Examinations of identity invariance in facial expression adaptation

Faces provide a wealth of information essential to social interaction, including both static features, such as identity, and dynamic features, such as emotional state. Classic models of face perception propose separate neural-processing routes for identity and facial expression (Bruce & Young, 1986), but more recent models suggest that these routes are not independent of each other (Calder & Young, 2005). Using a perceptual adaptation paradigm in the present study, we attempted to further examine the nature of the relation between the neural representations of identity and emotional expression. In Experiment 1, adaptation to the basic emotions of anger, surprise, disgust, and fear resulted in significantly biased perception away from the adapting expression. A significantly decreased aftereffect was observed when the adapting and the test faces differed in identity. With a statistical model that separated surface texture and reflectance from underlying expression geometry, Experiment 2 showed a similar decrease in adaptation when the face stimuli had identical underlying prototypical geometry but differed in the static surface features supporting identity. These results provide evidence that expression adaptation depends on perceptual features important for identity processing and thus suggest at least partly overlapping neural processing of identity and facial expression.     

Threat ≠ prevention,challenge ≠ promotion: The impact of threat,challenge and regulatory focus on attention to negative stimuli

The purpose of the current experiment was to distinguish between the impact of strategic and affective forms of gain- and loss-related motivational states on the attention to negative stimuli. On the basis of the counter-regulation principle and regulatory focus theory, we predicted that individuals would attend more to negative than to neutral stimuli in a prevention focus and when experiencing challenge, but not in a promotion focus and under threat. In one experiment (N = 88) promotion, prevention, threat, or challenge states were activated through a memory task, and a subsequent dot probe task was administered. As predicted, those in the prevention focus and challenge conditions had an attentional bias towards negative words, but those in promotion and threat conditions did not. These findings provide support for the idea that strategic mindsets (e.g., regulatory focus) and hot emotional states (e.g., threat vs. challenge) differently affect the processing of affective stimuli.     

Counting to ten milliseconds: low-anger, but not high-anger, individuals pause following negative evaluations

Low-anger individuals are less reactive, both emotionally and behaviourally, to a large variety of situational primes to anger and aggression. Why this is so, from an affective processing perspective, has been largely conjectural. Four studies (total N=270) sought to link individual differences in anger to tendencies exhibited in basic affective processing tasks. On the basis of motivational factors and considerations, it was hypothesised that negative evaluations would differentially activate a psychological alarm system at low levels of anger, resulting in a pause that should be evident in the speed of making subsequent evaluations. Just such a pattern was evident in all studies. By contrast, high-anger individuals did not pause following their negative evaluations. In relation to this affective processing tendency, at least, dramatically different effects were observed among low- versus high-anger individuals. Implications for the personality-processing literature, theories of trait anger, and fast-acting regulatory processes are discussed.     

Two facets of cognitive control in analogical mapping: The role of semantic interference resolution andgoal-driven structure selection

The study used scene analogies to investigate two component processes of analogical thinking: resolution of semantic interference, which emerges when the proper mapping between analogically matching objects is incoherent with their categorical features (e.g., stereotypical functions), and goal-driven selection of the key relational structure, by directing attention to the most promising objects which constitute that structure among many other candidate objects. We manipulated interference by placing in corresponding scenes the objects from one category in different relational roles. Selection was loaded by including additional, relationally irrelevant objects in a scene. We also manipulated relational complexity and the presence of salient objects (people) in relations. Increased load on both interference resolution and selection decreased the accuracy of analogical mapping, but these factors did not interact. Moreover, the factors yielded opposite patterns of interaction with relational complexity. Finally, salience eased selection, but tended to negatively influence interference resolution. In summary, inference resolution and selection seem to constitute two relatively independent facets of cognitive control involved in analogical thinking. Selection may act before mapping occurs, while interference influences analogy making only if an interfering object takes part in mapping.     

