EXPLORING THE INFLUENCE OF DECISION MAKERS' RACE AND GENDER ON ACTUAL PROMOTIONS TO TOP MANAGEMENT

The effects of decision makers' race and gender on promotion decisions about applicants of diverse race and gender for 51 top management positions in a cabinet-level U.S. federal department over a 12-year period were examined. Promotion decisions were made in a 2-stage process. First, a review panel decided which applicants to refer for the position. Second, the selecting official selected one of the referred applicants for the position. Overall, decisions by review panels of different race and gender composition and by selecting officials of different race and gender were to the advantage of female applicants and to the disadvantage of African American and Hispanic male applicants. These effects were not fully accounted for by race or gender differences in applicant qualifications, or by any of several theoretical explanations for the effects of race and gender on promotions to top management.     

NATURAL DOUBTS

Abstract: Many philosophers now argue that the doubts of the philosophical sceptic are unnatural ones, in that they are not forced on us by considerations that any reasonable person would have to accept as compelling but only arise if one has already accepted certain controversial theoretical commitments. In this article I defend the naturalness of philosophical scepticism against such criticisms. After defining “global ontological scepticism,” I examine the work of a number of anti‐sceptical philosophers—Michael Huemer, Michael Williams, and John McDowell. Although McDowell does move the debate to a deeper level by interpreting scepticism as a challenge to the very possibility of the mind's apprehending reality by being in a rational rather than a merely causal relation to it, none of them succeeds in showing that global ontological scepticism is, in the relevant sense, unnatural. This is not to say that the sceptic is correct; simply that it has not been shown that we can reasonably dismiss the sceptical questions and thereby evade the need to engage seriously with the sceptical arguments.     

Wright on the McKinsey Problem

The McKinsey Problem concerns a puzzling implication of the doctrines of Content Externalism and Privileged Access. I provide a categorization of possible solutions to the problem. Then I discuss Crispin Wright's work on the problem. I argue that Wright has misconceived the status of his own proferred solution to the problem.     

NO CLOSURE ON SKEPTICISM

This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure‐based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails.