Introducing Identity

The best-known syntactic account of the logical constants is inferentialism . Following Wittgenstein’s thought that meaning is use, inferentialists argue that meanings of expressions are given by introduction and elimination rules. This is especially plausible for the logical constants, where standard presentations divide inference rules in just this way. But not just any rules will do, as we’ve learnt from Prior’s famous example of tonk, and the usual extra constraint is harmony. Where does this leave identity? It’s usually taken as a logical constant but it doesn’t seem harmonious: standardly, the introduction rule (reflexivity) only concerns a subset of the formulas canvassed by the elimination rule (Leibniz’s law). In response, Read [5, 8] and Klev [3] amend the standard approach. We argue that both attempts fail, in part because of a misconception regarding inferentialism and identity that we aim to identify and clear up.

     

The Effect of Non-conscious Perception of Frequent Stimuli on Credibility Judgement

The aim of the work presented here is to investigate the effects of mere-exposure to familiar and unfamiliar stimuli (as primes) on credibility judgement about sentences unrelated to the primes. These target sentences are presented just after the prime. In all, 124 students participated in 3 priming experiments. The nature of the primes (both infraliminary and supraliminary) is different in each experiment: we used public vs. unknown faces, exposed vs. unexposed faces, and objects vs. nonobjects. Primes were presented for 50msec or 400msec. After the presentation of each prime, subjects had to judge the credibility of an assertion; its ambiguity has previously been tested with 100 subjects. The results show that assertions which follow familiar primes (public faces, exposed faces, or objects) are granted more credibility that those which follow unfamiliar primes (unknown faces or nonobjects). This effect is observed especially when presentation time is 50msec.     

Bilingualism and the perception of professional concepts

A selected set of professional concepts was subjected to analysis through two separate multidimensional scaling techniques, the INDSCAL and TORSCA models, to evaluate the intergroup perceptual differences of four experimental groups, made up of unilingual French, unilingual English and bilingual students. The linguistic relativism thesis provided the research hypotheses on the relationship between language access and usage and concept perception. The multidimensional scaling techniques were applied to the matrix of subjects' similarity judgments on pairs of concepts, thus enabling the identification of three dimensions. The dimensions were labelled as conjunctive, relational and disjunctive, and were assumed to be related to the criteria employed by the subjects in their similarity rankings. An analysis of variance of the individual saliences on each dimension provided evidence of linguistic relativism for both the relational and disjunctive dimensions. These findings support the contention that unilingual speakers of separate languages differ from each other and from bilingual speakers in their perception of professional concepts.     

A new approach to explain aggression

Two separate experiments are reported. They show the methodological difficulties and subsequent conceptual complications in Berkowitz's modified frustration-aggression theory and Zillman's theory of aggression. There was a marginally significant difference in the verbal measure of aggression favouring subjects aroused by frustration over subjects aroused by exercise, but not on the behavioral measure of aggression. Exp. II was conducted to test an alternative hypothesis, deduced from Fraisse's theory of emotion, which states that subjects respond more aggressively when confronted with unexpected than with expected annoyance. All six measures of aggression confirmed the hypothesis. The results of these two experiments indicate conceptual and methodological difficulties inherent in Berkowitz's modified frustration-aggression theory and Zillman's theory of aggression; they also suggest that Fraisse's theory of emotion presents a better model of aggression.     

First order logic with empty structures

For first order languages with no individual constants, empty structures and truth values (for sentences) in them are defined. The first order theories of the empty structures and of all structures (the empty ones included) are axiomatized with modus ponens as the only rule of inference. Compactness is proved and decidability is discussed. Furthermore, some well known theorems of model theory are reconsidered under this new situation. Finally, a word is said on other approaches to the whole problem.     

