Autism: A Brief History

This paper discusses how the understanding of autism has changed in the 60 years since Leo Kanner first described the syndrome. Originally identified as an emotional disorder caused by parental ambivalence and rejection, autism today is universally seen as a neurohiological difficulty, whose cause is organic and related to atypical brain development. Evidence for the organic and genetic causes is presented, along with a discussion of how the understanding of autism has evolved during the past half century. The current understanding of autism as a developmental disorder has dramatically improved the quality of care and effectiveness of interventions for these youngsters and their families.     

Closure of autobiographical memories moderates their directive effect on behaviour

Specific autobiographical memories have been theorised to serve a directive function, whereby the content of the memory directs behaviour outside awareness. The present research tested whether the extent to which a memory feels low in closure, or psychologically not in the past, moderates this directive effect. A total of 163 participants in an online experiment were asked to recollect a specific autobiographical memory of a time they had failed to donate to charity, or were not asked to recollect a memory. Those who recollected a memory were randomly assigned to think of the memory as high versus low in closure. Recollecting an autobiographical memory made to feel low in closure led to more memory-relevant behaviour than either recollecting a memory made to feel high in closure, or no memory at all. Moreover, the directive effect of a low-closure memory occurred whether participants were made aware of an upcoming behavioural opportunity or not. Discussion centres on possible processes linking low closure and behaviour, as well as implications for the self-memory system theory of autobiographical memory.     

The roles of hopeful thinking in preventing problems and enhancing strengths

From its most famous tale, that of Pandora, hope was meant to prevent the emergence and reemergence of life difficulties. A new model defining hope as a combination of agentic pathways and goal-directed thinking is reviewed. Comparisons of the similarities of this theory to other existing theories are made. The beneficial roles of hope in primary (before the appearance of a problem) and secondary (after a problem has appeared) prevention are explored. Primary enhancement is introduced as involving those thoughts and actions that establish optimal functioning and satisfaction. Secondary enhancement is posited to describe those thoughts and actions that are undertaken over time so as to further functioning and satisfaction in order to reach peak levels. Using hope theory as a lens, these primary and secondary enhancement processes are described. The natural synergy between prevention and enhancement activities is discussed, along with the future priorities for using hope in prevention and enhancement efforts.     

Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions

Active inference provides a simple and neurobiologically plausible account of how action and perception are coupled in producing (Bayes) optimal behaviour. This can be seen most easily as minimising prediction error: we can either change our predictions to explain sensory input through perception. Alternatively, we can actively change sensory input to fulfil our predictions. In active inference, this action is mediated by classical reflex arcs that minimise proprioceptive prediction error created by descending proprioceptive predictions. However, this creates a conflict between action and perception; in that, self-generated movements require predictions to override the sensory evidence that one is not actually moving. However, ignoring sensory evidence means that externally generated sensations will not be perceived. Conversely, attending to (proprioceptive and somatosensory) sensations enables the detection of externally generated events but precludes generation of actions. This conflict can be resolved by attenuating the precision of sensory evidence during movement or, equivalently, attending away from the consequences of self-made acts. We propose that this Bayes optimal withdrawal of precise sensory evidence during movement is the cause of psychophysical sensory attenuation. Furthermore, it explains the force-matching illusion and reproduces empirical results almost exactly. Finally, if attenuation is removed, the force-matching illusion disappears and false (delusional) inferences about agency emerge. This is important, given the negative correlation between sensory attenuation and delusional beliefs in normal subjects—and the reduction in the magnitude of the illusion in schizophrenia. Active inference therefore links the neuromodulatory optimisation of precision to sensory attenuation and illusory phenomena during the attribution of agency in normal subjects. It also provides a functional account of deficits in syndromes characterised by false inference and impaired movement—like schizophrenia and Parkinsonism—syndromes that implicate abnormal modulatory neurotransmission.     

Does response variability predict distractibility among adults with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder?

Increased intraindividual variability in response time (RTSD) has been observed reliably in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and has often been used as a measure of inattention. RTSD is assumed to reflect attentional lapses and distractibility, though evidence for the validity of this connection is lacking. We assessed whether RTSD is an indicator of inattention by comparing RTSD on the stop-signal task (SST) with performance on the delayed oculomotor response (DOR) task, a measure of distractibility. Participants included 30 adults with ADHD and 28 controls. Participants completed the SST and the DOR task, which measured subjects' ability to maintain attention and avoid distraction by inhibiting reflexive saccades toward distractors. On the SST, the ADHD group was slower to inhibit than were controls, indicating poorer inhibitory control in ADHD. The ADHD group also displayed slower reaction times (RTs), greater RTSD, and more omission errors. On the DOR task, the ADHD group displayed more premature saccades (i.e., greater distractibility) than did controls. Greater variability in RT was associated with increased distraction on the DOR task, but only in ADHD participants. Results suggest that RTSD is linked to distractibility among adults with ADHD and support the use of RTSD as a valid measure of inattention in ADHD.     

