A LONGITUDINAL INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN JOB INFORMATION SOURCES, APPLICANT PERCEPTIONS OF FIT, AND WORK OUTCOMES

This longitudinal field study was designed to examine the relationships between job information sources, self-esteem, and perceptions of person-job (P-J) and person-organization (P-O) fit, as well as the relationships between perceptions of fit and work outcomes (job satisfaction, organizational commitment, organizational identification, intentions to quit, stress symptoms, and turnover). The results indicate that the number of formal job information sources and self-esteem were positively related to perceptions of P-J fit, and formal job information sources were positively related to perceptions of P-O fit. Perceptions of P-J fit were positively related to job satisfaction, organizational commitment, organizational identification, and negatively related to stress symptoms and intentions to quit. Perceptions of P-O fit were negatively related to intentions to quit and turnover. In addition, perceptions of fit mediated the relationships between job information sources and self-esteem with job satisfaction, intentions to quit, and turnover. These results highlight the job applicant's perspective of fit, and demonstrate the importance of both P-J and P-O fit perceptions.     

Innoculi Innocula

In "Innocuous Infallibility," Earl Conee argues that the infallibility to which I argue Internalism is committed, in "An Argument that Internalism Requires Infallibility," is harmless and trivial. I maintain that this overlooks the fact that Internalism makes use of an intuitive notion of 'epistemic twinhood' to drive its position, rather than one antecedently defined with a filled-out notion of 'relevant epistemic circumstances'. Conee is correct that any theory requires, and trivially gets, some sort of infallibility-but it is not trivial that there is a coherent and univocal notion of the sort of relevant circumstances-and so, twinhood and infallibility-behind the Internalist strategy and motivation.     

Reason Internalism

Traditional epistemological reflection on our beliefs about the world attempts to proceed without presupposing or ineliminably depending upon any claims about the world. It has been argued that epistemological externalism fails to engage in the right way with the motivations for this project. I argue, however, that epistemological externalism satisfyingly undermines this project. If we accept the thesis that certain conditions other than the truth of one's belief must obtain in the world outside of one's mind in order for one to have knowledge (or justified belief) about the world, then there is no good intellectual motivation for taking up the traditional project. This results stands even if we accept the traditional theses that knowledge requires justified belief and that justified belief requires the ability to provide good reasons for one's belief.     

Ethics and the Extraterrestrial Environment

ABSTRACT After a brief review of environmental ethics this paper examines how terrestrial environmental values can be developed into policies to protect extraterrestrial environments. Shallow environmentalism, deep environmentalism and the libertarian extension of rights are compared and then applied to the environmental protection of extraterrestrial bodies. Some scientific background is given. The planet Mars is used as a test case from which an ethical argument emerges for the protection of environments beyond Earth. The argument is based on the necessity to recognise the intrinsic value of all living species and natural environments. At present, the treatment of extraterrestrial environments by makers of space policy is ethically undernourished. This paper explains why such an attitude endangers those environments and calls for the policy-makers to incorporate non-anthropocentric ethics into extraterrestrial environmental policy.     

PRESENTISM, TRUTHMAKERS, AND GOD

The truthmaker objection to presentism (the view that only what exists now exists simpliciter ) is that it lacks sufficient metaphysical resources to ground truths about the past. In this paper I identify five constraints that an adequate presentist response must satisfy. In light of these constraints, I examine and reject responses by Bigelow, Keller, Crisp, and Bourne. Consideration of how these responses fail, however, points toward a proposal that works; one that posits God's memories as truthmakers for truths about the past. I conclude that presentists have, in the truthmaker objection, considerable incentive to endorse theism.     

A Fortnight of My Life is Missing: a discussion of the status of the human 'pre-embryo'

ABSTRACT Summed up in the coinage of the term 'pre-embryo'is the denial that human beings, as such, begin to exist from the moment of conception. This denial, which may be thought to have significant moral implications, rests on two kinds of reason. The first is that the pre-embryo lacks the characteristics of a human being. The second is that the pre-embryo lacks what it takes to be an individual human being. The first reason, I argue, embodies an untenable view of what it is to be human. The second reason exploits certain logical difficulties which arise over the possibility of twinning. I question the relevance of the appeal to such difficulties and conclude that there is no good reason for denying that a human being begins to exist from the moment of conception.