Evolutionary Theory in the Social Philosophy of Charlotte Perkins Gilman

This paper examines Charlotte Perkins Gilman's connection with the evolutionist ideas of late nineteenth century Reform Darwinism. It focuses on the assumptions that her language and use of metaphor reveal, and upon her vision of human social evolution as a meUoristic process through which the equality of the sexes must finally emerge.     

The role of hope in conflict management and relational maintenance

Rooted in hope theory, this study examined how dispositional and relationship‐specific hope influence communication in romantic relationships. In Study 1a, dispositional hope was positively associated with active and constructive conflict responses and negatively associated with passive and destructive conflict responses. In Study 1b, dispositional hope was mainly a positive predictor of active and constructive responses. Hope was also found to predict certain relational maintenance behaviors. Study 2 then examined the influence of hope in specific relational conflict episodes. Dispositional and relationship‐specific hope predicted unique variance in conflict goals and styles. High‐ relative to low‐hope individuals reported more prorelationship goals and fewer hostility‐domination goals. They also reported greater integrative problem solving and less personal attacking, withdrawal, and third‐party assistance.     

Literature and Thought Experiments

Like works of literature, thought experiments present fictional narratives that prompt reflection in their readers. Because of these and other similarities, a number of philosophers have argued for a strong analogy between works of literary fiction and thought experiments, some going so far as to say that works of literary fiction are a species of thought experiment. These arguments are often used in defending a cognitivist position with regard to literature: thought experiments produce knowledge, so works of literary fiction can too. This article concedes that works of literary fiction can be put to use in thought experiments, but not in a way that is helpful to the cognitivist. In particular, it draws three disanalogies in the ways we engage critically with thought experiments and with literary fictions. First, we use thought experiments to make arguments; second, we read thought experiments in strongly allegorical terms; and third, the terms of criticism we apply to thought experiments and to works of literature differ. Although these disanalogies present problems for the cognitivist position, they also give us a sharper picture of the distinctive educative potential of works of literary fiction.