Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value

A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945, 1949 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Brogaard 2008, 2009 Brogaard, Berit 2009. What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78/2: 439–67.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011 Brogaard, Berit 2011. Knowledge-How: A Unified Account, in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, ed. John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, New York: Oxford University Press: 136–60. [Google Scholar]; Stanley 2011a Stanley, Jason 2011a. Knowing (How), Noûs 45/2: 207–38.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011b Stanley, Jason 2011b. Know How, Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.     

The role of the accessory and main olfactory systems in maternal behavior of the primiparous rat

The objective of this study was to analyze the respective roles of the main and accessory olfactory systems in the development of maternal behavior in the primiparous Wistar rat. Females underwent one of the following treatments: vomeronasal nerve section (VN), irrigation of nasal cavities with 5% ZnSO4 solution (ZN), surgical control, saline irrigation control, and normal control. Surgical or first irrigation were done before mating occurred. Irrigations were done every 7 days thereafter. The dams and their litters were observed from the day the litter was born (Day 1) through Day 16. Pup weights and temperatures were recorded daily. Home cages were checked daily for changes in nest location and number of times pups were found out of the nest. Retrieving tests were conducted on Days 4, 7, 10, and 13. The following behavioral items were observed: number of pup retrievals , number of times mother nosed or licked pups, percentage of litter returned to nest by end of test, dam self-grooming, dam climbing or rising, and dam digging or burrowing in shavings. The VN dams and their litters were not significantly different from the control dams and their litters on any of the measures taken. The ZN dams and their litters were not significantly different from their controls on all measures except for pup body temperature which was slightly lower from Day 13 through day 16 and pup body weight which was slightly lower from Day 12 through Day 16. Since these differences are very small, they do not seem to indicate a serious deficiency in maternal behavior. The results indicate that adequate maternal behavior develops with either of the two systems intact.     

(ANTI)‐Anti‐Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis

Anti‐intellectualists about knowledge‐how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudpaes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti‐intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge‐how to φ. John Bengson and Marc Moffett and Carlotta Pavese have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for different reasons, that anti‐intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument‐by‐counterexample to the anti‐intellectualist's sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti‐intellectualism remains unscathed.     

Development of a Communication Aid to Facilitate Risk Communication in Consultations with Unaffected Women from High Risk Breast Cancer Families: A Pilot Study

The literature on risk perception in women from high-risk breast cancer families reveals persistent over-estimation of risk, even after counseling. In this study, a communication aid was designed to facilitate discussion of risk between clinical geneticists and genetic counselors and women from this high-risk population. Method: Stage 1. The aid was developed by an expert panel of clinical geneticists, genetic counselors, psychologists, an epidemiologist, an oncologist, linguists and a consumer. It was guided by the international literature on risk communication and a large multi-centre Australian study of risk communication. The 13 page full-color communication aid used varying formats of words, numbers, graphs and pie-charts to address (a) the woman’s subjective risk; (b) the population risk of breast cancer; c) the risk of inherited breast cancer; (d) the cumulative risk for women with BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations; (e) family risk factors; (f) the woman’s suitability for genetic testing; (h) screening and management recommendations, and (i) a re-assessment of the woman’s subjective risk. Stage 2: A before–after pilot study of 38 women who were unaffected with breast cancer and were attending four Australian familial cancer clinics was undertaken. Baseline and follow-up questionnaires were completed by 27 women. Outcomes were compared to those observed in 107 similar women undergoing genetic counseling without the communication aid in 2001. Results: The risk communication aid appears to be beneficial; breast cancer genetics knowledge improved in some areas and importantly, risk perceptions improved in the cohort receiving the communication aid. Psychological measures showed no difference in anxiety or depression between the group receiving the communication aid and the comparison cohort. Women and clinicians were very positive about the usefulness of the communication aid as an adjunct to the genetic counseling consultation.     

Redundancy gain with static versus moving hands: a test of the hemispheric coactivation model

A simple reaction time (RT) experiment was conducted to test the hypothesis that redundancy gain arises partly because of hemispheric coactivation. Stimuli were presented to the left or right of fixation, or redundantly to both, and the participants had to make keypress responses as rapidly as possible to stimulus onset. A "static" condition, in which the participants held their hands at rest, was compared with a "dynamic" condition, in which they moved their hands back and forth in an oscillating motion prior to stimulus onset. As predicted from the hypothesis of hemispheric coactivation, redundancy gain, measured as the decrease in mean RT to redundant stimuli as compared with single stimuli, was smaller in the dynamic condition than in the static one.     

Acting intentionally and the side-effect effect

The concept of acting intentionally is an important nexus where theory of mind and moral judgment meet. Preschool children's judgments of intentional action show a valence-driven asymmetry. Children say that a foreseen but disavowed side effect is brought about "on purpose" when the side effect itself is morally bad, but not when it is morally good. This is the first demonstration in preschoolers that moral judgment influences judgments of whether something was done on purpose (as opposed to judgments of purpose influencing moral judgment). Judgments of intentionality are usually assumed to be purely factual. That these judgments are sometimes partly normative-even in preschoolers-challenges current understanding. Young children's judgments regarding foreseen side effects depend on whether the children process the idea that the character does not care about the side effect. As soon as preschoolers effectively process the theory-of-mind concept "not care that P," children show the side-effect effect.