Changing beliefs and memories through dream interpretation

Autobiographical memory is malleable, but how much can we change people's beliefs and memories about the past? We approached this question with a method designed to supply subjects with a highly personalized suggestion about what probably happened in their childhood. In the current study, one group of subjects (the ‘Dream’ subjects) had their dreams interpreted to indicate that they had experienced a critical childhood event (e.g. being harassed by a bully) before the age of 3. Relative to control subjects who did not receive personalized suggestion, the Dream subjects were more likely to increase their belief that they had the critical experience, and approximately half of these also produced concrete memory reports. These findings are discussed in terms of their implications for autobiographical memory, and also for psychotherapy practice. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pragmatic encroachment,stakes, and religious knowledge

It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of epistemic support that is required for knowledge. Finally, I generalize my results to include other religiously significant propositions such as “God exists” and “God does not exist.”     

Aggression Among Children with ADHD,Anxiety, or Co-occurring Symptoms: Competing Exacerbation and Attenuation Hypotheses

Competing hypotheses for explaining the role of anxiety in the relation between attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptoms and childhood aggression were evaluated. Two studies tested whether anxiety exacerbated, attenuated, or had no effect on the relation between ADHD and aggression subtypes among psychiatrically hospitalized children. In Study 1 (N = 99), children who scored above clinical cut-off levels for anxiety only, ADHD only, and co-occurring ADHD and anxiety were compared on aggression subtypes (i.e., reactive, proactive, overt, and relational aggression). In Study 2, the moderating role of anxiety on the relation between ADHD and aggression subtypes was examined with a larger sample (N = 265) and with continuous variables. No support was found for either the attenuation or exacerbation hypothesis, and results remained consistent when separately examining hyperactivity/impulsivity and inattention symptoms of ADHD. Although ADHD symptoms were significantly associated with all aggression subtypes, this association did not remain when including symptoms of oppositional defiant disorder.     

Lost at Sea: A New Route to Metaphysical Skepticism

Global metaphysical skepticism is the view that we have no knowledge of any substantive metaphysical thesis. Various reasons have been provided in support of global metaphysical skepticism. I provide a new one. The reason, very roughly, is this. Metaphysical theses come together as packages. Such packages are very different from each other. Because the packages are so different, we cannot know of any one of the packages that it isn't true. And because we cannot know of any one of them that it isn't true, we cannot know any substantive metaphysical thesis at all. My paper makes this argument much more precise and defends each of the premises in detail.     

Moral Foundations Theory and Its Implications for Counseling

Moral foundations theory has recently emerged from the field of social psychology as a means for understanding cultural, political, and religious differences between individuals and groups. The authors review the moral foundations theory literature to help counselors in understanding the roots of their clients' and their own moral belief systems and how these systems contribute to decision-making pertaining to morally laden topics. Lastly, the authors present a model for self-awareness around moral issues along with a fictional case study intended to illustrate the use of the model.     

Treating Insecure Attachment in Group Therapy: Attachment Theory Meets Modern Psychoanalytic Technique

Attachment theory is a comprehensive, empirically supported theory of emotional, relational, and neurophysiological development. Modern psychoanalysis is a theory of technique that addresses early psychological deficits and conflicts considered beyond the reach of traditional psychoanalysis. Both orientations have influenced the theory and practice of group psychotherapy and emphasize personality maturation as a treatment goal. This paper explores their potential synergies when treating preoedipal, insecurely attached emotional states, disrupted emotional self-regulation, and impaired mentalization. Theoretical and technical applications are suggested that may enhance the treatment of disordered attachment in group psychotherapy. By addressing insecure attachment as resistance, modern psychoanalytic techniques may engage the emotional substrates of the attachment process to facilitate the expansion of relational capacities, mentalization, self-regulation, the differentiation of self/other representations, and epistemic trust.     

Self-Doubt Effects Depend on Beliefs about Ability: Experimental Evidence

Past research has shown negative effects of chronic self-doubt on psychological and performance outcomes. Recent correlational evidence suggests that incremental beliefs about ability ameliorate certain self-doubt effects. The current research examines whether these correlational findings are robust when subjected to experimental testing. In Experiment 1, we manipulated beliefs about ability (incremental vs. entity) and demonstrated that changing beliefs about ability altered responses to self-doubt. For individuals primed with entity beliefs, higher self-doubt was associated with greater nervousness and poorer anagram performance; for individuals primed with incremental beliefs, self-doubt had no significant effects. Experiment 2 was a 2 (manipulated belief: incremental vs. entity) × 2 (self-doubt: doubt induction vs. control) factorial design. The result showed that self-doubt induction lowered self-esteem relative to control when people were primed with entity beliefs but did not affect self-esteem when incremental beliefs were primed. However, Experiment 1 results on affect and performance were not replicated in Experiment 2. Thus, although we provide some causal evidence that inducing individuals to adopt an ability-is-malleable mindset reduces the negative effects of self-doubt, further experimental work is required to study the moderating role of mindsets for self-doubt effects.