A facial expression for anxiety

Anxiety and fear are often confounded in discussions of human emotions. However, studies of rodent defensive reactions under naturalistic conditions suggest anxiety is functionally distinct from fear. Unambiguous threats, such as predators, elicit flight from rodents (if an escape-route is available), whereas ambiguous threats (e.g., the odor of a predator) elicit risk assessment behavior, which is associated with anxiety as it is preferentially modulated by anti-anxiety drugs. However, without human evidence, it would be premature to assume that rodent-based psychological models are valid for humans. We tested the human validity of the risk assessment explanation for anxiety by presenting 8 volunteers with emotive scenarios and asking them to pose facial expressions. Photographs and videos of these expressions were shown to 40 participants who matched them to the scenarios and labeled each expression. Scenarios describing ambiguous threats were preferentially matched to the facial expression posed in response to the same scenario type. This expression consisted of two plausible environmental-scanning behaviors (eye darts and head swivels) and was labeled as anxiety, not fear. The facial expression elicited by unambiguous threat scenarios was labeled as fear. The emotion labels generated were then presented to another 18 participants who matched them back to photographs of the facial expressions. This back-matching of labels to faces also linked anxiety to the environmental-scanning face rather than fear face. Results therefore suggest that anxiety produces a distinct facial expression and that it has adaptive value in situations that are ambiguously threatening, supporting a functional, risk-assessing explanation for human anxiety.     

The origin of the interaction between learning method and delay in the testing effect: The roles of processing and conceptual retrieval organization

Recent research has demonstrated a relationship between retrieval organization and the efficacy of prior repeated retrieval on delayed tests. The present study asked why repeated study engenders higher recall at a short delay despite lower retrieval organization but produces a decline at a long delay, and why repeated retrieval engenders lower recall at a short delay despite higher retrieval organization but produces stable recall over time. This relationship was examined through the inclusion of two successive recall tests—one immediately after learning method and one a week later. Results replicated the interaction in recall between learning method and delay characterizing the testing effect and, critically, revealed the qualitative differences inherent in the retrieval organization of each method. Specifically, stable recall in repeated retrieval was accompanied by strong and sustained conceptual organization, whereas organization for repeated study was tenuous and weakened across tests. These differences quantitatively were assessed through the use of five targeted analyses: specifically, the examination of cumulative recall curves, the accumulation of organization across time (a curve akin to cumulative recall), item gains and losses across time, changes in the size of categories across time, and the fate of specific clusters of recalled items across time. These differences are discussed within the context of differential processes occurring during learning method.     

From maps to navigation: The role of cues in finding locations in a virtual environment

In two experiments, participants navigated through a large arena within a virtual environment (VE) to a location encoded in memory from a map. In both experiments, participants recalled locations by navigating through the VE, but in Experiment 2, they additionally recalled the locations on the original map. Two cues were located outside and above the walls of the arena at either north-south locations or east-west locations. The pattern of angular bias was used to infer how the cues affected the creation of spatial categories influencing memory for location in the two tasks. When participants navigated to remembered locations in the VE, two cue-based spatial categories were inferred, with cues serving to demarcate the boundaries of the categories. When participants remembered locations on the original map, two cue-based categories were again formed, but with cues serving as category prototypes. The pattern of results implies that cue-based spatial categorization schemes may be formulated differently at the memory retrieval stage depending on task constraints.     

Stopping speech suppresses the task-irrelevant hand

Some situations require one to quickly stop an initiated response. Recent evidence suggests that rapid stopping engages a mechanism that has diffuse effects on the motor system. For example, stopping the hand dampens the excitability of the task-irrelevant leg. However, it is unclear whether this ‘global suppression’ could apply across wider motor modalities. Here we tested whether stopping speech leads to suppression of the task-irrelevant hand. We used Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation over the primary motor cortex with concurrent electromyography from the hand. We found that when speech was successfully stopped the motor evoked potential from the task-irrelevant hand was significantly reduced compared to when the participant failed to stop speaking, or responded on non stop signal trials, or compared to baseline. This shows that when speech is quickly stopped, there is a broad suppression across the motor system. This has implications for the neural basis of speech control and stuttering.     

