A Cross-National Study of Nuclear Attitudes,Normative Support,and Activist Behavior: Additive and Interactive Effects1

We tested the cross-national similarity of additive and interactive variants of the Contingent Consistency Hypothesis in regard to antinuclear activist behavior. We predicted that attitudinally consistent behavior is influenced (a) more by specific than general attitudes, (b) by facilitation between normative support and personal attitudes in an interactive manner, and (c) by a fundamental or basic social-psychological process that can be demonstrated in people from different countries and cultures. These three hypotheses were tested for general (pacifist) attitudes, specific (antinuclear) attitudes, normative support, and antinuclear political activism in samples of college students from the U. S., England, and Sweden. In each sample, specific attitudes were strong, unique predictors of activist behavior (more so than general attitudes), while normative support had no additive influence on this behavior beyond that explained by attitudes for U. S. and British students. Interaction effects were found for both pacifist and nuclear attitudes in conjunction with normative support among the U. S. students, but only for pacifist attitudes in the British sample and only with antinuclear attitudes in the Swedish sample. In contrast with other studies where interaction effects were hypothesized for behaviors that were deviant or typically initiated by others, the present interactions were obtained for lawful behaviors that are often begun and/ or performed alone. With some notable variations, these results were confirmed in each sample, partially validating the cross-national generality of the interactive attitude-behavior model for activist behavior.     

DO BLACK AND WHITE SUPERVISORY PROBLEM SOLVING STYLES DIFFER?*

Do black supervisors manage differently than white supervisors? Do black supervisors solve problems in the same way as white supervisors? To investigate these issues a group of 21 blacks and 56 whites in a supervisory training program conducted by the College of Business, University of Georgia, were studied using a take-home paper and pencil exercise. Certain independent variables were first identified which included biographical data, employment experience and personality factors. The exercises attempted to measure the way they resolved role conflict situations and handled disciplinary problems–two important duties of supervisors. The most outstanding finding from the study was the paucity of differences in all measures except in attitudes toward received discipline. Blacks were less willing to accept harsh punishment for violation of organizational rules than whites, especially where there was a history of high performance. We conclude, however, that organizational acculturation may substantially offset any minority subcultural influences in organizational situations.     

NATURAL DOUBTS

Abstract: Many philosophers now argue that the doubts of the philosophical sceptic are unnatural ones, in that they are not forced on us by considerations that any reasonable person would have to accept as compelling but only arise if one has already accepted certain controversial theoretical commitments. In this article I defend the naturalness of philosophical scepticism against such criticisms. After defining “global ontological scepticism,” I examine the work of a number of anti‐sceptical philosophers—Michael Huemer, Michael Williams, and John McDowell. Although McDowell does move the debate to a deeper level by interpreting scepticism as a challenge to the very possibility of the mind's apprehending reality by being in a rational rather than a merely causal relation to it, none of them succeeds in showing that global ontological scepticism is, in the relevant sense, unnatural. This is not to say that the sceptic is correct; simply that it has not been shown that we can reasonably dismiss the sceptical questions and thereby evade the need to engage seriously with the sceptical arguments.     

Wright on the McKinsey Problem

The McKinsey Problem concerns a puzzling implication of the doctrines of Content Externalism and Privileged Access. I provide a categorization of possible solutions to the problem. Then I discuss Crispin Wright's work on the problem. I argue that Wright has misconceived the status of his own proferred solution to the problem.     

NO CLOSURE ON SKEPTICISM

This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure‐based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails.     

Chaos and Christianity: A Response to Butz and a Biblical Alternative

This article responds to M. R. Butz's (1995) fundamental conclusion regarding chaos and Christianity, briefly discusses the compatibility between the two perspectives, and offers a biblical model for counselors in assisting Christian clients in embracing chaos.