The Replication Crisis and Qualitative Research in the Psychology of Religion

ABSTRACT

This article forms a contribution to the discussion on the “replication crisis” in psychology from the qualitative research perspective and qualitative-oriented psychology of religion. The main theme of our article is, how should we deal, as qualitative-oriented psychologists of religion, with the issue of replicability? The introductory part of the article concentrates on validity criteria within qualitative-oriented research, and why qualitative-oriented psychologists of religion should take them into consideration in their research projects. Next, a typology of approaches (Intuitive, Field, Pragmatic, Synthetic), toward replication within qualitative studies is presented. Alongside discussing the possible ways of making qualitative research more replicable, examples of good practices in that matter are discussed. Some takeaway tips for qualitative-oriented psychologists of religion, that are to be used in order to make their research more replicable, are presented in the concluding part. Promoting CAQDAS, developing clear research protocols and procedures, describing the cultural context of the research in detail and discussing methodological issues and barriers/limitations of the study in a separate section are one of the main ideas postulated in the article, that should be included in the future qualitative studies on religion (s). The article concludes with a plea of sorts, that qualitative-oriented researchers do need to pay more attention to methodological issues while designing a research project, keeping in mind that it can (and should) be replicated in the future.     

What do zebra finches learn besides singing? Systematic mapping of the literature and presentation of an efficient associative learning test

Animal Cognition - The process of learning in birds has been extensively studied, with a focus on species such as pigeons, parrots, chickens, and crows. In recent years, the zebra finch has emerged...     

A DEFENCE OF THE EXPLANATORY ARGUMENT FOR PHYSICALISM

One argument for reductive physicalism, the explanatory argument, rests on its ability to explain the vast and growing body of acknowledged psychophysical correlations. Jaegwon Kim has recently levelled four objections against the explanatory argument. I assess all of Kim's objections, showing that none is successful. The result is a defence of the explanatory argument for physicalism.