Delivery of Psychological Interventions by Clinical Neuropsychologists: Current Practice in Australia and Implications for Training

Clinical neuropsychologists are increasingly involved in delivering psychological interventions to people with neurological conditions. This is a key competency for accredited Australian postgraduate neuropsychology courses; however it is not clear how effective courses are in preparing neuropsychologists to deliver interventions. The study aims were to (a) determine the frequency and confidence with which particular types of interventions are delivered by Australian neuropsychologists, (b) examine the availability of opportunities to deliver interventions on clinical placements, (c) identify barriers to delivering interventions in current workplaces; and (d) determine which factors influence the frequency and confidence with which neuropsychologists deliver interventions. An online survey was completed by 114 participants who had graduated from a postgraduate neuropsychology program. Results indicated that respondents delivered different intervention types with varying frequency. They reported limited opportunities to practice these interventions on placements. The majority wanted to be doing more interventions, with lack of time, resources, and adequate training being the major barriers. There were several significant relationships between the frequency and confidence with which respondents delivered interventions and the perceived quality of their postgraduate training. These results highlight the need to consider appropriate postgraduate training options in delivery of interventions, including increasing opportunities to practice interventions on placements.     

The Influence of Avoidance Temperament and Avoidance‐Based Achievement Goals on Flow

In the present research, we conducted two studies designed to examine the joint influence of avoidance temperament and avoidance‐based achievement goals on the experience of flow on a creativity task. In both a laboratory study (N = 101; M_age = 22.61, SD_age = 4.03; 74.3% female) and a naturalistic study (N = 102; M_age = 16.23, SD_age = 1.13; 48% female), participants high in avoidance temperament were shown to experience greater flow when performance‐avoidance goals were induced; no differences were found in any of the other three achievement goal conditions from the 2 × 2 achievement goal framework. These findings reveal a short‐term benefit for a disposition‐goal match grounded in avoidance motivation, and point to the need for more research on both avoidance‐based matches and the short‐term versus long‐term implications of such matches.     

Sincerity,Solidarity, and Deliberative Commitment

Two challenges have lately been posed to the importance of sincerity for our public discourse. On the one hand, it has been suggested that because sincerity is so difficult to identify, a preoccupation with the inner lives of others distracts us from the substance of what people say. On the other hand, some worry that making sincere statements can sometimes undermine the very deliberation that advocates of sincerity are so concerned to protect. In light of these challenges, I attempt to analyze our interest in sincerity in terms of a concern for solidarity with our fellow citizens. I then argue that focusing on the sincerity of various assertions is not a good way to promote social cohesion and that this concern is better addressed by looking at the commitment that others have to the process of democratic deliberation.     

Vindicating Virtue: A Critical Analysis of the Situationist Challenge Against Aristotelian Moral Psychology

This article provides a critical analysis of the situationist challenge against Aristotelian moral psychology. It first outlines the details and results from four paradigmatic studies in psychology that situationists have heavily drawn upon in their critique of the Aristotelian conception of virtuous characteristics, including studies conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928), Darley and Batson (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 27:100–108, 1973), Isen and Levin (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21:384–388, 1972), and Milgram (Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67:371–378, 1963). It then presents ten problems with the way situationists have used these studies to challenge Aristotelian moral psychology. After challenging the situationists on these grounds, the article then proceeds to challenge the situationist presentation of the Aristotelian conception, showing that situationists have provided an oversimplified caricature of it that goes against the grain of much Aristotelian text. In evaluating the situationist challenge against the actual results from empirical research as well as primary Aristotelian text, it will be shown that the situationist debate has advanced both an extreme, untenable view about the nature of characteristics and situations, as well as an inaccurate presentation of the Aristotelian view.     

