Extending Color Psychology to the Personality Realm: Interpersonal Hostility Varies by Red Preferences and Perceptual Biases

The color psychology literature has made a convincing case that color is not just about aesthetics, but also about meaning. This work has involved situational manipulations of color, rendering it uncertain as to whether color‐meaning associations can be used to characterize how people differ from each other. The present research focuses on the idea that the color red is linked to, or associated with, individual differences in interpersonal hostility. Across four studies (N = 376 undergraduates), red preferences and perceptual biases were measured along with individual differences in interpersonal hostility. It was found that (a) a preference for the color red was higher as interpersonal hostility increased, (b) hostile people were biased to see the color red more frequently than nonhostile people, and (c) there was a relationship between a preference for the color red and hostile social decision making. These studies represent an important extension of the color psychology literature, highlighting the need to attend to person‐based, as well as situation‐based, factors.     

Judging the Goring Ox: Retribution Directed Toward Animals

Prior research on the psychology of retribution is complicated by the difficulty of separating retributive and general deterrence motives when studying human offenders (Study 1). We isolate retribution by investigating judgments about punishing animals, which allows us to remove general deterrence from consideration. Studies 2 and 3 document a “victim identity” effect, such that the greater the perceived loss from a violent animal attack, the greater the belief that the culprit deserves to be killed. Study 3 documents a “targeted punishment” effect, such that the responsive killing of the actual “guilty” culprit is seen as more deserved than the killing of an almost identical yet “innocent” animal from the same species. Studies 4 and 5 extend both effects to participants' acceptance of inflicting pain and suffering on the offending animal at the time of its death, and show that both effects are mediated by measures of retributive sentiment, and not by consequentialist concerns.     

Student Voice for School‐Climate Improvement: A Case Study of an Urban Middle School

This case study used a student voice program in an urban middle school in the southeastern United States to examine the validity of three theoretically derived pathways through which student voice may affect positive school climate. First, using a youth participatory action research process to identify barriers to learning, analyse their root causes, and advocate for solutions to school administration allowed students to influence minor school policies and implement anti‐bullying, classroom‐behaviour‐monitoring, and experiential‐learning initiatives. However, there were challenges to making these policy and practice changes systemic. Second, relationships were formed and strengthened as a byproduct of student participant and staff collaboration in program activities. However, the program may have contributed to an ingroup–outgroup dynamic between participants and other peers. Third, students who participated in the program developed citizenship competencies, and their development may have promoted broader prosocial norms among the student body, though evidence was inconsistent. Study findings suggest that future research examine how variations in the implementation of student voice initiatives can maximize the contribution to a positive school climate in urban schools. Findings also suggest that practitioners should ensure that student teams be representative of a multitude of student identities. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Meta‐Ethical Realism with Good of a Kind

There is a difference between an object's being good simpliciter and an object's being good of its kind, and the vast majority of philosophers have supposed that it is the former variety of goodness that is relevant to ethics. I argue that one may be a meta‐ethical realist while employing the notion of good of a kind to the exclusion of good simpliciter; I call such a view kindism. I distinguish between two varieties of kindism, explicate the details of one of those varieties, and defend (that variety of) kindism against possible objections.