The Pathoplastic Relationship Between Interpersonal Problems and Fear of Failure

ABSTRACT This study advances the understanding of fear of failure (FF), a dispositional avoidance-oriented achievement motive, by employing interpersonal classification techniques to groups of individuals who fear failure in order to examine the pathoplastic relations between FF and interpersonal problems. Shame-based FF is thought to be related to the self-regulation strategies of appeasement and aggression, and these strategies are hypothesized to be associated with the interpersonal problems of Nonassertiveness and Vindictiveness, respectively. Using 2 independent samples ( n s=60 and 38) reporting high FF, interpersonal profiles were examined for the groups in their entirety and for cluster solutions within the larger samples. Results demonstrated that individuals high in FF exhibited 1 of 2 prototypical interpersonal profiles associated with Domineering/Vindictive or Nonassertive/Exploitable problems that correspond with the hypothesized aggression and appeasement regulation strategies. Consistent with the concept of pathoplasticity, these differences were not better accounted for by demographic, affective, motivational, personality, or attachment style characteristics of the samples.     

When some is actually all: Scalar inferences in face-threatening contexts

Accounts of the scalar inference from ‘some X-ed’ to ‘not all X-ed’ are central to the debate between contemporary theories of conversational pragmatics. An important contribution to this debate is to identify contexts that decrease the endorsement rate of the inference. We suggest that the inference is endorsed less often in face-threatening contexts, i.e., when X implies a loss of face for the listener. This claim is successfully tested in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 rules out a possible confound between face-threatening contexts and lower-bound contexts. Experiment 3 shows that whilst saying ‘some X-ed’ when one knew for a fact that all X-ed is always perceived as an underinformative utterance, it is also seen as a nice and polite thing to do when X threatens the face of the listener. These findings are considered from the perspective of Relevance Theory as well as that of the Generalized Conversational Inference approach.     

How many processes underlie category-based induction? Effects of conclusion specificity and cognitive ability

Two studies investigated participants' sensitivity to the amount and diversity of the evidence when reasoning inductively about categories. Both showed that participants are more sensitive to characteristics of the evidence for arguments with general rather than specific conclusions. Both showed an association between cognitive ability and sensitivity to these evidence characteristics, particularly when the conclusion category was general. These results suggest that a simple associative process may not be sufficient to capture somekey phenomena of category-based induction. They also support the claim that the need to generate a superordinate category is a complicating factor in category-based reasoning and that adults' tendency to generate such categories while reasoning has been overestimated.     

Relations between premise similarity and inductive strength

According to the diversity principle, diverse evidence is strong evidence. There has been considerable evidence that people respect this principle in inductive reasoning. However, exceptions may be particularly informative. Medin, Coley, Storms, and Hayes (2003) introduced a relevance theory of inductive reasoning and used this theory to predict exceptions, including the nondiversity-by-propertyreinforcement effect. A new experiment in which this phenomenon was investigated is reported here. Subjects made inductive strength judgments and similarity judgments for stimuli from Medin et al. (2003). The inductive strength judgments showed the same pattern as that in Medin et al. (2003); however, the similarity judgments suggested that the pattern should be interpreted as a diversity effect, rather than as a nondiversity effect. It is concluded that the evidence regarding the predicted nondiversity-byproperty-reinforcement effect does not give distinctive support for relevance theory, although this theory does address other results.     

Comparisons, mental models, and the action effect in judgments of regret

People tend to attribute more regret to a character who has decided to take action and experienced a negative outcome than to one who has decided not to act and experienced a negative outcome. For some decisions, however, this finding is not observed in a between-participants design and thus appears to rely on comparisons between people's representations of action and their representations of inaction. In this article, we outline a mental models account that explains findings from studies that have used within- and between-participants designs, and we suggest that, for decisions with uncertain counterfactual outcomes, information about the consequences of a decision to act causes people to flesh out their representation of the counterfactual states of affairs for inaction. In three experiments, we confirm our predictions about participants' fleshing out of representations, demonstrating that an action effect occurs only when information about the consequences of action is available to participants as they rate the nonactor and when this information about action is informative with respect to judgments about inaction. It is important to note that the action effect always occurs when the decision scenario specifies certain counterfactual outcomes. These results suggest that people sometimes base their attributions of regret on comparisons among different sets of mental models.     

The development of regret

In two experiments, 4- to 9-year-olds played a game in which they selected one of two boxes to win a prize. On regret trials the unchosen box contained a better prize than the prize children actually won, and on baseline trials the other box contained a prize of the same value. Children rated their feelings about their prize before and after seeing what they could have won if they had chosen the other box and were asked to provide an explanation if their feelings had changed. Patterns of responding suggested that regret was experienced by 6 or 7 years of age; children of this age could also explain why they felt worse in regret trials by referring to the counterfactual situation in which the prize was better. No evidence of regret was found in 4- and 5-year-olds. Additional findings suggested that by 6 or 7 years, children's emotions were determined by a consideration of two different counterfactual scenarios.     

A comparison of passive-aggressive and negativistic personality disorders

Passive-aggressive personality disorder (PAPD) has historically played an important role in clinical theorizing and was diagnosable prior to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. [DSM-IV]; American Psychiatric Association, 1994), in which the construct was relabeled negativistic (NEGPD), expanded to include negative affective symptoms, and appendicized. In this study we tested the hypothesis that the expansion of PAPD to include content related to negative moods and nonspecific personality pathology compromised its discriminant validity. In an undergraduate sample (N = 1,215), a self-report measure of PAPD was only moderately related to NEGPD and showed less diagnostic overlap with other personality disorders than NEGPD. Furthermore, a conjoint factor analysis yielded a strong first factor (moodiness) that appeared less specific to passive-aggressive behavior than 3 other factors (irresponsibility, inadequacy, and contempt). We conclude that future research on this potentially important clinical construct should focus on core passive-aggressive features and abandon the negativistic content that has been added to it in successive editions of the DSM.