Need,Compassion, and Support for Social Welfare

Funding for social welfare depends on citizen support. Drawing on evolutionary psychological approaches to politics, we study two types of need that might shape citizens' welfare support by regulating their feelings of compassion. One type of need is a recipient's absolute need. The other type is acute need created by sudden misfortune, such as sudden job loss. Across four studies, we find that absolute and acute needs independently affect compassion and welfare attitudes. This leads to potential inefficiencies in judgments: People who have fallen far are judged more deserving of compassion and access to welfare even when they are not in an absolute sense the most impoverished.     

The psychosemantics of free riding: dissecting the architecture of a moral concept

For collective action to evolve and be maintained by selection, the mind must be equipped with mechanisms designed to identify free riders--individuals who do not contribute to a collective project but still benefit from it. Once identified, free riders must be either punished or excluded from future collective actions. But what criteria does the mind use to categorize someone as a free rider? An evolutionary analysis suggests that failure to contribute is not sufficient. Failure to contribute can occur by intention or accident, but the adaptive threat is posed by those who are motivated to benefit themselves at the expense of cooperators. In 6 experiments, we show that only individuals with exploitive intentions were categorized as free riders, even when holding their actual level of contribution constant (Studies 1 and 2). In contrast to an evolutionary model, rational choice and reinforcement theory suggest that different contribution levels (leading to different payoffs for their cooperative partners) should be key. When intentions were held constant, however, differences in contribution level were not used to categorize individuals as free riders, although some categorization occurred along a competence dimension (Study 3). Free rider categorization was not due to general tendencies to categorize (Study 4) or to mechanisms that track a broader class of intentional moral violations (Studies 5A and 5B). The results reveal the operation of an evolved concept with features tailored for solving the collective action problems faced by ancestral hunter-gatherers.     

A qualitative investigation of mock-jurors' theories of emotion and reason

Mock-juries' deliberations of murder/manslaughter verdicts were videotaped and analysed. It was found that jurors' deliberations incorporated their theories of emotion and of the relationship between emotion and reason. Although there was agreement among jurors that emotions can overwhelm persons' rational faculties, there was disagreement between jurors voting for murder and for manslaughter as to the relationship of emotion and reason. Jurors voting for murder suggested emotion and reason are interdependent and that persons can simultaneously act from emotion as well as reason, whereas jurors voting for manslaughter suggested the two are independent and that they cannot operate simultaneously. The import of jurors' folk concepts of emotion and reason to the legal system, as well as to our understanding of emotions themselves, is discussed.