Benefits,Entitlements and Non‐Responsible Threats

This article offers an explanation for the proposed moral asymmetry between non‐responsible threats and innocent bystanders. Some argue that a non‐responsible threat – a person who threatens another through no fault or choice – is required to bear a greater burden to avert the threat than a bystander. I argue that previous attempts to explain this asymmetry are either incorrect or incomplete, since they either implausibly suggest that agents who do not benefit from their bodily resources, or whose bodily resources primarily benefit third parties, are liable to greater costs than a bystander, or fail to accommodate such cases. Instead, the asymmetry (when it exists) is explained either by virtue of the fact that the non‐responsible threat has a beneficiary status with respect to the threatening object, or possesses distribution‐limiting entitlements over the threatening object.     

The Embodied God: Core Intuitions About Person Physicality Coexist and Interfere With Acquired Christian Beliefs About God,the Holy Spirit,and Jesus

Why are disembodied extraordinary beings like gods and spirits prevalent in past and present theologies? Under the intuitive Cartesian dualism hypothesis, this is because it is natural to conceptualize of minds as separate from bodies; under the counterintuitiveness hypothesis, this is because beliefs in minds without bodies are unnatural—such beliefs violate core knowledge intuitions about person physicality and consequently have a social transmission advantage. We report on a critical test of these contrasting hypotheses. Prior research found that among adult Christian religious adherents, intuitions about person psychology coexist and interfere with theological conceptualizations of God (e.g., infallibility). Here, we use a sentence verification paradigm where participants are asked to evaluate as true or false statements on which core knowledge intuitions about person physicality and psychology and Christian theology about God are inconsistent (true on one and false on the other) versus consistent (both true or both false). We find, as predicted by the counterintuitiveness hypothesis but not the Cartesian dualism hypothesis, that Christian religious adherents show worse performance (lower accuracy and slower response time) on statements where Christian theological doctrines about God's physicality (e.g., incorporeality, omnipresence) conflict with intuitions about person physicality. We find these effects for other extraordinary beings in Christianity—the Holy Spirit and Jesus—but not for an ordinary being (priest). We conclude that it is unintuitive to conceptualize extraordinary beings as disembodied, and that this, rather than inherent Cartesian dualism, may explain the prevalence of beliefs in such beings.     

Change blindness in driving scenes

One of the key perceptual errors that contributes to accidents on the road is ‘looking but failing to see’. Though this has previously been attributed to failures of attention or time gaps, the recent change blindness literature suggests another alternative. Researchers have proposed that we have a poor memory for the visual world, and as such, participants find it very hard to notice a change between two successive pictures providing the transients that normally catch attention are masked. Such masking can occur naturally due to blinks and saccadic suppression. It is suggested that these effects may contribute to accident liability. An experiment was undertaken to test the application of the change blindness paradigm to the driving domain. It was predicted that experienced drivers may have greater visual persistence for changed targets in a road scene provided they are relevant to a driver’s parsing of the road (i.e. if the targets are potential hazards such as pedestrians, rather than changes in background scenery). The experiment required drivers and non-drivers to view a complex driving-related visual scene that was constantly interrupted by a flash once per second. During the flashes one item in the scene was changed. This target was manipulated according to location and semantic relevance. Results showed an interaction between central and peripheral items with semantic relevance. Participants found it hard to detect central items that were inconsequential, relative to other classifications of targets. No effect of experience was noted. The results are discussed in relation to the general theoretical literature and their potential applications to the driving domain.