Christology and duplex hominis beatitudo: Re‐sketching the Supernatural Again

Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of duplex beatitudo is problematic for theologians who want to read his conception of human nature as integrally ordered to the visio divina. The doctrine seems rather to support a duplex ordo– a tidy parallelism of existent human ‘ends’, one discretely ‘natural’ and the other discretely ‘supernatural’. Is this in fact the case? Does the doctrine of duplex beatitudo commit the theologian to a bifurcated anthropology? Or is it possible to reconcile the doctrine with a more paradoxical anthropology which understands the human being as naturally ordered to a supernatural end that nevertheless exceeds the attainable power of human nature? This article offers a christological reading of the doctrine of duplex beatitudo. The article proposes a tensive distinction in unity of the twofold beatitude according to the Chalcedon paradox: inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter.     

Deconstructing the Linearity of Grace: The Risk and Reflexive Paradox of Mary's Immaculate Fiat

Abstract: Beginning from Pope Pius IX's doctrinal definition in Ineffabilis Deus, this article explores the circular paradox of the Virgin Mary's immaculate fiat. Fully contingent on Christ's work of reconciliation (and ‘immaculate’ by virtue of it), Mary's fiat paradoxically precedes that work and consents to it. The article suggests that this circularity is integral to the intimate bond that unites Mary's fiat to the Son's kenosis on the cross. Her fiat thus points the way of redeemed creation into the reflexivity of God's own intra‐trinitarian communication. Mary is hereby read as ‘the way to prayer’, the ‘epiphany’ of the Holy Spirit (as Alexander Schmemann names her) who cries ‘Abba, Father’ on behalf of those who do not know how to pray.     

LEARNING WITHIN A LEARNER CONTROL TRAINING ENVIRONMENT: THE INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF GOAL ORIENTATION AND METACOGNITIVE INSTRUCTION ON LEARNING OUTCOMES

This study proposes that effective engagement in metacognitive activities is critical to success in high learner-control training environments. A model was developed that focuses on the interactive effects of goal orientation and a metacognitive training intervention on metacognitive activity and learning outcomes. Seventy-nine participants completed a Web-based training course on how to create Web pages. Consistent with expectations, learners reporting greater levels of metacognitive activity during training gained more declarative knowledge, performed better on a skill-based measure, and had higher levels of self-efficacy. Metacognitive activity was also found to partially mediate the relationship between goal orientation and learning outcomes. Finally, the expected goal orientation by intervention interaction was found. The metacognitive intervention was beneficial in enhancing metacognitive activity for trainees with low performance-avoidance orientations, but resulted in lower metacognitive activity among highly avoidant learners. Implications of these findings for research on self-regulation and training practice are discussed.     

Is she the one? Personality judgments from online personal advertisements

The authors examined the linguistic cues that inform personality judgments from online personal advertisements, and whether these judgments are accurate. Advertisers reported their personality, and 2 sets of naïve judges—including one that was seeking a romantic partner—rated advertisers' personality after reading their ads. Judges' impressions of extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability—3 traits that are strongly desired in a romantic partner—were influenced by particular lexical cues, such as word count, emotionality, and profanity. Both sets of judges formed accurate impressions for extraversion, but not other traits. These findings suggest that online daters use linguistic cues to judge the desirability of a potential romantic partner's personality, but that the impressions driven by these cues are not always accurate.     

POWER IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AS THE SUBJECT OF JUSTICE

Abstract: The paper suggests that the state is subject to assessment according to principles of social justice because state institutions or practices exercise forms of power over which no particular person has control. This rationale for assessment of social justice equally applies to legally optional or informal social practices. But it does not apply to individual conduct. Indeed, it follows that principles of social justice cannot provide a basis for the assessment and guidance of individual choice. The paper develops this practice‐based conception of the subject of justice by rejoining G. A. Cohen's influential critique of Rawls’ focus on the “basic structure” of society.     

Emotion and underlying concerns during couples' conflict: An investigation of within‐person change

This study investigated how emotion changes within persons across different episodes of romantic relationship conflict. Presumably, changes in different types of emotion are linked to changes in the types of underlying adaptive concerns people have during conflict, which in turn are linked to changes in the types of emotion that one's partner is perceived to express. Over the span of 8 weeks, 105 college students in romantic relationships completed between 2 and 5 online assessments of a recent relationship conflict. Hierarchical linear modeling was used to distinguish within‐person effects from between‐person effects. Results confirmed expected differences between types of emotion and types of underlying concern, indicated that most effects occur at the within‐person level, and identified mediating pathways.     

Constructivism about Practical Reasons1

Philosophers commonly wonder what a constructivist theory as applied to practical reasons might look like. For the methods or procedures of reasoning familiar from moral constructivism do not clearly apply generally, to all practical reasons. The paper argues that procedural specification is not necessary, so long as our aims are not first‐order but explanatory. We can seek to explain how there could be facts of the matter about reasons for action without saying what reasons we have. Explanatory constructivism must assume constructive “norms of practical reasoning” which yield particular truths without assuming them. But philosophers often mistakenly assume that only “formal” norms of reasoning could fulfill this role. The paper describes a further possibility: norms of reasoning can be “situation‐specific” and yet retain truth‐independent authority. Though we might doubt whether such norms can be independently defended, we should not doubt the possibility or coherence of constructivism about practical reasons.