Neural correlates of intertemporal choice in aggressive behavior

People often have to make decisions between immediate rewards and more long-term goals. Such intertemporal judgments are often investigated in the context of monetary choice or drug use, yet not in regard to aggressive behavior. We combined a novel intertemporal aggression paradigm with functional neuroimaging to examine the role of temporal delay in aggressive behavior and the neural correlates thereof. Sixty-one participants (aged 18–22 years; 37 females) exhibited substantial variability in the extent to which they selected immediate acts of lesser aggression versus delayed acts of greater aggression against a same-sex opponent. Choosing delayed-yet-more-severe aggression was increased by provocation and associated with greater self-control. Preferences for delayed aggression were associated with greater activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) during such choices, and reduced functional connectivity between the VMPFC and brain regions implicated in motor impulsivity. Preferences for immediate aggression were associated with reduced functional connectivity between the VMPFC and the frontoparietal control network. Dispositionally aggressive participants exhibited reduced VMPFC activity, which partially explained and suppressed their preferences for delayed aggression. Blunted VMPFC activity may thus be a neural mechanism that promotes reactive aggression towards provocateurs among dispositionally aggressive individuals. These findings demonstrate the utility of an intertemporal framework for investigating aggression and provide further evidence for the similar underlying neurobiology between aggression and other rewarding behaviors.     

Responsibility and Self-Defense: Can We Have It All?

The role of responsibility in our common-sense morality of self-defense is complex. According to common-sense morality, one can sometimes use substantial, even deadly, force against people who are only minimally responsible for posing a threat to us. The role of responsibility in self-defense is thus limited. However, responsibility is still sometimes relevant. It sometime affects how much force you can use against a threatener: less if they are less responsible and more if they are more responsible. Is there a well-motivated theory that can explain both why the role of responsibility is limited and why it is sometimes relevant? It is hard to see what theory could unify these disparate elements of our common-sense morality, and if one cannot be found then we may simply have to revise some of our pre-theoretic beliefs. But it would be an important advantage of a theory if it could justify those beliefs. I will argue that there is a theory of this kind: surprisingly, the familiar rights theory of self-defense, defended by Judith Thomson, can do so if it is suitably supplemented. Along the way I will survey some alternative theories of self-defense and show why they are not up to the task.     

Using facial muscular movements to understand young children's emotion regulation and concurrent neural activation

Individual differences in young children's frustration responses set the stage for myriad developmental outcomes and represent an area of intense empirical interest. Emotion regulation is hypothesized to comprise the interplay of complex behaviors, such as facial expressions, and activation of concurrent underlying neural systems. At present, however, the literature has mostly examined children's observed emotion regulation behaviors and assumed underlying brain activation through separate investigations, resulting in theoretical gaps in our understanding of how children regulate emotion in vivo. Our goal was to elucidate links between young children's emotion regulation‐related neural activation, facial muscular movements, and parent‐rated temperamental emotion regulation. Sixty‐five children (age 3–7) completed a frustration‐inducing computer task while lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) activation and concurrent facial expressions were recorded. Negative facial expressions with eye constriction were inversely associated with both parent‐rated temperamental emotion regulation and concurrent LPFC activation. Moreover, we found evidence that positive expressions with eye constriction during frustration may be associated with stronger LPFC activation. Results suggest a correspondence between facial expressions and LPFC activation that may explicate how children regulate emotion in real time.     

How (not) to think of the ‘dead-donor’ rule

Although much has been written on the dead-donor rule (DDR) in the last twenty-five years, scant attention has been paid to how it should be formulated, what its rationale is, and why it was accepted. The DDR can be formulated in terms of either a Don’t Kill rule or a Death Requirement, the former being historically rooted in absolutist ethics and the latter in a prudential policy aimed at securing trust in the transplant enterprise. I contend that the moral core of the rule is the Don’t Kill rule, not the Death Requirement. This, I show, is how the DDR was understood by the transplanters of the 1960s, who sought to conform their practices to their ethics—unlike today’s critics of the DDR, who rethink their ethics in a question-begging fashion to accommodate their practices. A better discussion of the ethics of killing is needed to move the debate forward.