Uncivil Disobedience: Political Commitment and Violence

Standard accounts of civil disobedience include nonviolence as a necessary condition. Here I argue that such accounts are mistaken and that civil disobedience can include violence in many aspects, primarily excepting violence directed at other persons. I base this argument on a novel understanding of civil disobedience: the special character of the practice comes from its combination of condemnation of a political practice with an expressed commitment to the political. The commitment to the political is a commitment to engaging with others as co-members in the on-going political project of living together. I show how such an understanding of civil disobedience is superior to the Rawlsian strain of thought, which focuses on fidelity to law. Rawls was concerned with civil disobedience solely in the context of overriding political obligation. The project of characterizing a contestatory political practice that can be distinguished and used in a wider variety of contexts than Rawls is concerned with, including under illegitimate regimes, beyond the nation-state, or on behalf of anarchism, requires a different understanding of civil disobedience.     

Conceptions of love in Ghana: An exploration among Ghanaian Christians

We explored conceptions of love from the perspective of Ghanaian Christians. Using an ethnographic approach, we interviewed 61 participants (males = 39; females = 22; age range 20 to 70) on their understanding and experiences of love in the context of family. Thematic analysis of the interview data revealed understandings of love expression in meeting material needs (of children, spouse, parents, and close relatives), helping other people in need (including the elderly, friends, and strangers), and affectionate care. Communal and maintenance-oriented love appears to characterise love expression among Ghanaian Christians.     

The role of the clinical ethics consultant in "unsettled" cases

In this article I take up a central question posed by the article jointly authored with Bill Winslade in this issue of JCE: What should be the role of clinical ethics consultants (CECs) in (what we call) an unsettled case: that is, a situation in which the range of allowable choices, among which the parties to a bioethical disagreement must select, cannot be clearly or completely specified? I argue here that CECs should, in such cases, guide the parties by presenting their own reasoned conclusions about what the scope of allowable choices should be taken to include. Since this position challenges the received view that CECs must not express their own moral positions or conclusions in their role as ethicists, I try to defend my view of the CEC's role in unsettled cases against several objections.     

Looking the other way: The role of gaze direction in the cross-race memory effect

One of the most replicable findings reported in the social psychological literature is the cross-race memory effect. We argue this effect derives from higher-order interactions among social cues that determine the perceived relevance of a face to an observer. The current research tested this hypothesis by examining the combined influences of eye gaze direction and race on face memory. The physical subtlety of eye gaze belies its powerful influence on social perception, and in this case helps specify the relevance of same- versus other-race faces. We found that only in faces making direct eye contact—not those displaying averted eye gaze—was the cross-race memory effect evident. Likewise, only in same-race faces did direct relative to averted-gaze enhance face memory. These findings have implications for our general understanding of the combinatorial nature of social perception and help clarify the underlying cause of the cross-race memory effect.     

Forgetting and the mirror effect in recognition memory: concentering of underlying distributions

The mirror effect is a strong regularity in recognition memory: If there are two conditions, A and B, with A giving higher recognition accuracy, then old items in A are recognized as old better than old items in B, and also new items in A are recognized as new better than new items in B. The mirror effect is explained by attention/likelihood theory, which also makes several new, counterintuitive predictions. One is that any variable, such as forgetting, that affects recognition changes the responses to new as well as old stimuli. In terms of underlying distributions, forgetting produces concentering, the bilateral movement of distributions, both new (noise) and old (signal), toward a midpoint. Data from two forced-choice experiments are reported that support the prediction of concentering and other predictions drawn from the theory. It is argued that current theories of memory, which are strength theories, cannot handle these regularities.     

The Wax and the Mechanical Mind: Reexamining Hobbes's Objections to Descartes's Meditations

Many critics, Descartes himself included, have seen Hobbes as uncharitable or even incoherent in his Objections to the Meditations on First Philosophy. I argue that when understood within the wider context of his views of the late 1630s and early 1640s, Hobbes's Objections are coherent and reflect his goal of providing an epistemology consistent with a mechanical philosophy. I demonstrate the importance of this epistemology for understanding his Fourth Objection concerning the nature of the wax and contend that Hobbes's brief claims in that Objection are best understood as a summary of the mechanism for scientific knowledge found in his broader work. Far from displaying his confusion, Hobbes's Fourth Objection in fact pinpoints a key weakness of Descartes's faculty psychology: its unintelligibility within a mechanical philosophy.