Lay theories of delinquency

This paper is concerned with the range, structure and determinants of lay people's implicit theories of delinquency. The different explicit psychological and sociological theories were reviewed as were studies on lay beliefs about crime and delinquency. After pilot interviews in which people were asked to list what they believed to be the major causes of delinquency, over 350 people completed a questionnaire in which they rated 30 explanations for their importance in explaining delinquency. The results showed numerous sex, age and voting differences. Conservatives tended to blame a person's poor education for his or her delinquency, while Labour voters tended to explain delinquency in terms of societal factors. A factor analysis revealed six clear explanation types for delinquency some of which were clearly related to explicit theories. Results were discussed in terms of the psychology of explanations and the relationship between explicit and implicit theories. Implications of this research were also noted.     

Favouritism,fairness and joint profit in long-term relationships

This study was designed to test a number of hypotheses about the use of FAV and other strategies as measured by the intergroup ‘matrices’ in four long-term relationships-with spouse, child, friend and workmate. Forty subjects filled in matrices giving three measures of self-favouritism (FAV), and one each of fairness (F) and maximum joint profit (MJP), in relation to the allocation of money and time. It was found that FAV was not used for spouse, and was used less for child than for the non-family relationships (p < 0.01, p < 0.05). There was also an influence of altruism (A) against FAV, when time was distributed between spouse (p < 0.01) or child (p < 0.001) and the self. F was used most for spouse, followed by child, friend and workmate (p < 0.001), and was used more by females in distributing money (p < 0.01). MJP was not used at all for money, but was used to some extent for time.     

The good,the bad and the mad: Response bias in self-report measures

This study set out to examine the susceptibility of five extensively used, self-report measures to response set bias. Subjects were requested either to fake good, (give a good impression), fake bad, (give a bad impression), fake mad, (give an impression of mental instability) or respond honestly. Subjects who faked good had significantly higher Extraversion, Lie and Social Desirability scores but lowest Neuroticism, Psychoticism and Social Anxiety scores. Subjects who faked bad had significantly lower Extraversion and higher Psychoticism and Social Anxiety scores. Fake mad subjects scored higher on Self-Monitoring and Locus of Control. Four of the eight scales showed significant differences between subjects faking bad and those faking mad. The results are discussed in terms of questionnaire design and respondent's motivation.     

Psychoticism,social desirability and situation selection

Previous research on personality and activity preference has shown that extraverts have a significantly and meaningfully different pattern of activity preference from introverts. This finding was also true of high and low neurotics but not to the same extent. This study was designed to see whether the traits of psychoticism and social desirability are also related to situational selection. Subjects from a large group were divided first into high P and low P scorers, and then high L and low L scorers. They indicated how much time they had spent in leisure situations over the past week; rank ordered their preferences for activities related to some of Murray's major needs and presses; rated their choice or avoidance of other abstractly described situations; and then stressful, anxiety-provoking, social situations. It was shown that both psychoticism and social desirability are related to situation selection in meaningful and predictable ways. The implications for personality assessment are considered.     

A comparison of operant licking and lever pressing in the rat

Two groups of rats were trained on a signaled, free-operant, avoidance procedure to lick or to lever press in order to avoid shock while water-deprived or satiated and, in the case of licking, while ingesting deionized water, isotonic saline, or 10% sucrose. The most effective avoidance licking occurred while the rats were water-deprived and ingesting 10% sucrose. Water deprivation level had no effect on lever pressing for shock avoidance. Two other groups of rats were operantly conditioned to lick or to lever press for food pellets while waterdeprived or satiated and, in the case of licking, while ingesting deionized water or 10% sucrose. The most effective licking for food reinforcement occurred while the rats were water-deprived and ingesting 10% sucrose. Water deprivation level had no effect on lever pressing for food reinforcement. The data indicated that effective operant licking must be supported by factors related to water regulation and taste palatability.     

Some attitudinal and cognitive consequences of thought

A “reinterpretation of inconsistent cognitions” explanation of the previous finding that thought about an object tends to polarize attitudes toward that object was tested. Under the assumption that ambiguity facilitates reinterpretation, ambiguity of inconsistent information and opportunity for thought were manipulated. Consistent with expectations, (a) thought resulted in attitude polarization and this effect was increased with ambiguity (p < .01) and (b) evaluation (interpretation) of the inconsistent information varied as a function of thought (p < .05) and ambiguity (p < .01).     

Attitude polarization as a function of thought and reality constraints

It was suggested that thought changes cognitions to be more consistent with one's initial attitude direction and, therefore, results in attitude polarization. Specifically, it was predicted that polarization would be highest under thought with reality constraints absent, followed by thought with reality constraints present, followed by distration. During the first period of each of two trials, some of the 144 subjects were distracted from thinking about a preselected painting, others thought about the painting while viewing it, and others thought about it in its absence. Subjects were redistributed across the same three conditions for a second period. They then indicated their feelings about the painting. In the original study as well as a partial replication, females behaved as predicted: Thought with reality constraints absent produced the most polarization, followed by thought with reality constraints present, followed by distraction. In both the original study and the replication there was no systematic trend for the males. The theoretical implications of the female results and the sex differences were discussed.