A central capacity limit to the simultaneous storage of visual and auditory arrays in working memory

If working memory is limited by central capacity (e.g., the focus of attention; N. Cowan, 2001), then storage limits for information in a single modality should apply also to the simultaneous storage of information from different modalities. The authors investigated this by combining a visual-array comparison task with a novel auditory-array comparison task in 5 experiments. Participants were to remember only the visual, only the auditory (unimodal memory conditions), or both arrays (bimodal memory conditions). Experiments 1 and 2 showed significant dual-task tradeoffs for visual but not for auditory capacity. In Experiments 3-5, the authors eliminated modality-specific memory by using postperceptual masks. Dual-task costs occurred for both modalities, and the number of auditory and visual items remembered together was no more than the higher of the unimodal capacities (visual: 3-4 items). The findings suggest a central capacity supplemented by modality- or code-specific storage and point to avenues for further research on the role of processing in central storage.     

Religious Fundamentalism and Gender Differences

The role of religious fundamentalism and its relationship to shame and guilt was evaluated in 107 students who attend a church-sponsored university. A number of personality measures were given and gender differences were analyzed. The role of externalization was similar for males in this sample to that of earlier studies. However, it was found that females showed positive correlations between externalization and both shame and guilt. For females, more fundamentalistic religious training may help to contribute to an external orientation at the expense of identifying with a personal religion, and appropriate guilt.     

Meaning and learning: Response to Moerk

In response to Moerk (1986, Developmental Review, 6, 365–385) the following points are discussed: (a) Semantic and conceptual development must be conceived in terms of systems that undergo developmental change, (b) Objects are viewed as embedded in events and as being conceptualized first within a syntagmatic and later a paradigmatic system, (c) While the nature of the input to the child is important, its effects cannot be considered independently of the state of the child's conceptual and linguistic system. (d) The neurological considerations discussed by Moerk are not relevant to the particular developmental issues discussed in my book.     

Effects of early institutionalization on the development of emotion processing: a case for relative sparing?

We tested the capacity to perceive visual expressions of emotion, and to use those expressions as guides to social decisions, in three groups of 8‐ to 10‐year‐old Romanian children: children abandoned to institutions then randomly assigned to remain in ‘care as usual’ (institutional care); children abandoned to institutions then randomly assigned to a foster care intervention; and community children who had never been institutionalized. Experiment 1 examined children's recognition of happy, sad, fearful, and angry facial expressions that varied in intensity. Children assigned to institutional care had higher thresholds for identifying happy expressions than foster care or community children, but did not differ in their thresholds for identifying the other facial expressions. Moreover, the error rates of the three groups of children were the same for all of the facial expressions. Experiment 2 examined children's ability to use facial expressions of emotion to guide social decisions about whom to befriend and whom to help. Children assigned to institutional care were less accurate than foster care or community children at deciding whom to befriend; however, the groups did not differ in their ability to decide whom to help. Overall, although there were group differences in some abilities, all three groups of children performed well across tasks. The results are discussed in the context of theoretical accounts of the development of emotion processing.     

On some worldly worries

Israel Scheffler and others have had trouble accepting such drastic theses in my work as that worlds, even old ones, are made by right versions, even new ones, and that two conflicting versions may both be right. But further explication shows how such theses have advantages over the more usual common-sense alternatives.Published by the author at Emerson Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02138, U.S.A., on 1 September 1988.NOTICE: This paper may be copied and circulated with due credit but without charge. (It was accepted by theJournal of Philosophy, but withdrawn by that journal on the eve of publication because of a dispute over rights.)     

Utilization of base-rate information during feeling-of-knowing judgments.

We examined whether subjects use base-rate information about item difficulty when making feeling-of-knowing judgments for items they failed to recall. First, the subjects attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions. Then, for those items they recalled incorrectly, half of the subjects received information about the normative probability of recall of each item while judging their feeling of knowing. The other subjects made their feeling-of-knowing judgments without receiving any base-rate information. Finally, all subjects had a forced-choice recognition test on those items to validate the accuracy of their feeling-of-knowing judgments. Relative to the no-base-rate information group, the base-rate group had lower feelings of knowing for normatively difficult items and higher feelings of knowing for normatively easier items. Subjects who had received base-rate information during the judgment state had greater feeling-of-knowing accuracy than subjects who did not receive base-rate information. However, even the predictions from subjects who received base-rate information were not significantly more accurate for predicting subsequent recognition than were the predictions derived from normative information alone.     

Importance of the kind of cue for judgments of learning (JOL) and the delayed-JOL effect

The delayed-JOL effect is the finding in which judgments of learning (JOLs) are more accurate at predicting eventual recall when they are made a short time after study rather than immediately after study. The present research replicated this effect and found that the kind of cue that is used for JOLs is critical. In particular, following the study of stimulus-response paired associates, there is an extremely robust delayed-JOL effect when the cue for JOLs is the stimulus alone (every one of 45 subjects showed the effect); however, there is little, if any, delayed-JOL effect when the cue for JOLs is the stimulus-response pair. This finding has important implications for education: To have the greatest accuracy at predicting eventual recall, a person should make JOLs not immediately after study but, instead, shortly after study (i.e., delayed JOLs) with the cue for JOLs being the stimulus alone. The theoretical mechanisms for the delayed-JOL effect are currently unknown, but some speculations are offered.     

The retrieval of controlled and automatic aspects of meaning on direct and indirect tests

The literature concerning implicit memory presents conflicting evidence on the importance of meaning in recovering recently studied words. When the same cues are used during testing, indirect instructions reduce levels of processing effects relative to those obtained with direct instructions, suggesting that meaning is not as likely to be retrieved on indirect tests. However, with certain cues, meaning set size of the studied words affects performance even under indirect instructions, suggesting that meaning is retrieved on such tests. The purpose of the present experiments was to resolve this apparent inconsistency. In Experiment 1, the effects of levels of processing and meaning set size were evaluated under direct and indirect test instructions, with the use of stem and word-fragment cues. In other experiments, beginning and ending stem cues were compared, and levels, set size, and instructional effects were evaluated using meaning cues. The findings indicated that levels effects were determined more by test instructions than by test cues, and that set size effects were determined more by test cues than by test instructions. Implications are discussed for transfer-appropriate processing viewpoints and for a model in which it is assumed that performance is determined by searching either explicit or implicit memories.