Catching up with wonderful women: The women‐are‐wonderful effect is smaller in more gender egalitarian societies

Inequalities between men and women are common and well‐documented. Objective indexes show that men are better positioned than women in societal hierarchies—there is no single country in the world without a gender gap. In contrast, researchers have found that the women‐are‐wonderful effect—that women are evaluated more positively than men overall—is also common. Cross‐cultural studies on gender equality reveal that the more gender egalitarian the society is, the less prevalent explicit gender stereotypes are. Yet, because self‐reported gender stereotypes may differ from implicit attitudes towards each gender, we reanalysed data collected across 44 cultures, and (a) confirmed that societal gender egalitarianism reduces the women‐are‐wonderful effect when it is measured more implicitly (i.e. rating the personality of men and women presented in images) and (b) documented that the social perception of men benefits more from gender egalitarianism than that of women.     

Neuroscience and Brain Death Controversies: The Elephant in the Room

The conception and the determination of brain death continue to raise scientific, legal, philosophical, and religious controversies. While both the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in 1981 and the President’s Council on Bioethics in 2008 committed to a biological definition of death as the basis for the whole-brain death criteria, contemporary neuroscientific findings augment the concerns about the validity of this biological definition. Neuroscientific evidentiary findings, however, have not yet permeated discussions about brain death. These findings have critical relevance (scientifically, medically, legally, morally, and religiously) because they indicate that some core assumptions about brain death are demonstrably incorrect, while others lack sufficient evidential support. If behavioral unresponsiveness does not equate to unconsciousness, then the philosophical underpinning of the definition based on loss of capacity for consciousness as well as the criteria, and tests in brain death determination are incongruent with empirical evidence. Thus, the primary claim that brain death equates to biological death has then been de facto falsified. This conclusion has profound philosophical, religious, and legal implications that should compel respective authorities to (1) reassess the philosophical rationale for the definition of death, (2) initiate a critical reappraisal of the presumed alignment of brain death with the theological definition of death in Abrahamic faith traditions, and (3) enact new legislation ratifying religious exemption to death determination by neurologic criteria.     

Emotional capture by fearful expressions varies with psychopathic traits

Task-irrelevant emotional expressions are known to capture attention, with the extent of “emotional capture” varying with psychopathic traits in antisocial samples. We investigated whether this variation extends throughout the continuum of psychopathic traits (and co-occurring trait anxiety) in a community sample. Participants (N?=?85) searched for a target face among facial distractors. As predicted, angry and fearful faces interfered with search, indicated by slower reaction times relative to neutral faces. When fear appeared as either target or distractor, diminished emotional capture was seen with increasing affective-interpersonal psychopathic traits. However, moderation analyses revealed that this was only when lifestyle-antisocial psychopathic traits were low, consistent with evidence suggesting that these two facets of psychopathic traits display opposing relationships with emotional reactivity. Anxiety did not show the predicted relationships with emotional capture effects. Findings show that normative variation in high-level individual differences in psychopathic traits influence automatic bias to emotional stimuli.     

Task switching: The effect of task recency with dual- and single-affordance stimuli

When we switch to a new task, performance is transiently relatively poor, but improves dramatically after one trial. Such a “switch cost” may result from the preceding task being highly primed while the new task is not yet primed. This predicts that it should become more difficult to switch back to Task A when more trials of Task B have intervened. Such a lag effect has been found in some but not in most previous experiments, and to resolve this discrepancy we examined the effects of task lag with different stimuli. We found that when stimuli uniquely and clearly cued the task—minimizing the need for control—switch reaction time increased with task lag. However, when the need for control was increased by using similar or identical stimuli in the two tasks, this lag effect was abolished or reversed. Thus only when control processes are minimized can priming explain the difficulty of switching back from Task B to Task A. Second, we asked how the impact of control is mediated in conditions where it is not minimized. If it is mediated through altering the relative activation states of competing tasks, then as it becomes easier to do one task—the relative task-set activation state is tipped in that task's favour—it should always become harder to do the other task. On the other hand, if control bias affects switch performance directly, this relationship need not hold. We found that as it becomes easier to perform one task it can become easier, not harder, to switch to the competing task. Thus control bias must act directly on switch performance, rather than only through its influence on relative task-set activation.