ETHICS AND OBSERVATION: DEWEY,THOREAU, AND HARMAN

Abstract: In 1929, John Dewey said that “the problem of restoring integration and cooperation between man's beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about the values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of human life.” Using this as its theme, this article begins with an examination of Gilbert Harman's reasons for denying the existence of moral facts. It then presents an alternative account of the relationship between science and ethics, making use of the writings of Dewey and Henry David Thoreau. For both Dewey and Thoreau, the dichotomy between a scientific approach to the world and an ethical approach to the world is a false one. The article explores the reasons for believing that the dichotomy is a false one, agreeing with Thoreau that there “is no exclusively moral law—there is no exclusively physical law.”     

Toward science‐informed supervision of clinical case formulation: A training model and supervision method

Case formulation is a core competency in the practice of clinical psychology and although many component skills can be taught in lectures, supervised clinical practice is a key step in moving from knowledge about case formulation to knowledge of formulation. The present paper outlines a model of science‐informed clinical practice and the ways in which clinical supervision may play a role. In addition, a methodology for assessing and benchmarking skills in case formulation is described to assist clinical psychology training programs to provide supervisees with normative feedback about their skills in case formulation. In so doing, the supervision of case formulation can become more informed by science and responsive to evaluation.     

“We Are,Therefore We Should”: Evidence That In‐Group Identification Mediates the Acquisition of In‐Group Norms1

In 2 field studies (Ns = 71 and 113), we tested the prediction that in‐group identification would mediate the acquisition of group norms by new group members. Study 1 demonstrated that participants surveyed after a team‐development program reported greater awareness of in‐group norms of teamwork and cooperation, compared to those surveyed at the start. Moreover, there was evidence that this effect was mediated by increased in‐group identification. Study 2 replicated this finding, and showed that the effects were specific to the norm of teamwork. Acquisition of alternative norms of individualism and competitiveness did not increase after participation in the program, and did not correlate with identification. Practical implications and future work are discussed.     

Examining Creative Performance in the Workplace through a Person‐Environment Fit Model

Puccio, Treffinger, and Talbot's 1995 paper examined relationships between creativity style and characteristics of employees' products. Using the same data, the present investigation tested a quite different question. Specifically, this investigation explicitly tested a person‐environment fit model for predicting employees' level of creative productivity. A modified version of Kirton's Adaptor‐Innovator Inventory was used to operationalize the personenvironment fit model and a self‐report measure, based on Bese‐mer's work, was used to assess creative productivity. Multiple regression analysis yielded main effects across all three subtraits associated with Kirton's creativity style measure. Significant interaction effects were found for the efficiency subtrait and two of the subscales from the product measure. The interaction effects indicated that style match between the individual and the environment was associated with higher levels of product novelty and resolution. Greater negative effects of a style mismatch were found for those with an innovative preference. The implications of these results and suggestions for future research are discussed.     

KANT's EMPIRICAL HEDONISM

Abstract: According to the long orthodox interpretation of Kant's theory of motivation, Kant recognized only two fundamental types of motives: moral motives and egoistic, hedonistic motives. Seeking to defend Kant against the ensuing charges of psychological simplism, Andrews Reath formulated a forceful and seminal repudiation of this interpretation in his 1989 essay “Hedonism, Heteronomy and Kant's Principle of Happiness.” The current paper aims to show that Reath's popular exegetical alternative is untenable. His arguments against the traditional view miss the mark, and his revisionist interpretation of Kant's theory of motivation cannot bear the considerable weight of the countervailing evidence.