It's a great big universe: Astrobiology and future trends for an astrotheology

Despite the awe and wonder that discoveries related to astrobiology inspire, the sheer volume and diversity of new discoveries related to space science can become overwhelming without meaningful frames of reference by which to organize our understanding of these phenomena. I suggest that a critical feature of the future of “astrotheology” relates to how it serves as an organizing correlate to astrobiology and space research. Considering that the prefix astro‐ has an amplicative and abductive effect on the fields of study to which it is applied, I contend that astrotheology implies a creative and constructive shift in how we conceptualize meaningful human being for theology that parallels how astrobiology effects a creative and constructive shift in how we conceptualize living systems.     

Threat ≠ prevention,challenge ≠ promotion: The impact of threat,challenge and regulatory focus on attention to negative stimuli

The purpose of the current experiment was to distinguish between the impact of strategic and affective forms of gain- and loss-related motivational states on the attention to negative stimuli. On the basis of the counter-regulation principle and regulatory focus theory, we predicted that individuals would attend more to negative than to neutral stimuli in a prevention focus and when experiencing challenge, but not in a promotion focus and under threat. In one experiment (N = 88) promotion, prevention, threat, or challenge states were activated through a memory task, and a subsequent dot probe task was administered. As predicted, those in the prevention focus and challenge conditions had an attentional bias towards negative words, but those in promotion and threat conditions did not. These findings provide support for the idea that strategic mindsets (e.g., regulatory focus) and hot emotional states (e.g., threat vs. challenge) differently affect the processing of affective stimuli.     

Counting to ten milliseconds: low-anger, but not high-anger, individuals pause following negative evaluations

Low-anger individuals are less reactive, both emotionally and behaviourally, to a large variety of situational primes to anger and aggression. Why this is so, from an affective processing perspective, has been largely conjectural. Four studies (total N=270) sought to link individual differences in anger to tendencies exhibited in basic affective processing tasks. On the basis of motivational factors and considerations, it was hypothesised that negative evaluations would differentially activate a psychological alarm system at low levels of anger, resulting in a pause that should be evident in the speed of making subsequent evaluations. Just such a pattern was evident in all studies. By contrast, high-anger individuals did not pause following their negative evaluations. In relation to this affective processing tendency, at least, dramatically different effects were observed among low- versus high-anger individuals. Implications for the personality-processing literature, theories of trait anger, and fast-acting regulatory processes are discussed.     

Two facets of cognitive control in analogical mapping: The role of semantic interference resolution andgoal-driven structure selection

The study used scene analogies to investigate two component processes of analogical thinking: resolution of semantic interference, which emerges when the proper mapping between analogically matching objects is incoherent with their categorical features (e.g., stereotypical functions), and goal-driven selection of the key relational structure, by directing attention to the most promising objects which constitute that structure among many other candidate objects. We manipulated interference by placing in corresponding scenes the objects from one category in different relational roles. Selection was loaded by including additional, relationally irrelevant objects in a scene. We also manipulated relational complexity and the presence of salient objects (people) in relations. Increased load on both interference resolution and selection decreased the accuracy of analogical mapping, but these factors did not interact. Moreover, the factors yielded opposite patterns of interaction with relational complexity. Finally, salience eased selection, but tended to negatively influence interference resolution. In summary, inference resolution and selection seem to constitute two relatively independent facets of cognitive control involved in analogical thinking. Selection may act before mapping occurs, while interference influences analogy making only if an interfering object takes part in mapping.     

Anxiety,anticipation and contextual information: A test of attentional control theory

We tested the assumptions of Attentional Control Theory (ACT) by examining the impact of anxiety on anticipation using a dynamic, time-constrained task. Moreover, we examined the involvement of high- and low-level cognitive processes in anticipation and how their importance may interact with anxiety. Skilled and less-skilled tennis players anticipated the shots of opponents under low- and high-anxiety conditions. Participants viewed three types of video stimuli, each depicting different levels of contextual information. Performance effectiveness (response accuracy) and processing efficiency (response accuracy divided by corresponding mental effort) were measured. Skilled players recorded higher levels of response accuracy and processing efficiency compared to less-skilled counterparts. Processing efficiency significantly decreased under high- compared to low-anxiety conditions. No difference in response accuracy was observed. When reviewing directional errors, anxiety was most detrimental to performance in the condition conveying only contextual information, suggesting that anxiety may have a greater impact on high-level (top-down) cognitive processes, potentially due to a shift in attentional control. Our findings provide partial support for ACT; anxiety elicited greater decrements in processing efficiency than performance effectiveness, possibly due to predominance of the stimulus-driven attentional system.     