Husker du?

Sven Bernecker develops a theory of propositional memory that is at odds with the received epistemic theory of memory. On Bernecker’s account the belief that is remembered must be true, but it need not constitute knowledge, nor even have been true at the time it was acquired. I examine his reasons for thinking the epistemic theory of memory is false and mount a defense of the epistemic theory.     

Julian of Norwich: Problems of Evil and the Seriousness of Sin

Julian of Norwich emphasizes God’s eternal and unchanging love for humankind. Her visions show how God is not angry with our sins and so has no need to forgive us. God does not shame or blame us but excuses us and plans how to reward and compensate us for sin. In relation to Mother Jesus, we remain dear lovely children who need help, correction, and education. Although these remarks suggest to some that Julian must be “soft” on sin, that she has no adequate appreciation of the worthiness of God or the dignity of human nature, I argue that this is far from the case. On the contrary, she makes Divine worthiness axiomatic and urges readers to live into it. She relocates human dignity not in its intrinsic value but in our centrality to God’s plan. She measures the seriousness of sin in terms of the “real hard work” it takes to rear us up out of it: crucifixion for Christ, the hell of being a sinner and the crucifixion of life-long penance for us. Nevertheless, the brightness of her visions dominates with her assurance that despite the sin-produced sufferings of this present life, all will be well.     

Moral Mistakes

Is it possible to show that a moral claim is mistaken without taking a moral stand with regard to it? A striking number of contemporary metaethicists suppose that it is. In this paper, I argue against a prominent line of support for this supposition. My goal is to cast suspicion on a general tendency to think that the epistemic standing of moral claims is something that can be assessed from outside the practices of making and critically evaluating moral judgements. I do this by focusing on a widely accepted criterion of competence with regard to the use of moral concepts, the moral supervenience criterion (MSC). This criterion holds that someone who judges two acts or events to be morally different without thinking that he has to identify some non‐particular non‐moral difference between them simply doesn't understand what it is to make a moral judgement. I focus on a paradigmatic example of the sort of mistake in moral judgement that is supposed to support the MSC and argue that it provides no support whatsoever. I then offer my own alternative explanation of this sort of mistake in moral judgement. I conclude with a discussion of why advocates of the MSC are inclined to suppose that it is possible to assess the epistemic standing of a moral claim without oneself taking a moral stand with regard to it.     

Differentially tuned responses to restricted versus prolonged awareness of threat: a preliminary fMRI investigation

Responses to threat occur via two known independent processing routes. We propose that early, reflexive processing is predominantly tuned to the detection of congruent combinations of facial cues that signal threat, whereas later, reflective processing is predominantly tuned to incongruent combinations of threat. To test this prediction, we examined responses to threat-gaze expression pairs (anger versus fear expression by direct versus averted gaze). We report on two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, one employing prolonged presentations (2 s) of threat-gaze pairs to allow for reflective processing (Study 1), and one employing severely restricted (33 ms), backward masked presentations of threat-gaze pairs to isolate reflexive neural responding (Study 2). Our findings offer initial support for the conclusion that early, reflexive responses to threat are predominantly tuned to congruent threat-gaze pairings, whereas later reflective responses are predominantly tuned to ambiguous threat-gaze pairings. These findings highlight a distinct dual function in threat perception.     

Different components of working memory have different relationships with different mathematical skills

A comprehensive working memory battery and tests of mathematical skills were administered to 90 children-41 in Year 1 (5-6 years of age) and 49 in Year 3 (7-8 years of age). Working memory could explain statistically significant variance in number writing, magnitude judgment, and single-digit arithmetic, but the different components of working memory had different relationships with the different skills. Visual-spatial sketchpad (VSSP) functioning predicted unique variance in magnitude judgments and number writing. Central executive functioning explained unique variance in the addition accuracy of Year 1 children. The unique variance explained in Year 3 multiplication explained by phonological loop functioning just missed conventional levels of significance (p=.06). The results are consistent with the VSSP having a role in the development of number writing and magnitude judgments but a lesser role in early arithmetic.