A Capuchin monkey (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Cebus apella</Emphasis>) recognizes when people do and do not know the location of food

In a previous study, Kuroshima and colleagues demonstrated that capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) learned to discriminate between a "knower" who inspected a box for food, and a "guesser" who did not. The aim of the present study was to specify whether the subjects learned a simple conditional discrimination or a causal relationship that seeing leads to knowing. In experiment 1, we introduced five types of novel containers to two subjects. Each container was of different shape and color. The subjects gradually learned to reach toward the container the knower suggested. In experiment 2, we diversified the behavior of the knower and the guesser. In experiment 3, in order to eliminate the possibility of discrimination based on differences in the magnitude and the complexity of two trainers, we equated their behaviors. One subject adapted to the novel behaviors of the knower and the guesser, successfully discriminating the two trainers. Thus this monkey clearly learned to use the inspecting action of the knower and the non-inspecting action of the guesser as a discriminative cue to recognize the baited container. This result suggests that one capuchin monkey learned to recognize the relationship between seeing and knowing.     

When stereotypes get in the way: stereotypes obstruct stereotype-inconsistent trait inferences

There is a growing body of evidence indicating that people spontaneously make trait inferences while observing the behavior of others. The present article reports a series of 5 experiments that examined the influence of stereotypes on the spontaneous inference of traits. Results consistently showed weaker spontaneous trait inferences for stereotype-inconsistent behavioral information than for stereotype-consistent and stereotype-neutral information. Taken together, the current results suggest that specific spontaneous trait inferences become obstructed by inhibitory processes when behavior is inconsistent with an already activated stereotype. These findings are discussed in relation to stereotype maintenance processes and recent models of attribution in social judgment.     

Visual masking during the attentional blink: tests of the object substitution hypothesis

When 2 masked targets are presented in a rapid sequence, correct identification of the 1st hinders identification of the 2nd. Visual masking of the 2nd target plays a critical role during this 2nd-target deficit, or "attentional blink" (AB). The object substitution hypothesis (B. Giesbrecht & V. Di Lollo, 1998) predicts that late-stage visual processes involved in object substitution mediate masking of the 2nd target during AB, whereby stronger masking should produce a more severe deficit. Six experiments are presented, together testing this hypothesis. Although masking by object substitution was observed, it did not interact with the AB. An alternative hypothesis is proposed stating that mostly early-stage visual processes mediate the masking effects that are critical to the AB.     

The use of category and similarity information in limiting hypotheses

Memory &; Cognition - Previous studies have shown that adults usually select diverse evidence for generalizing hypotheses. We investigated what kind of evidence people select in another type of...     

Subgroup analysis of sex difference on the Vandenberg-Kuse mental rotation test

A large sex difference has been elicited on the Vandenberg-Kuse mental rotation test. Prior research emphasizes the biological root of this sex difference. In recent experiments we confirmed this viewpoint. A large sample was administered the test, and the distributions of scores for men and women (N = 138; 68 men and 70 women: ages 19 to 23 years). The mean scores were used as cut-off points to group the men and the women in different subgroups (Low/Women, High/Women, Low/Men, High/Men). There were large differences among all subgroups, reinforcing Kimura's testosterone hypothesis for sex differences in spatial ability.     

Internal versus external attention in social anxiety: an investigation using a novel paradigm

Several cognitive models propose that social anxiety is associated with increased self-focused attention. Indirect evidence for this hypothesis has been provided by questionnaire studies, and by cognitive psychology paradigms that have demonstrated reduced processing of external information during feared social-evaluative situations. However, no studies have simultaneously measured on-line attention to internal and external events. A probe detection task that aimed to measure the balance of attention between internal and external stimuli was developed. High and low socially anxious individuals were instructed to detect two probes. The external probe was superimposed on pictures of faces (happy, neutral, angry) or household objects that were presented on a VDU. The 'internal' probe was a pulse to the finger which participants were led to believe represented significant changes in their physiology. Compared to low speech anxious individuals, high speech anxious individuals showed an internal attentional bias, that was specific to conditions of social-evaluative threat.     

It takes two to mimic: behavioral consequences of self-construals

The present studies demonstrated the moderation of self-construal orientation on mimicry. Recent research has indicated that an interdependent self-construal is associated with assimilation of the other to the self whereas an independent self-construal is associated with minimizing the influence of others on the self (H. R. Markus & S. Kitayama, 1991; D. Stapel & W. Koomen, 2001). Therefore, the authors hypothesized that an interdependent self-construal would be associated with more mimicry than an independent self-construal. When self-construal orientations were experimentally primed, as in Studies 1 and 2, independent self-construals produced less nonconscious mimicry than interdependent self-construals. When self-construals were examined as cultural differences with either a chronically dominant independent (Americans) or interdependent (Japanese) construal of the self, these results were replicated.     

Perseverative responding in a violation-of-expectation task in 6.5-month-old infants

In the present research, 6.5-month-old infants perseverated in a violation-of-expectation task designed to examine their reasoning about width information in containment events. After watching a familiarization event in which a ball was lowered into a wide container, the infants failed to detect the violation in a test event in which the same ball was lowered into a container only half as wide as the ball (narrow-container test event). This negative result (which was replicated in another experiment) was interpreted in terms of a recent problem-solving account of infants' perseverative errors in various means-end tasks (Aguiar, A., & Baillargeon, R. (2000). Perseveration and problem solving in infancy. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 27, pp. 135-180). San Diego, CA: Academic Press). It was assumed that the infants in the present experiments (1) did not attend to the relative widths of the ball and container in their initial analysis of the narrow-container test event, (2) categorized the event as similar to the familiarization event shown on the preceding trials, and (3) retrieved the expectation they had formed for that event ("the ball will fit into the container"), resulting in a perseverative error. This interpretation was supported by additional experiments in which different modifications were introduced that led to non-perseverative responding, indicating that 6.5-month-old infants could detect the violation in the narrow-container test event. The present findings are important for several reasons. First, they provide the first demonstration of perseverative responding in a violation-of-expectation task. Second, they make clear the breadth and usefulness of the problem-solving account mentioned above. Finally, they add to the evidence for some degree of continuity between infants' and adults' problem-solving abilities.