the response currently required, it can bias response-selection processes towards selecting the retrieved response, resulting in facilitation. Previous studies have used classification tasks at retrieval. Here, two (or more) response options are competing, and it is likely that any evidence (e.g., an S–R binding) in favour of one option will be utilized to effect a decision. Thus, S–R effects are likely to be seen when using such a task. It is unclear whether such effects can be seen under conditions of higher response certainty, when participants are explicitly cued to make a response. Across two experiments, evidence for a modulating influence of S–R bindings is seen despite using a response cueing method at retrieval to minimize response uncertainty and despite stimuli being task irrelevant. Finally, the results suggest that responses within these S–R bindings are coded at the level of left versus right hand, and not a more fine-grained within-hand thumb versus index finger. The results underline the resilience of S–R effects, suggesting that they are present even under conditions where no explicit object-oriented decision is required.     

Marketing of Professional Counselors: A Q‐Sort Study of Best Practices

This quantitative Q‐sort research was designed to evaluate representations of counselor qualifications and to determine which configurations account for the variance in consumer preference and selection. The sample consisted of 161 graduate and undergraduate students in a regional university in Texas. An iterative inverse factor analysis produced 3 distinct factors that accounted for 65.85% of the variance in the data, explaining a majority of the differences in how consumers perceive counselor credentials.     

Is regret for inaction relatively self‐enhancing?

Previous accounts of regret suggest that people report greater regret for inaction than for action because the former is longer lasting and more painful than the latter. We suggest instead that the tendency for people's greatest regrets to concern inaction more than action may be due to the relatively self‐enhancing nature of regrets for inaction. In Study 1 we asked people to think about their greatest recent regret and to code it as being due to action or inaction. In Study 2 participants described their greatest regret from across their entire life. In both studies we observed an inaction effect only amongst individuals high in self‐esteem (HSE). In Study 2 we found that the inaction effect was confined to HSE people whose greatest regret was personal in nature. These results support the claim that regret for inaction is relatively self‐enhancing and suggest that the inaction effect found in real‐life regrets may be due, in part at least, to the self‐enhancement goals of HSE individuals. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The story of some: everyday pragmatic inference by children and adults.

The statement, some elephants have trunks, is logically true but pragmatically infelicitous. Whilst some is logically consistent with all, it is often pragmatically interpreted as precluding all. In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that with pragmatically impoverished materials, sensitivity to the pragmatic implicature associated with some is apparent earlier in development than has previously been found. Amongst 8-year-old children, we observed much greater sensitivity to the implicature in pragmatically enriched contexts. Finally, in Experiment 3, we found that amongst adults, logical responses to infelicitous some statements take longer to produce than do logical responses to felicitous some statements, and that working memory capacity predicts the tendency to give logical responses to the former kind of statement. These results suggest that some adults develop the ability to inhibit a pragmatic response in favour of a logical answer. We discuss the implications of these findings for theories of pragmatic inference.     

Bias in older adults’ driving self-assessments: The role of personality

A convenience sample of 50 older drivers (M_age = 73.14, SD = 4.85) completed the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator® (MBTI®) Step III™ instrument and rated their own driving abilities (compared to all other drivers, same age drivers, and their own driving 20 years prior) and their ability to perform 68 specific driving-related behaviors. Each subject’s driving performance was also evaluated in a comprehensive on-road assessment conducted by a certified driving rehabilitation specialist, who rated the same 68 driving behaviors as well as driving performance. Drivers identified by the MBTI Step III instrument as Extraverted, Sensing, and (above median) Confident rated their driving significantly more favorably than Introverts, Intuitives, and below median Confidence drivers. Step III Sufficiency scales were associated with on-road performance: drivers with scores indicating low Confidence, low Stamina, or critical high levels of Compensatory Strain received significantly lower evaluations. Drivers with a Sensing preference or critical Strain score rated their driving significantly more favorably than evaluators did. These findings present preliminary evidence for the utility of personality assessments in identifying self-serving bias in driving self-evaluations, essential for safe self-regulation of driving.