How to be a type-C physicalist

This paper advances a version of physicalism which reconciles the “a priori entailment thesis” (APET) with the analytic independence of our phenomenal and physical vocabularies. The APET is the claim that, if physicalism is true, the complete truths of physics imply every other truth a priori. If so, “cosmic hermeneutics” is possible: a demon having only complete knowledge of physics could deduce every truth about the world. Analytic independence is a popular physicalist explanation for the apparent “epistemic gaps” between phenomenal and physical truths. The two are generally seen as incompatible, since the demon’s deductions seem to presuppose analytic connections between physical and phenomenal terms. I begin by arguing, in support of the APET, that implications from the complete truths of physics to phenomenal truths cannot be a posteriori. Such implications are (according to the physicalist) necessarily true. But they cannot be Kripke-style a posteriori necessities, since (according to the physicalist) the complete truths of physics fix any relevant a posteriori facts about the reference of terms. I then show how the physicalist can turn the tables: the demon can exploit the physical fixing of reference to bridge the gap between the vocabularies, by deducing when phenomenal and physical terms co-refer. This opens the way for a “type-C” physicalism, which accepts in-principle deducibility while still appealing to analytic independence to explain why we (who are not demons) find it impossible to see phenomenal-physical connections a priori.     

From health beliefs to self-regulation: Theoretical advances in the psychology of action control

Abstract

The paper reviews the theoretical concepts included in a range of social cognitive models which have identified psychological antecedents of individual motivation and behaviour. Areas of correspondence are noted and core constructs (derived primarily from the theory of planned behaviour and social cognitive theory) are identified. The role of intention formation, self-efficacy beliefs, attitudes, normative beliefs and self-representations are highlighted and it is argued that these constructs provide a useful framework for modelling the psychological prerequisites of health behaviour. Acknowledging that intentions do not translate into action automatically, recent advances in our understanding of the ways in which prior planning and rehearsal can enhance individual control of action and facilitate the routinisation of behaviour are considered. The importance of engaging in preparatory behaviours for the achievement of many health goals is discussed and the processes by which goals are prioritised, including their links to self-representations, are explored. The implications of social cognitive and self-regulatory theories for the cognitive assessment of individual readiness for action and for intervention design in health-related settings are highlighted.     

Scary warnings and rational precautions: A review of the psychology of fear appeals

Abstract

Research into the effects of fear-arousal on precautionary motivation and action is reviewed. Current models do not adequately distinguish between emotional (i.e., fear arousal) and cognitive (i.e., threat perception) responses to fear appeals and, in general, are not well supported. Evidence suggesting that (i) coping appraisals are more powerful predictors of precautionary action than threat perception and that (ii) fear control processes may interfere with precautionary motivation, recommends cautious and limited use of fear appeals in health promotion. It seems likely that fear arousal is less important in motivating precautionary action than perceptions of action effectiveness and self-efficacy. Moreover, perceived personal relevance may be critical to the emotional and cognitive impact of threat information. Available findings are summarised in the form of a process model that highlights the potential complexity of fear arousal effects. Sequential measurement of fear arousal, other than by self-report, is recommended in studies seeking to clarify these effects.     

Extracurricular activities in young applicants’ résumés: What are the motives behind their involvement?

Applicants use résumés to demonstrate their knowledge, skills, abilities, and other personal characteristics (KSAOs) to recruiters, through education and job‐related or non‐job‐related experiences. But research suggests that the situation for young applicants is especially competitive, since they increasingly enter the labour market with similar educational credentials and limited job‐related experience. They may thus use non‐job‐related experiences, such as participation in extracurricular activities (ECAs) during their studies, to demonstrate KSAOs to recruiters, but also to add distinction and value to their credentials. ECAs may therefore become more important in the selection of young applicants. Yet few studies have undertaken a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the relationships students have with these activities. The purpose of this study was to investigate to what extent students’ involvement in ECAs is due to internal (e.g., passion) or external (e.g., résumé‐building) motives, and what factors influence these motives. Results from a study with 197 students suggest that students engage in ECAs mainly out of internal motives. But external motives are stronger for activities started closer to entering the labour market, for students active in associative or volunteering activities (as compared to sports or artistic activities), and for students holding leadership positions in their activities. Our results suggest that labour market pressure may be a key component of applicants’ involvement in ECAs. Also, organizations and recruiters may want to consider that students tend not to engage in ECAs purely out of internal motives, but also to add value to their credentials and match employers’ expectations.     

Why experiments matter*

Experimentation is traditionally considered a privileged means of confirmation. However, why and how experiments form a better confirmatory source relative to other strategies is unclear, and recent discussions have identified experiments with various modeling strategies on the one hand, and with ‘natural’ experiments on the other hand. We argue that experiments aiming to test theories are best understood as controlled investigations of specimens. ‘Control’ involves repeated, fine-grained causal manipulation of focal properties. This capacity generates rich knowledge of the object investigated. ‘Specimenhood’ involves possessing relevant properties given the investigative target and the hypothesis in question. Specimens are thus representative members of a class of systems, to which a hypothesis refers. It is in virtue of both control and specimenhood that experiments provide powerful confirmatory evidence. This explains the distinctive power of experiments: although modelers exert extensive control, they do not exert this control over specimens; although natural experiments utilize specimens, control is diminished.     

Parents Think Their Sons Are Brighter Than Their Daughters: Sex Differences in Parental Self-Estimations and Estimations of Their Children's Multiple Intelligences

In this study, 156 participants, predominantly White British adults (M age = 44.3 years) rated themselves on overall IQ and on H. Gardner's (1983) 7 intelligence subtypes. Parents (n = 120) also estimated the intelligence of their children. Men's self-estimates were significantly higher than women's (110.15 vs. 104.84). Participants thought their verbal, mathematical, and spatial intelligence scores were the best indicators of their own overall intelligence. Parents estimated that their sons had significantly higher IQs than their daughters (115.21 vs. 107.49). Self-estimates and estimates of children's multiple intelligences were higher for men and sons, significantly so for logical-mathematical and spatial intelligence. Parents rated 2nd-born daughters as having significantly higher verbal and musical intelligence than their male counterparts. Higher parental IQ self-estimates corresponded with higher IQ estimates for children. Results for 1st-born children were clearest and showed the most significant differences. The findings are interpreted in terms of sociocultural and familial influences and the possibility of actual sex differences in particular abilities.     

Eating-Problem Patients' Conceptions of Normality

Three groups of people—anorexic patients, helping professionals, and a control group—filled out the Eating Attitude Test (Garner & Garfinkel, 1979) three times. The control subjects were asked to fill it out honestly for themselves; as they imagined an ordinary person might complete it; and, finally, as they would expect a patient with an eating disorder to fill it out. The anorexic patients were asked to complete it honestly for themselves; as they imagined an ordinary person might fill it out; and, finally, as they would expect to fill it out when fully recovered. The professionals filled out the questionnaires as they imagined the typical patient with eating disorders might; as they imagined the ordinary person might complete it; and as a recovered patient might complete it. The results provided support for some but not all hypotheses, the most central of which was that there would be a difference between how the patients rated the ordinary person and how control subjects (supposedly ordinary people) rated themselves.