The Moral Status of Deprogramming

ABSTRACT  In this paper I examine some of the issues surrounding the moral status of the therapy known as 'deprogramming'. I argue against the extreme view that all deprogrammings are morally impermissible. In certain instances deprogramming is morally justified because it is quite capable of restoring the conditions needed for the exercise of autonomy. The view of autonomy I am following is that constructed by Gerald Dworkin, wherein two conditions must be met in describing a person as autonomous—authenticity and procedural independence. Autonomy of another type, described by Dworkin as authenticity plus substantive independence, may be lost by persons involved in cults but in those instances deprogramming as reconstructed in this paper is not a morally justified measure.     

Cheshire Calhoun's Project of Separating Lesbian Theory from Feminist Theory

I support Cheshire Calhoun's argument that there is a distinctive type of sexuality injustice addressed to lesbians and gays, but challenge her definitional strategy regarding the concepts of “lesbian” and “gay” and the “universalistic essentialist” distinction that she draws between patriarchy and compulsory heterosexuality. Finally, I take issue with the political implications of her claim that lesbians’ and gays’ special oppression stems from our exclusion from the legal prerogatives of marriage and parenthood.     

Regional Variation in Preferences for Vernacular Houses

This paper tests 2 theories of relevance to design review and design guidelines. In Study I. a between-subjects design. III college students in Connecticut and 93 college students in Ohio judged goodness of example, familiarity, or preference for 6 houses. The results failed to uncover differences in response related to local experience, suggesting that global features of the houses may overcome local experience. In Study 2, a within-subjects design, 110 students from Connecticut and 49 from Ohio rated goodness of example, familiarity, and preference for the same 6 houses. Results indicate minor effects of goodness of example and familiarity on preference. The results show preference as multidimensional, reflecting knowledge structure, physical features, and connotative meanings.     

Kantian Morals and Humean Motives

The idea that moral imperatives are categorical is commonly used to support internalist claims about moral judgment. I argue that the categorical quality of moral requirements shows at most that moral motivation need not flow from a background desire to be moral. It does not show that moral judgments can motivate by themselves, or that amoralism is impossible.     

A Functionalist Theory of Properties

I consider a grand, yet neglected proposal put forward by Shoemaker—a functionalist theory of all properties. I argue that two possible ways of developing this proposal meet with substantial objections. However, if we are prepared to endorse an ontology of tropes, one of these functionalist analyses can be developed into an original and informative theory of properties.     

Pressing the Flesh: A Tension in the Study of the Embodied,Embedded Mind?*

Mind, it is increasingly fashionable to assert, is an intrinsically embodied and environmentally embedded phenomenon. But there is a potential tension between two strands of thought prominent in this recent literature. One of those strands depicts the body as special, and the fine details of a creature’s embodiment as a major constraint on the nature of its mind: a kind of new‐wave body‐centrism. The other depicts the body as just one element in a kind of equal‐partners dance between brain, body and world, with the nature of the mind fixed by the overall balance thus achieved: a kind of extended functionalism (now with an even broader canvas for multiple realizability than ever before). The present paper displays the tension, scouts the space of possible responses, and ends by attempting to specify what the body actually needs to be, given its complex role in these recent debates.