Unfounded beliefs among teachers: The interactive role of rationality priming and cognitive ability

Previous research suggests that unfounded beliefs (UB)—such as conspiracist beliefs and beliefs in the supernatural—stem from similar cognitive and motivational mechanisms. More specifically, it has been demonstrated that cognitive ability is negatively associated with UB but only among individuals who value epistemic rationality. The present study goes beyond previous correlational studies by examining whether the negative association between cognitive ability and UB can be strengthened through a subtle rationality prime. In a large scale online experiment (N = 762 French teachers), we demonstrate that priming rationality (vs. control) does enhance the negative relationship between cognitive ability and adherence to supernatural beliefs, as well as conspiracy mentality (d = 0.2). This effect was not obtained for illusory pattern perception. This study's usefulness as a “proof of concept” for future interventions aimed at reducing UB prevalence among the general public is discussed.     

The Nonworseness Claim and the Moral Permissibility of Better-Than-Permissible Acts

Grounded in what Alan Wertheimer terms the “nonworseness claim,” it is thought by some philosophers that what will be referred to herein as “better-than-permissible acts”—acts that, if undertaken, would make another or others better off than they would be were an alternative but morally permissible act to be undertaken—are necessarily morally permissible. What, other than a bout of irrationality, it may be thought, would lead one to hold that an act (such as outsourcing production to a “sweatshop” in a developing country) that produces more benefits for others than an act that is itself morally permissible (such as not doing business in the developing country at all) with respect to those same others, is not morally permissible? In this article, I argue that each of the two groups of philosophers that are most likely to accept the nonworseness claim—consequentialists and non-consequentialists—have reason to reject it, and thereby also have reason to reject the belief that better-than-permissible acts are necessarily morally permissible.     

Neural circuitry and plasticity mechanisms underlying delay eyeblink conditioning

Pavlovian eyeblink conditioning has been used extensively as a model system for examining the neural mechanisms underlying associative learning. Delay eyeblink conditioning depends on the intermediate cerebellum ipsilateral to the conditioned eye. Evidence favors a two-site plasticity model within the cerebellum with long-term depression of parallel fiber synapses on Purkinje cells and long-term potentiation of mossy fiber synapses on neurons in the anterior interpositus nucleus. Conditioned stimulus and unconditioned stimulus inputs arise from the pontine nuclei and inferior olive, respectively, converging in the cerebellar cortex and deep nuclei. Projections from subcortical sensory nuclei to the pontine nuclei that are necessary for eyeblink conditioning are beginning to be identified, and recent studies indicate that there are dynamic interactions between sensory thalamic nuclei and the cerebellum during eyeblink conditioning. Cerebellar output is projected to the magnocellular red nucleus and then to the motor nuclei that generate the blink response(s). Tremendous progress has been made toward determining the neural mechanisms of delay eyeblink conditioning but there are still significant gaps in our understanding of the necessary neural circuitry and plasticity mechanisms underlying cerebellar learning.     

Hemispheric asymmetry in the processing of negative and positive words: a divided field study

Research on the lateralisation of brain functions for emotion has yielded different results as a function of whether it is the experience, expression, or perceptual processing of emotion that is examined. Further, for the perception of emotion there appear to be differences between the processing of verbal and nonverbal stimuli. The present research examined the hemispheric asymmetry in the processing of verbal stimuli varying in emotional valence. Participants performed a lexical decision task for words varying in affective valence (but equated in terms of arousal) that were presented briefly to the right or left visual field. Participants were significantly faster at recognising positive words presented to the right visual field/left hemisphere. This pattern did not occur for negative words (and was reversed for high arousal negative words). These results suggest that the processing of verbal stimuli varying in emotional valence tends to parallel hemispheric asymmetry in the experience of emotion.     

The use of a distractor-assigned response slows later responding in a location negative priming task

Responding to a target's location takes longer when that location has recently contained a distractor event (ignored-repetition [IR] trial) relative to when it has been unoccupied (control trial). This is known as the location negative priming (NP) effect. We aimed to determine whether the elevated reaction time observed for IR trials was due to the reuse of a distractor location (location locus) and/or to the need to execute a (just inhibited) distractor response (response locus). We isolated these loci latency effects by using many-to-one and one-to-many location-response assignments. Our results showed that reusing a distractor location hastened target processing at that position (facilitative location locus), whereas the production of a distractor response was associated with a time cost (interfering response locus). Accordingly, part of the latency elevation seen with IR trials results from the need on these occasions to execute ajust inhibited (distractor) response, and, hence, the location NP effect has a response locus.