“We Are,Therefore We Should”: Evidence That In‐Group Identification Mediates the Acquisition of In‐Group Norms1

In 2 field studies (Ns = 71 and 113), we tested the prediction that in‐group identification would mediate the acquisition of group norms by new group members. Study 1 demonstrated that participants surveyed after a team‐development program reported greater awareness of in‐group norms of teamwork and cooperation, compared to those surveyed at the start. Moreover, there was evidence that this effect was mediated by increased in‐group identification. Study 2 replicated this finding, and showed that the effects were specific to the norm of teamwork. Acquisition of alternative norms of individualism and competitiveness did not increase after participation in the program, and did not correlate with identification. Practical implications and future work are discussed.     

Examining Creative Performance in the Workplace through a Person‐Environment Fit Model

Puccio, Treffinger, and Talbot's 1995 paper examined relationships between creativity style and characteristics of employees' products. Using the same data, the present investigation tested a quite different question. Specifically, this investigation explicitly tested a person‐environment fit model for predicting employees' level of creative productivity. A modified version of Kirton's Adaptor‐Innovator Inventory was used to operationalize the personenvironment fit model and a self‐report measure, based on Bese‐mer's work, was used to assess creative productivity. Multiple regression analysis yielded main effects across all three subtraits associated with Kirton's creativity style measure. Significant interaction effects were found for the efficiency subtrait and two of the subscales from the product measure. The interaction effects indicated that style match between the individual and the environment was associated with higher levels of product novelty and resolution. Greater negative effects of a style mismatch were found for those with an innovative preference. The implications of these results and suggestions for future research are discussed.     

KANT's EMPIRICAL HEDONISM

Abstract: According to the long orthodox interpretation of Kant's theory of motivation, Kant recognized only two fundamental types of motives: moral motives and egoistic, hedonistic motives. Seeking to defend Kant against the ensuing charges of psychological simplism, Andrews Reath formulated a forceful and seminal repudiation of this interpretation in his 1989 essay “Hedonism, Heteronomy and Kant's Principle of Happiness.” The current paper aims to show that Reath's popular exegetical alternative is untenable. His arguments against the traditional view miss the mark, and his revisionist interpretation of Kant's theory of motivation cannot bear the considerable weight of the countervailing evidence.     

WHEN DOES FALSEHOOD PRECLUDE KNOWLEDGE?

Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a truth, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a truth. This paper provides a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence when it does not. We present the paper as an approach to the Gettier problem and arrive at a relatively simple theory with virtues linked to several issues at the heart of contemporary epistemology.