Solidarity and Social Moral Rules

The value of solidarity, which is exemplified in noble groups like the Civil Rights Movement along with more mundane teams, families and marriages, is distinctive in part because people are in solidarity over, for or with regard to something, such as common sympathies, interests, values, etc. I use this special feature of solidarity to resolve a longstanding puzzle about enacted social moral rules, which is, aren’t these things just heuristics, rules of thumb or means of coordination that we ‘fetishize’ or ‘worship’ if we stubbornly insist on sticking to them when we can do more good by breaking them? I argue that when we are in a certain kind of solidarity with others, united by social moral rules that we have established among ourselves, the rules we have developed and maintain are a constitutive part of our solidary relationships with one another; and it is part of being in this sort of solidarity with our comrades that we are presumptively required to follow the social moral rules that join us together. Those in the Polish Revolution, for example, were bound by informally enforced rules about publicity, free speech and the use of violence, so following their own rules became a way of standing in a valuable sort of solidarity with one another. I explain why we can have non-instrumental reasons to follow the social moral rules that exist in our own society, improve our rules and even sometimes to break the otherwise good rules that help to unite us.     

Local and global effects of motivation on cognitive control

Motivation has been found to enhance cognitive control, but the mechanisms by which this occurs are still poorly understood. Cued motivational incentives (e.g., monetary rewards) can modulate cognitive processing locally??that is, on a trial-by-trial basis (incentive cue effect). Recently, motivational incentives have also been found to produce more global and tonic changes in performance, as evidenced by performance benefits on nonincentive trials occurring within incentive blocks (incentive context effect). In two experiments involving incentivized cued task switching, we provide systematic evidence that the two effects are dissociable. Through behavioral, diffusion-modeling, and individual-differences analyses, we found dissociations between local and global motivational effects that were linked to specific properties of the incentive signals (i.e., timing), while also ruling out alternative interpretations (e.g., practice and speed??accuracy trade-off effects). These results provide important clues regarding the neural mechanisms by which motivation exerts both global and local influences on cognitive control.     

Making Sense of Animal Disenhancement

In this paper I look at moral debates about animal disenhancement. In particular, I propose that given the particular social institutions in which such disenhancement will operate, we ought to reject animal disenhancement. I do this by introducing the issue of animal disenhancement and presenting arguments in support of it, and showing that while these arguments are strong, they are unconvincing when we look at the full picture. Viewing animal disenhancement in a context such as high intensity food production, we see that the arguments in support of it fall short of other ethical considerations, leading me to conclude that the moral and pragmatic reasons weigh against animal disenhancement.     

Response to an intervening event reverses nonspatial repetition effects in 2AFC tasks: Nonspatial IOR?

The repetition effect in two-alternatiave forced choice (2AFC) tasks is a cornerstone effect in human cognition. Yet the experiments described here show that the customary benefit of repetition reverses to a cost of repetition when participants respond to an irrelevant event between targets. In Experiments 1A-1C, participants made manual 2AFC decisions to both of two consecutive targets on a trial and, on some trials, also made a manual response to an intervening event that appeared between the two targets. A repetition benefit was observed when no intervening event appeared, whereas a repetition cost was observed when a response was required to an intervening event. Experiment 2 ruled out a solely strategic interpretation of the repetition cost effect observed on intervening event trials. In Experiments 3A and 3B, an intervening event that required a simple vocal "go" response also produced a repetition cost. In Experiment 4, a repetition cost was observed when the intervening event was changed to a tone presented aurally. In Experiment 5, the repetition benefit was observed when a response was withheld to an intervening event. A dual-process interpretation of these results is discussed, with one process related to episodic integration, and the other related to processes that produce inhibition of return.     

EMPIRICISM FOR CYBORGS

One important debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists concerns whether we observe things using instruments. This paper offers a new perspective on the debate over instruments by looking to recent discussion in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Realists often speak of instruments as ‘extensions’ to our senses. I ask whether the realist may strengthen her view by drawing on the extended mind thesis. Proponents of the extended mind thesis claim that cognitive processes can sometimes extend beyond our brains and bodies into the environment. I suggest that the extended mind thesis offers a way to make sense of realists’ talk of instruments as extensions to the senses and that it provides the realist with a new argument against the constructive empiricist view of instruments.     

Do Measures of Executive Functioning and Manipulation of Ego Depletion Predict How University Students Discount Probabilistic Gains and Losses?

Discounting occurs when the subjective value of an outcome is altered because the outcome is delayed or uncertain. Previous research has suggested that how individuals discount delayed gains is related to executive functioning. The present study attempted to extend this relationship to discounting of probabilistic gains and losses, and to examine whether diminishing cognitive resources would impact how participants discounted monetary outcomes. In Experiment 1, university students completed an executive function measure and then a probability-discounting task that involved the hypothetical sum of either $1,000 or $100,000 framed as either a gain or a loss. The executive function of organization was a significant predictor of how participants discounted all four outcomes while motivational drive predicted discounting of losses, but not gains. In Experiment 2, participants completed the same measures with the addition of an ego-depletion task to deplete cognitive resources before making discounting decisions. The executive function of motivational drive and empathy were significant predictors of how participants discounted both loss outcomes. The results suggest that discounting of monetary outcomes is related to the executive function of organization for gains and motivational drive, and empathy for losses. They also support the notion that the discounting of gains may be a distinct process from the discounting of losses.     

Consequences of anticipatory processing on cognitive symptoms of social anxiety

Anticipatory processing is an anxious style of repetitive negative thought associated with social anxiety (SA) that was proposed by Clark and Wells. Considerable research has examined factors of Clark and Wells' cognitive model of SA (e.g. attention, interpretation), but few studies have examined anticipatory processing, which is hypothesized to interact with other components in the model. In the current study, individuals high in social anxiety symptoms (HSA; N = 56) and control participants [Normal Control (NC); N = 52] engaged in an anticipation or distraction task prior to a threatened social interaction. HSAs who anticipated had higher self-focused attention than NCs who anticipated and HSAs in the distraction condition, suggesting an important relationship between anticipation and self-focus that is specific to HSAs. Those who anticipated endorsed more negative interpretations than those who engaged in distraction, regardless of SA status. However, this relationship was mediated by self-focus. Implications in the context of Clark and Wells' model and future directions are discussed.     

Unique contributions of religious and science beliefs on meaning systems in a nationally representative American sample

Individuals often hold beliefs in religion and in science, but how they mutually function is not well-understood. We examined these conjoint influences by examining their relative contributions to individuals' global meaning systems. We also examined whether subgroups of participants could be identified in terms of relative influence of religious or science beliefs on their meaning systems. A nationally representative sample of 300 American adults completed online surveys. Results suggested that science beliefs and religion beliefs comprise separate but only modestly negatively correlated dimensions. Both contributed similarly to the explanation of world assumptions, but only religious beliefs generally predicted goals, values and sense of meaning in life. Latent profile analysis produced a three-profile solution: one profile of moderate science and religious beliefs represented half the sample while the remainder split evenly between predominantly religious and predominantly science beliefs. In general, across most aspects of global meaning, the religious beliefs group was higher than the science beliefs and moderate beliefs in both groups. Results of this first systematic investigation of the separate effects of beliefs in religion and in science on meaning systems suggest that the balance of these beliefs is a potentially important individual difference warranting further investigation and elaboration.