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GEORGIANA SHICK TRYON ANTHONY J. DeVITO FREDRICA R. HALLIGAN ABIGAIL S. KANE JOHN J. SHEA 《Journal of counseling and development : JCD》1988,67(3):178-181
Students with borderline personality disorders are difficult to counsel and present problems in consultation. Providing these students with structure through consistent limit setting can produce positive changes in their behavior. 相似文献
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ANTHONY EVERETT 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2007,74(1):56-80
There has recently been considerable interest in accounts of fiction which treat fictional characters as abstract objects. In this paper I argue against this view. More precisely I argue that such accounts are unable to accommodate our intuitions that fictional negative existentials such as "Raskolnikov doesn't exist" are true. I offer a general argument to this effect and then consider, but reject, some of the accounts of fictional negative existentials offered by abstract object theorists. I then note that some of the sort of data invoked by the abstract object theorist in fact cuts against her position. I conclude that we should not regard fictional characters as abstract objects but rather should adopt a make-believe theoretic account of fictional characters along the lines of those developed by Ken Walton and others. 相似文献
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ANTHONY WRIGLEY 《Journal of applied philosophy》2011,28(2):169-187
The standard by which we apply decision‐making for those unable to do so for themselves is an important practical ethical issue with substantial implications for the treatment and welfare of such individuals. The approach to proxy or surrogate decision‐making based upon substituted judgement is often seen as the ideal standard to aim for but suffers from a need to provide a clear account of how to determine the validity of the proxy's judgements. Proponents have responded to this demand by providing the truth‐conditions for the substituted judgement in terms of counterfactual reasoning using a possible worlds semantics. In this paper, I show how these underpinnings fail to support the substituted judgement approach as a reasonable standard for decision‐making. Firstly, I show how this counterfactual element has been poorly interpreted. I then explain how various accounts have failed to reflect problems and limitations associated with providing an interpretation of their truth‐conditions using counterfactuals. Finally, I argue that, even when we attend to the initial problems of providing a counterfactual analysis, it still deeply problematic as a means of determining the validity of substituted judgements for two main reasons. Firstly, making determinate judgements as to the truth‐value of these judgements will often not be possible and, secondly, there is a strong requirement when interpreting many counterfactual claims to charitably accede to their being true. I conclude that substituted judgements, as interpreted through counterfactual reasoning and possible worlds semantics, do not therefore provide an adequate standard for surrogate decision‐making. 相似文献
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ANTHONY BARRATT 《Heythrop Journal》2008,49(5):764-793
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