Counting to ten milliseconds: low-anger, but not high-anger, individuals pause following negative evaluations

Low-anger individuals are less reactive, both emotionally and behaviourally, to a large variety of situational primes to anger and aggression. Why this is so, from an affective processing perspective, has been largely conjectural. Four studies (total N=270) sought to link individual differences in anger to tendencies exhibited in basic affective processing tasks. On the basis of motivational factors and considerations, it was hypothesised that negative evaluations would differentially activate a psychological alarm system at low levels of anger, resulting in a pause that should be evident in the speed of making subsequent evaluations. Just such a pattern was evident in all studies. By contrast, high-anger individuals did not pause following their negative evaluations. In relation to this affective processing tendency, at least, dramatically different effects were observed among low- versus high-anger individuals. Implications for the personality-processing literature, theories of trait anger, and fast-acting regulatory processes are discussed.     

Asymmetric switch-costs and ERPs reveal facial identity dominance over expression

Previous studies on face processing have revealed an asymmetric overlap between identity and expression, as identity is processed irrespective of expression while expression processing partly depends on identity. To investigate whether this relative interaction is caused by dominance of identity over expression, participants performed familiarity and expression judgments during task switching. This paradigm reveals task-set dominance with a paradoxical asymmetric switch-cost (i.e., greater difference between switch and repeat trials when switching toward the dominant task). Event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded to find the neural signature of the asymmetric cost. As expected, greater switch-cost was shown in the familiarity task with respect to response times, indicating its dominance over the expression task. Moreover, a left-sided ERP correlate of this effect was observed at the level of the frontal N2 component, interpreted as an index of modulations in endogenous executive control. Altogether, these results confirm the overlap between identity and expression during face processing and further indicate their relative dominance.     

Recognising faces seen alone or with others: why are two heads worse than one?

The ability to identify an unfamiliar target face from an identity lineup declines when the target is accompanied by a second face during visual encoding. This two-face disadvantage is still little studied and its basis remains poorly understood. We investigated several possible explanations for this phenomenon. Experiments 1 and 2 varied the number of potential targets (1 or 2) and the number of faces in a lineup (5 or 10) to explore if this effect arises from the number of identity comparisons that need to be made to detect a target in a lineup. We also explored if this effect arises from an uncertainty concerning which is the to-be-identified target in two-face displays, by cueing the relevant face during encoding. In experiment 3 we then examined whether the two-face disadvantage reflects the depth of face encoding or a memory effect. The results show that this effect arises from the additional comparisons that are necessary to compare two potential targets to an identity lineup when memory demands are minimised (experiment 1), but it reflects a difficulty in remembering several faces when targets and lineups cannot be viewed simultaneously (experiments 2 and 3). However, in both cases the two-face disadvantage could not be eliminated fully by cueing the target. This hints at a further possible locus for this effect, which might reflect perceptual interference during the initial encoding of the target. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Expecting to lift a box together makes the load look lighter

The action abilities of an individual observer modulate his or her perception of spatial properties of the environment and of objects. The present study investigated how joint action abilities shape perception. Four experiments examined how the intention to lift an object with another individual affects perceived weight. In Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b, participants judged the perceived weight of boxes while expecting to lift them either alone or with a co-actor. In Experiment 3, the co-actor was healthy or injured. Participants intending to lift a box with a co-actor perceived the box as lighter than participants intending to lift the same box alone, provided that the co-actor appeared healthy and therefore capable of helping. These findings suggest that anticipated effort modulates the perception of object properties in the context of joint action. We discuss implications for the role of action prediction and action simulation processes in social interaction.     

What Does God Know? Supernatural Agents’ Access to Socially Strategic and Non‐Strategic Information

Current evolutionary and cognitive theories of religion posit that supernatural agent concepts emerge from cognitive systems such as theory of mind and social cognition. Some argue that these concepts evolved to maintain social order by minimizing antisocial behavior. If these theories are correct, then people should process information about supernatural agents' socially strategic knowledge more quickly than non-strategic knowledge. Furthermore, agents' knowledge of immoral and uncooperative social behaviors should be especially accessible to people. To examine these hypotheses, we measured response-times to questions about the knowledge attributed to four different agents--God, Santa Claus, a fictional surveillance government, and omniscient but non-interfering aliens--that vary in their omniscience, moral concern, ability to punish, and how supernatural they are. As anticipated, participants respond more quickly to questions about agents' socially strategic knowledge than non-strategic knowledge, but only when agents are able to punish.