Student Voice for School‐Climate Improvement: A Case Study of an Urban Middle School

This case study used a student voice program in an urban middle school in the southeastern United States to examine the validity of three theoretically derived pathways through which student voice may affect positive school climate. First, using a youth participatory action research process to identify barriers to learning, analyse their root causes, and advocate for solutions to school administration allowed students to influence minor school policies and implement anti‐bullying, classroom‐behaviour‐monitoring, and experiential‐learning initiatives. However, there were challenges to making these policy and practice changes systemic. Second, relationships were formed and strengthened as a byproduct of student participant and staff collaboration in program activities. However, the program may have contributed to an ingroup–outgroup dynamic between participants and other peers. Third, students who participated in the program developed citizenship competencies, and their development may have promoted broader prosocial norms among the student body, though evidence was inconsistent. Study findings suggest that future research examine how variations in the implementation of student voice initiatives can maximize the contribution to a positive school climate in urban schools. Findings also suggest that practitioners should ensure that student teams be representative of a multitude of student identities. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value

A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945, 1949 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Brogaard 2008, 2009 Brogaard, Berit 2009. What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78/2: 439–67.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011 Brogaard, Berit 2011. Knowledge-How: A Unified Account, in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, ed. John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, New York: Oxford University Press: 136–60. [Google Scholar]; Stanley 2011a Stanley, Jason 2011a. Knowing (How), Noûs 45/2: 207–38.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011b Stanley, Jason 2011b. Know How, Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.     

Redundancy gain with static versus moving hands: a test of the hemispheric coactivation model

A simple reaction time (RT) experiment was conducted to test the hypothesis that redundancy gain arises partly because of hemispheric coactivation. Stimuli were presented to the left or right of fixation, or redundantly to both, and the participants had to make keypress responses as rapidly as possible to stimulus onset. A "static" condition, in which the participants held their hands at rest, was compared with a "dynamic" condition, in which they moved their hands back and forth in an oscillating motion prior to stimulus onset. As predicted from the hypothesis of hemispheric coactivation, redundancy gain, measured as the decrease in mean RT to redundant stimuli as compared with single stimuli, was smaller in the dynamic condition than in the static one.     

Acting intentionally and the side-effect effect

The concept of acting intentionally is an important nexus where theory of mind and moral judgment meet. Preschool children's judgments of intentional action show a valence-driven asymmetry. Children say that a foreseen but disavowed side effect is brought about "on purpose" when the side effect itself is morally bad, but not when it is morally good. This is the first demonstration in preschoolers that moral judgment influences judgments of whether something was done on purpose (as opposed to judgments of purpose influencing moral judgment). Judgments of intentionality are usually assumed to be purely factual. That these judgments are sometimes partly normative-even in preschoolers-challenges current understanding. Young children's judgments regarding foreseen side effects depend on whether the children process the idea that the character does not care about the side effect. As soon as preschoolers effectively process the theory-of-mind concept "not care that P," children show the side-effect effect.