WHAT ABOUT ISAAC?: Rereading Fear and Trembling and Rethinking Kierkegaardian Ethics

In this essay I offer a reading of Fear and Trembling that responds to critiques of Kierkegaardian ethics as being, as Brand Blanshard claims, “morally nihilistic,” as Emmanuel Levinas contends, ethically violent, and, as Alasdair MacIntyre charges, simply irrational. I argue that by focusing on Isaac's singularity as the very condition for Abraham's “ordeal,” the book presents a story about responsible subjectivity. Rather than standing in competition with the relation to God, the relation to other people is, thus, inscribed into this very relation. Fear and Trembling, I contend, advocates a bidirectional responsibility that is constitutive of subjectivity itself and, as such, actually resonates with certain aspects of Levinasian ethics. I conclude by suggesting that Abraham's ordeal is not due to the conflict between a nonreligious duty and the duty to God, but instead reflects a tension that is internal to the life of faith itself.     

Causal essentialism and mereological monism

Several philosophers have recently defended Causal Essentialism—the view that every property confers causal powers, and whatever powers it confers, it confers essentially. I argue that on the face of it, Causal Essentialism implies a form of Monism, and in particular, the thesis I call ‘Mereological Monism’: that there is some concretum that is a part of every concretum. However, there are three escape routes, three views which are such that if one of them is true, Causal Essentialism does not imply any form of Monism at all. I survey the costs associated with taking these escape routes along with the costs associated with accepting Mereological Monism.     

Sluggish Cognitive Tempo in Psychiatrically Hospitalized Children: Factor Structure and Relations to Internalizing Symptoms, Social Problems, and Observed Behavioral Dysregulation

As research examining sluggish cognitive tempo (SCT) advances, it is important to examine the structure and validity of SCT in a variety of samples, including samples of children who are clinically-distressed but not referred specifically for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The present study used a large sample of psychiatrically hospitalized children (N?=?680; 73 % male; 66 % African American) between the ages of 6 and 12 to examine the latent structure of SCT, ADHD, oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), depression, and anxiety using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Results of the CFA analyses demonstrated that SCT is distinct from these other dimensions of child psychopathology, including ADHD inattention, depression, and anxiety. Regression analyses indicated that SCT symptoms were positively associated with depression and, to a lesser degree, anxiety. SCT symptoms were also positively associated with children’s general social problems, whereas SCT symptoms were negatively associated with an observational measure of behavioral dysregulation (i.e., frequency of time-outs received as a part of a manualized behavior modification program). These associations were significant above and beyond relevant child demographic variables (i.e., age, sex, race), children’s other mental health symptoms (i.e., ADHD, ODD, depression, anxiety symptoms), and, for all relations except child anxiety, parents’ own anxiety and depression symptoms.     

Self-pacing study of faces of different races: metacognitive control over study does not eliminate the cross-race recognition effect

People often recognize same-race faces better than other-race faces. This cross-race effect (CRE) has been proposed to arise in part because learners devote fewer cognitive resources to encode faces of social out-groups. In three experiments, we evaluated whether learners’ other-race mnemonic deficits are due to “cognitive disregard” during study and whether this disregard is under metacognitive control. Learners studied each face either for as long as they wanted (the self-paced condition) or for the average time taken by a self-paced learner (the fixed-rate condition). Self-paced learners allocated equal amounts of study time to same-race and other-race faces, and having control over study time did not change the size of the CRE. In the second and third experiments, both self-paced and fixed-rate learners were given instructions to “individuate” other-race faces. Individuation instructions caused self-paced learners to allocate more study time to other-race faces, but this did not significantly reduce the size of the CRE, even for learners who reported extensive contact with other races. We propose that the differential processing that people apply to faces of different races and the subsequent other-race mnemonic deficit are not due to learners’ strategic cognitive disregard of other-race faces.     

Blur detection is unaffected by cognitive load

Blur detection is affected by retinal eccentricity, but is it also affected by attentional resources? Research showing effects of selective attention on acuity and contrast sensitivity suggests that allocating attention should increase blur detection. However, research showing that blur affects selection of saccade targets suggests that blur detection may be pre-attentive. To investigate this question, we carried out experiments in which viewers detected blur in real-world scenes under varying levels of cognitive load manipulated by the N-back task. We used adaptive threshold estimation to measure blur detection thresholds at 0°, 3°, 6°, and 9° eccentricity. Participants carried out blur detection as a single task, a single task with to-be-ignored letters, or an N-back task with four levels of cognitive load (0, 1, 2, or 3-back). In Experiment 1, blur was presented gaze-contingently for occasional single eye fixations while participants viewed scenes in preparation for an easy picture recognition memory task, and the N-back stimuli were presented auditorily. The results for three participants showed a large effect of retinal eccentricity on blur thresholds, significant effects of N-back level on N-back performance, scene recognition memory, and gaze dispersion, but no effect of N-back level on blur thresholds. In Experiment 2, we replicated Experiment 1 but presented the images tachistoscopically for 200 ms (half with, half without blur), to determine whether gaze-contingent blur presentation in Experiment 1 had produced attentional capture by blur onset during a fixation, thus eliminating any effect of cognitive load on blur detection. The results with three new participants replicated those of Experiment 1, indicating that the use of gaze-contingent blur presentation could not explain the lack of effect of cognitive load on blur detection. Thus, apparently blur detection in real-world scene images is unaffected by attentional resources, as manipulated by the cognitive load produced by the N-back task.     

Risk should be objectively defined: comment on Pelé and Sueur

Pelé and Sueur (2013) propose that optimal decisions depend on delay of reinforcement, accuracy (probability or magnitude of reinforcement), and risk. The problem with this model is delay and accuracy are easy to define, but according to Pelé and Sueur the third, risk, depends on the animal’s perceived or “interpreted” risk rather than actual (experienced) risk. Thus, choice of the smaller more immediate reward over the larger delayed reward (the delay discounting function) is viewed by the authors as optimal because delay is associated with increased risk (due to potential competition or predation). But perceived risk is assessed by the decision made (e.g., the slope of the discounting function), and since there is virtually no actual risk involved, by default if there is no independent means of measuring risk, according to Pelé and Sueur, all choices can be viewed as optimal. Thus, optimality is an untestable concept. We suggest that risk be defined by the actual risk (given sufficient experience to judge it) and under conditions in which there is no actual risk (or risk is controlled), when animals choose an alternative that provides a lower rate of access to food, that one considers such choice to be suboptimal.