Assortative mating,convergence, and satisfaction in married couples

This work investigates assortative mating and convergence in personality and their effect on marital satisfaction. Measures of personality were collected from a sample of married couples before they met and twice after they were married. Results showed evidence for assortative mating but not for convergence in an average couple. Similarity and convergence in personality predicted later marital satisfaction. These results indicate that similarity and convergence in psychological characteristics may benefit relationships and that while spouses may choose partners with similar personalities they do not become more like their partners in the early part of their marriage.     

RACE, RELIGION, AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF IDENTITY: A THEOLOGICAL ENGAGEMENT WITH DOUGLASS's 1845 NARRATIVE

This essay is about identity and the place of religion and theology in how it is thought about and performed. I purse this subject through a theologically informed reading of the 1845 Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass. Taking Douglass's Narrative as emblematic of how identity continues to be conceived, I explain what is promising in the close link forged between religion, theology and culture. The promise of Douglass's Narrative resides in the emancipatory politics of race that it produces and the creative use of the theology of Easter in that politics. But I also explore the contradictions arising from that link—in particular, Douglass's oppressive gender politics. To overcome this problem, I conclude the article by pushing Douglass's cultural reading of identity and the Cross in a more robust theological direction, a direction that gestures towards a theology of Israel and of Pentecost.     

Ethics and the Extraterrestrial Environment

ABSTRACT After a brief review of environmental ethics this paper examines how terrestrial environmental values can be developed into policies to protect extraterrestrial environments. Shallow environmentalism, deep environmentalism and the libertarian extension of rights are compared and then applied to the environmental protection of extraterrestrial bodies. Some scientific background is given. The planet Mars is used as a test case from which an ethical argument emerges for the protection of environments beyond Earth. The argument is based on the necessity to recognise the intrinsic value of all living species and natural environments. At present, the treatment of extraterrestrial environments by makers of space policy is ethically undernourished. This paper explains why such an attitude endangers those environments and calls for the policy-makers to incorporate non-anthropocentric ethics into extraterrestrial environmental policy.     

PRESENTISM, TRUTHMAKERS, AND GOD

The truthmaker objection to presentism (the view that only what exists now exists simpliciter ) is that it lacks sufficient metaphysical resources to ground truths about the past. In this paper I identify five constraints that an adequate presentist response must satisfy. In light of these constraints, I examine and reject responses by Bigelow, Keller, Crisp, and Bourne. Consideration of how these responses fail, however, points toward a proposal that works; one that posits God's memories as truthmakers for truths about the past. I conclude that presentists have, in the truthmaker objection, considerable incentive to endorse theism.     

A Fortnight of My Life is Missing: a discussion of the status of the human 'pre-embryo'

ABSTRACT Summed up in the coinage of the term 'pre-embryo'is the denial that human beings, as such, begin to exist from the moment of conception. This denial, which may be thought to have significant moral implications, rests on two kinds of reason. The first is that the pre-embryo lacks the characteristics of a human being. The second is that the pre-embryo lacks what it takes to be an individual human being. The first reason, I argue, embodies an untenable view of what it is to be human. The second reason exploits certain logical difficulties which arise over the possibility of twinning. I question the relevance of the appeal to such difficulties and conclude that there is no good reason for denying that a human being begins to exist from the moment of conception.