Problems for Dogmatism

I argue that its appearing to you that P does not provide justification for believing that P unless you have independent justification for the denial of skeptical alternatives – hypotheses incompatible with P but such that if they were true, it would still appear to you that P. Thus I challenge the popular view of ‘dogmatism,’ according to which for some contents P, you need only lack reason to suspect that skeptical alternatives are true, in order for an experience as of P to justify belief that P. I pursue three lines of objection to dogmatism, having to do with probabilistic reasoning, considerations of future or hypothetically available justification, and epistemic circularity. I briefly sketch a fall-back position which avoids the problems raised.     

Desires in Practical Reasoning

Inferences from desired ends to intended necessary means seem to be among the most unproblematic elements of practical reasoning. A closer look dissolves this appearance, however, when we see that such inferences are defeasible. We can nevertheless understand such inferences as leading to the adoption of plans, by analogy with inferences leading to explanations. Plans should satisfy at least some important ends desired by the agent, be consistent with the satisfaction of other desired ends, and be inconsistent with as few desired ends as possible. A rational plan may rule out the satisfaction of some desires, however, and this feature explains the defeasibility of such inferences.     

Analysis of An Intervention to Reduce or Prevent Secondary Conditions for People with Spinal Cord Injuries

People with acute spinal cord injuries (SCI) are at risk for developing secondary conditions such as pressure sores, urinary tract infections, pain, weight gain and deconditioning, and depression. This study analyzed the effectiveness of an Internet assessment and feedback tool in determining secondary condition risk for this population based on individual responses to a knowledge and behavioral questionnaire. Seventy-one people with newly-diagnosed SCI who were treated at one of five Model Spinal Cord Injury Systems Centers were randomly assigned to either an experimental condition in which they received computerized feedback and one-on-one consultations based on their online questionnaire answers, or to a control condition in which they received no feedback until the study's completion. One year after the initial assessment, the online questionnaire was re-administered to all participants as a post-test. Three times between the pre- and post-test assessments researchers telephoned participants to administer phone surveys probing secondary condition development. Results indicate there were significant differences among race groups and between complete and incomplete injury status for pressure sore occurrence. This study represents a new era of interactive technology in health promotion that can serve as a basis for future research to decrease secondary condition risk for people with SCI.     

Psychophysics of remembering: to bias or not to bias

Delayed matching to sample is typically a two-alternative forced-choice procedure with two sample stimuli. In this task the effects of varying the probability of reinforcers for correct choices and the resulting receiver operating characteristic are symmetrical. A version of the task where a sample is present on some trials and absent on others is analogous to a yes/no recognition task. We describe data from two experiments where an asymmetry in performance in the yes/no task could be attributed to a change in response bias with increasing retention-interval duration from a matching-law perspective, but not from a signal-detection perspective. Both approaches make explicit assumptions about response bias. The apparent inconsistency between the two approaches to the treatment of response bias is resolved in terms of a model proposed by K. G. White and J. T. Wixted (1999) which predicts asymmetrical matching-law functions and receiver operating characteristics without making any assumptions about response bias.     

The property transmission hypothesis: a possible explanation for visual impressions of pulling and other kinds of phenomenal causality

Under certain circumstances, stimuli involving two moving objects that do not come into contact reliably give rise to the illusory perceptual impression that one of the objects is pulling the other, as if there is an unseen connection between them. It is proposed that the conditions determining the occurrence of this impression can be explained as cases of application of the property-transmission hypothesis. This is a general hypothesis that causal objects operate in part by transmitting some of their own properties to effect objects under conditions where the causal object is active, where there are cues to the occurrence of generative transmission between the causal object and an effect object, and where there is a time-ordered relation of resemblance between properties of the causal object and those of the effect object. This hypothesis predicts that the pulling impression should occur only when the effect object adopts kinematic properties (speed and direction) that resemble those of the causal object. An experiment is reported that supports this prediction.     

Using Gender Role Conflict Theory in Counseling Male‐to‐Female Transgender Individuals

Ignoring gender socialization while counseling transgender clients neglects a significant aspect of the transgender experience. To address this, the authors review the literature on gender role conflict (GRC) theory as it pertains to the transgender experience of biological males whose authentic self is female. They explore the main types of distress experienced by transgender individuals, detail the therapeutic process using a GRC theory perspective, specify how GRC applies to transgender individuals, and suggest ways to work with this population.     

Origins of adolescents’ autobiographical memories

Adolescents (N = 46; M = 12.46 years) who had previously participated in a longitudinal study of autobiographical memory development narrated their early childhood memories, interpreted life events, and completed a family history questionnaire and language assessment. Three distinct components of adolescent memory emerged: (1) age of earliest memory and insight into life events; (2) volume of early memories; and (3) density of specific memories from early childhood. Children's language, self-awareness, and theory of mind during early childhood (19–51 months) all contributed to their memories as adolescents. However, adolescents’ early reminiscing environment was the best single predictor of the age and volume of their early memories and their insight into life events. In contrast, adolescents’ delayed self-recognition and reminiscing in early childhood predicted the density of their early memories. These findings provide partial support for theories of autobiographical memory development.