The use of a distractor-assigned response slows later responding in a location negative priming task

Responding to a target's location takes longer when that location has recently contained a distractor event (ignored-repetition [IR] trial) relative to when it has been unoccupied (control trial). This is known as the location negative priming (NP) effect. We aimed to determine whether the elevated reaction time observed for IR trials was due to the reuse of a distractor location (location locus) and/or to the need to execute a (just inhibited) distractor response (response locus). We isolated these loci latency effects by using many-to-one and one-to-many location-response assignments. Our results showed that reusing a distractor location hastened target processing at that position (facilitative location locus), whereas the production of a distractor response was associated with a time cost (interfering response locus). Accordingly, part of the latency elevation seen with IR trials results from the need on these occasions to execute ajust inhibited (distractor) response, and, hence, the location NP effect has a response locus.     

The Nonworseness Claim and the Moral Permissibility of Better-Than-Permissible Acts

Grounded in what Alan Wertheimer terms the “nonworseness claim,” it is thought by some philosophers that what will be referred to herein as “better-than-permissible acts”—acts that, if undertaken, would make another or others better off than they would be were an alternative but morally permissible act to be undertaken—are necessarily morally permissible. What, other than a bout of irrationality, it may be thought, would lead one to hold that an act (such as outsourcing production to a “sweatshop” in a developing country) that produces more benefits for others than an act that is itself morally permissible (such as not doing business in the developing country at all) with respect to those same others, is not morally permissible? In this article, I argue that each of the two groups of philosophers that are most likely to accept the nonworseness claim—consequentialists and non-consequentialists—have reason to reject it, and thereby also have reason to reject the belief that better-than-permissible acts are necessarily morally permissible.     

Neural circuitry and plasticity mechanisms underlying delay eyeblink conditioning

Pavlovian eyeblink conditioning has been used extensively as a model system for examining the neural mechanisms underlying associative learning. Delay eyeblink conditioning depends on the intermediate cerebellum ipsilateral to the conditioned eye. Evidence favors a two-site plasticity model within the cerebellum with long-term depression of parallel fiber synapses on Purkinje cells and long-term potentiation of mossy fiber synapses on neurons in the anterior interpositus nucleus. Conditioned stimulus and unconditioned stimulus inputs arise from the pontine nuclei and inferior olive, respectively, converging in the cerebellar cortex and deep nuclei. Projections from subcortical sensory nuclei to the pontine nuclei that are necessary for eyeblink conditioning are beginning to be identified, and recent studies indicate that there are dynamic interactions between sensory thalamic nuclei and the cerebellum during eyeblink conditioning. Cerebellar output is projected to the magnocellular red nucleus and then to the motor nuclei that generate the blink response(s). Tremendous progress has been made toward determining the neural mechanisms of delay eyeblink conditioning but there are still significant gaps in our understanding of the necessary neural circuitry and plasticity mechanisms underlying cerebellar learning.     

Hemispheric asymmetry in the processing of negative and positive words: a divided field study

Research on the lateralisation of brain functions for emotion has yielded different results as a function of whether it is the experience, expression, or perceptual processing of emotion that is examined. Further, for the perception of emotion there appear to be differences between the processing of verbal and nonverbal stimuli. The present research examined the hemispheric asymmetry in the processing of verbal stimuli varying in emotional valence. Participants performed a lexical decision task for words varying in affective valence (but equated in terms of arousal) that were presented briefly to the right or left visual field. Participants were significantly faster at recognising positive words presented to the right visual field/left hemisphere. This pattern did not occur for negative words (and was reversed for high arousal negative words). These results suggest that the processing of verbal stimuli varying in emotional valence tends to parallel hemispheric asymmetry in the experience of emotion.