Cognitive change processes in psychotherapy

Several types of cognitive-behavioral therapy are now practiced that use different sets of theoretical concepts and propose different kinds of change mechanisms. None, however, is directly grounded in experimental research in cognitive and social psychology, and few address basic issues such as the relevance of conscious versus nonconscious cognitive processes and the validity of the self-report data on which therapy depends. Put forward in this article is a model that describes the conscious and nonconscious processing of emotional stimuli and distinguishes between knowledge that is verbally accessible and knowledge that can only be recovered by exposure to situational cues. Also proposed are three mechanisms of cognitive change that involve altering verbally accessible knowledge, the accessibility of nonconscious situational memories, and self-regulatory strategies. These mechanisms are related to the current practices of behavioral and cognitive-behavioral therapists.     

Behavioral sequelae of long-term self-attributed success and failure: an attribution theory analysis

Starting from earlier results that self-caused long-term failure improved performance, this experiment tested the effect of "working conditions" as well as successes and failures succeeding the experience of long-term success and long-term failure. 64 subjects participated in recognition tests, composed of 9 tasks (with 42 stimuli each), to be solved within five different experimental sessions. Subjects received false feedback concerning each judgement. The feedback was designed to correspond to Kelley's informational requirements for self-attributions. Results clearly show an impairment of performances within new "working conditions" if successes succeed long-term failure or long-term success. Failure succeeding long-term failure in new "working conditions", on the other hand, improves performance. Different attribution theories' capacity to explain these results is discussed.     

Objective and simulated stimulation: an empirical study of the effect of indirect suggestion on motor behavior

In an experimental investigation it is demonstrated that motor behavior-in contrast to the opinion forwarded in the literature-is not only elicitable by means of direct persuasion, but also to a great extend by mere indirect suggestion, (feigning of stimuli). A differential investigation of these effects provided evidence that reactions to feigned stimuli are highly person specific and relatively homogenous concerning the respective instruments whereas objective stimuli lead to reactions relatively specific for the respective instrument applied. The findings are interpreted as an analog on to placebo-effects in the area of motor behavior. Their extend may be seen as an argument for a stronger concern with subjective reaction tendencies in this field.     

Acquisition of strategies depending on the opponents' competence level

The development of problem-solving skills from novices to advanced subjects in dependence of the competence level of the opponent is examined in a two-person zero-sum game (Othello). In a repeated-measurement design 18 Ss. (6 Ss in 3 groups) played 10 games against one of three opponent-strategies (implemented on a computer): one "expertlike" strategy, which uses domain specific knowledge and local heuristics (minimax-algorithm with alpha-beta pruning); one "novicelike" strategy, in which global, domain independent problem solving strategies (means-ends analysis, goal-reduction) are implemented; and one strategy, which contradicts the supposed heuristics of the novices, but which results in a "weak" performance (minimization in move-selection). Contrary to our assumptions no significant effects of experience could be verified (win versus loss during single runs). An experience dependent differentiation of global problem solving strategies could not be shown for any of the groups. Neither could a general improving effect of the model for acquiring local, task specific heuristics be proved.     

History,philosophy, and science teaching: A brief review

School science education is currently the subject of much debate. Historians and philosophers of science should play a role in this debate. Since the late nineteenth century there has been a persistent, if minor, tradition arguing for the incorporation of historical and philosophical dimensions in the teaching of school science. With the current crisis in science teaching, there are encouraging signs that more attention is being paid to this tradition. What is required is much greater collaboration between philosophers, historians, and science educators, particularly in the training of teachers.This article is a shortened version of my 1988, A Role for History and Philosophy in Science Teaching, inEducational Philosophy and Theory 20 (2). All references are to the following History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching: A Bibliography.This special number ofSynthese is part of a large international project on the place of history and philosophy in science teaching. Special issues ofEducational Philosophy and Theory, Interchange, andStudies in Philosophy and Education are being produced. An international conference on the subject will be held at Florida State University in November 1989. Details of the journals and the conference can be obtained from the author.The project commenced while the author was on leave at Florida State University in 1987. It began with a gracious invitation from Jaakko Hintikka to guest edit this number, and was furthered with the support and encouragement of David Gruender. I thank them both, and also the Philosophy Department for its hospitality. Special appreciation is due to the nearly 30 authors who have contributed papers to the project. I hope that their efforts will re-open the needed dialogue between historians, philosophers, and science educators.     

A model of the influence of processing effort and number of changes on subjective time perception

The paper is concerned with a model for subjective time estimation as determined by processing effort and number of changes. In a previous paper, a proposal was made that should solve a problem of confounded variables in the area of time estimation. An experimental design was developed to allow for the independent manipulation of processing effort and number of changes. It is shown that this proposal is valid only under the assumption that Stevens' law holds with exponent one. Therefore, another way of conceptualizing this problem is advanced in which one asks for the relative impact of processing effort and change on the parameters of Stevens' law. It can be demonstrated that this law yields considerable fit despite interindividual differences.     

Social psychology and the wrong revolution

Many social psychologists take increasing comfort in cognitive explanations of human action. This paper first attempts to demonstrate that cognitively based formulations not only delimit the possibilities for social understanding, but create a range of intractable conceptual problems. If real world events are reduced to cognitive representations of the world, then social events cease to exist for the discipline as legitimate foci of concern. Further, once the reality of cognition is granted, there is no conceptual means of viably explaining either the origins or acquisition of cognitive categories (schemas, representations, etc.), or the relationship between cognition and action. The paper then goes on to argue that the cognitive revolution in psychology blinds the discipline to the far more pervasive revolution occurring elsewhere in the intellectual world, that of social epistemology. When cognition is replaced by language as the major means for representing the world, then the individual is replaced by the social relationship as the central focus of concern. Theory and research within the framework of social epistemology are reviewed and their implications discussed.