Different Disgust Domains Specifically Relate to Mental and Contact Contamination Fear in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder: Evidence From a Path Analytic Model in an Italian Clinical Sample

Both contact contamination (CC) and mental contamination (MC) fears—which combined represent the most common manifestation of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)—have been widely associated with disgust propensity. However, extant research explored this relationship using measures assessing only pathogen-related disgust, not taking into account the potential role played by sexual and moral disgust, despite literature about MC suggesting that this might be particularly relevant. In Study 1, the psychometric properties of the Italian version of the Three Domains of Disgust Scale (TDDS) were assessed in a large Italian community sample. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses confirmed the three-factor structure of the TDDS. The scale also showed good internal consistency and construct validity. In Study 2, the differential patterns of relationships between CC and MC and the three disgust domains were explored in an Italian clinical OCD sample using a path analytic approach. The TDDS-Pathogen subscale was a unique predictor of CC while the TDDS-Sexual subscale was a unique predictor of MC, after controlling for anxiety and depression. Surprisingly, the TDDS-Moral subscale was not a predictor of either domain of contamination fear. Limitations and clinical implications are discussed.     

Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value

A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945, 1949 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Brogaard 2008, 2009 Brogaard, Berit 2009. What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78/2: 439–67.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011 Brogaard, Berit 2011. Knowledge-How: A Unified Account, in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, ed. John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, New York: Oxford University Press: 136–60. [Google Scholar]; Stanley 2011a Stanley, Jason 2011a. Knowing (How), Noûs 45/2: 207–38.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011b Stanley, Jason 2011b. Know How, Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.     

An MMPI-based empirical model of malingering and deception

The empirically-based model of malingering and deception described by Rogers (1984b) was operationalized using MMPI and clinical interview data. Subjects (N = 159) were patients committed to an inpatient forensic hospital as ‘Incompetent to Stand Trial’ or ‘Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity’. Inter-rater reliability was acceptable for the 11 criteria used to define response styles. Each subject was categorized into one of five response style groups: ‘Reliable’, ‘Malingering’, ‘Defensive’, ‘Irrelevant’, or ‘Unclassifiable’. Factor analysis of the rating criteria yielded four factors, three of which are comparable to the assigned groups, providing some validation for the constructs underlying these groups.     

Responsibility and Self-Defense: Can We Have It All?

The role of responsibility in our common-sense morality of self-defense is complex. According to common-sense morality, one can sometimes use substantial, even deadly, force against people who are only minimally responsible for posing a threat to us. The role of responsibility in self-defense is thus limited. However, responsibility is still sometimes relevant. It sometime affects how much force you can use against a threatener: less if they are less responsible and more if they are more responsible. Is there a well-motivated theory that can explain both why the role of responsibility is limited and why it is sometimes relevant? It is hard to see what theory could unify these disparate elements of our common-sense morality, and if one cannot be found then we may simply have to revise some of our pre-theoretic beliefs. But it would be an important advantage of a theory if it could justify those beliefs. I will argue that there is a theory of this kind: surprisingly, the familiar rights theory of self-defense, defended by Judith Thomson, can do so if it is suitably supplemented. Along the way I will survey some alternative theories of self-defense and show why they are not up to the task.