Making use of professional development: Employee interests and motivational goal orientations

Vocational interests and goal orientation (GO) are examined for their potential influences on employees' decisions to engage in professional development and to apply the knowledge and skills gained from development activities in their jobs. Specifically, professional development, in the form of continuing professional education (CE), was examined for a variety of practicing healthcare professionals (N = 183), including physicians, nurses, and allied health professionals in the Midwest United States. Aspects of vocational interest theory (interests and congruence) and GO theory predicted CE outcomes (voluntary participation in CE beyond professional requirements and the application of CE learning at work). Further, employee GO mediated between interests and the application of CE learning at work, providing evidence of a work-specific motivational process linking interests with performance-related behavioral outcomes.     

Causal essentialism and mereological monism

Several philosophers have recently defended Causal Essentialism—the view that every property confers causal powers, and whatever powers it confers, it confers essentially. I argue that on the face of it, Causal Essentialism implies a form of Monism, and in particular, the thesis I call ‘Mereological Monism’: that there is some concretum that is a part of every concretum. However, there are three escape routes, three views which are such that if one of them is true, Causal Essentialism does not imply any form of Monism at all. I survey the costs associated with taking these escape routes along with the costs associated with accepting Mereological Monism.     

Luck Attributions and Cognitive Bias

Philosophers have developed three theories of luck: the probability theory, the modal theory, and the control theory. To help assess these theories, we conducted an empirical investigation of luck attributions. We created eight putative luck scenarios and framed each in either a positive or a negative light. Furthermore, we placed the critical luck event at the beginning, middle, or end of the scenario to see if the location of the event influenced luck attributions. We found that attributions of luckiness were significantly influenced by the framing of the scenario and by the location of the critical event. Positively framing an event led to significantly higher lucky ratings than negatively framing the same exact event. And the closer a negative event was placed toward the end of a scenario, the more unlucky the event was rated. Overall, our results raise the possibility that there is no such thing as luck and thereby pose serious challenges to the three prominent theories of luck. We instead propose that luck may be a cognitive illusion, a mere narrative device used to frame stories of success or failure.     

Group‐level effects of forgiveness: Group cohesiveness and collective action in social dilemmas

Forgiveness research has predominately focused on individual/relational outcomes such as well‐being and closeness. Less research has examined group outcomes such as cohesiveness or collective action. Forgiveness studies have also emphasized the victim's or transgressor's perspective, neglecting the effects of forgiveness on ingroup members who have neither given nor received forgiveness. We theorize that forgiveness promotes collective action among ingroup members through group cohesiveness and that transgressors' apologetic reactions impact this process. In a laboratory experiment, 229 students (175 females) were led to believe they were in a social dilemma with three others. Some participants witnessed group members forgive an apologetic, obstinate, or neutral defector, whereas others witnessed an unforgiving response. Forgiveness of apologetic and neutral defectors increased later cooperation among ingroup members. This effect was generally mediated by group cohesiveness. Our findings suggest that forgiveness can impact cooperation on a group level, providing a path to successful resolutions to collective action problems. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sluggish Cognitive Tempo in Psychiatrically Hospitalized Children: Factor Structure and Relations to Internalizing Symptoms, Social Problems, and Observed Behavioral Dysregulation

As research examining sluggish cognitive tempo (SCT) advances, it is important to examine the structure and validity of SCT in a variety of samples, including samples of children who are clinically-distressed but not referred specifically for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The present study used a large sample of psychiatrically hospitalized children (N?=?680; 73 % male; 66 % African American) between the ages of 6 and 12 to examine the latent structure of SCT, ADHD, oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), depression, and anxiety using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Results of the CFA analyses demonstrated that SCT is distinct from these other dimensions of child psychopathology, including ADHD inattention, depression, and anxiety. Regression analyses indicated that SCT symptoms were positively associated with depression and, to a lesser degree, anxiety. SCT symptoms were also positively associated with children’s general social problems, whereas SCT symptoms were negatively associated with an observational measure of behavioral dysregulation (i.e., frequency of time-outs received as a part of a manualized behavior modification program). These associations were significant above and beyond relevant child demographic variables (i.e., age, sex, race), children’s other mental health symptoms (i.e., ADHD, ODD, depression, anxiety symptoms), and, for all relations except child anxiety, parents’ own anxiety and depression symptoms.     

Self-pacing study of faces of different races: metacognitive control over study does not eliminate the cross-race recognition effect

People often recognize same-race faces better than other-race faces. This cross-race effect (CRE) has been proposed to arise in part because learners devote fewer cognitive resources to encode faces of social out-groups. In three experiments, we evaluated whether learners’ other-race mnemonic deficits are due to “cognitive disregard” during study and whether this disregard is under metacognitive control. Learners studied each face either for as long as they wanted (the self-paced condition) or for the average time taken by a self-paced learner (the fixed-rate condition). Self-paced learners allocated equal amounts of study time to same-race and other-race faces, and having control over study time did not change the size of the CRE. In the second and third experiments, both self-paced and fixed-rate learners were given instructions to “individuate” other-race faces. Individuation instructions caused self-paced learners to allocate more study time to other-race faces, but this did not significantly reduce the size of the CRE, even for learners who reported extensive contact with other races. We propose that the differential processing that people apply to faces of different races and the subsequent other-race mnemonic deficit are not due to learners’ strategic cognitive disregard of other-race faces.     

Blur detection is unaffected by cognitive load

Blur detection is affected by retinal eccentricity, but is it also affected by attentional resources? Research showing effects of selective attention on acuity and contrast sensitivity suggests that allocating attention should increase blur detection. However, research showing that blur affects selection of saccade targets suggests that blur detection may be pre-attentive. To investigate this question, we carried out experiments in which viewers detected blur in real-world scenes under varying levels of cognitive load manipulated by the N-back task. We used adaptive threshold estimation to measure blur detection thresholds at 0°, 3°, 6°, and 9° eccentricity. Participants carried out blur detection as a single task, a single task with to-be-ignored letters, or an N-back task with four levels of cognitive load (0, 1, 2, or 3-back). In Experiment 1, blur was presented gaze-contingently for occasional single eye fixations while participants viewed scenes in preparation for an easy picture recognition memory task, and the N-back stimuli were presented auditorily. The results for three participants showed a large effect of retinal eccentricity on blur thresholds, significant effects of N-back level on N-back performance, scene recognition memory, and gaze dispersion, but no effect of N-back level on blur thresholds. In Experiment 2, we replicated Experiment 1 but presented the images tachistoscopically for 200 ms (half with, half without blur), to determine whether gaze-contingent blur presentation in Experiment 1 had produced attentional capture by blur onset during a fixation, thus eliminating any effect of cognitive load on blur detection. The results with three new participants replicated those of Experiment 1, indicating that the use of gaze-contingent blur presentation could not explain the lack of effect of cognitive load on blur detection. Thus, apparently blur detection in real-world scene images is unaffected by attentional resources, as manipulated by the cognitive load produced by the N-back task.