Galef’s Transfer-of-Information Effect Occurs in a Free-Foraging Situation

Galef and his colleagues have repeatedly shown that one rat may transfer information regarding the type of food it has consumed to other conspecifics. Such experiments typically have been conducted in wire-mesh cages or a wooden maze. The present experiments sought to extend this paradigm to the open-field foraging situation having six food patches to choose from. Following interaction with a demonstrator that had consumed either a cocoa or a cinnamon diet, single observers (Experiment 1) were tested in the foraging situation. Food-consumption scores indicated that observers consumed significantly more of their specific demonstrator’s diet than a second diet that was available also. Experiment 2 involved the simultaneous testing of two observers in the foraging laboratory. In Experiment 3 two observers were once again tested, but each had been provided a different food-type message prior to foraging. Positive results, mirroring those of Experiment 1, were obtained in both Experiments 2 and 3. The results of these three experiments underscore the robustness of this phenomenon and its generalizability to other testing conditions.

     

In search of the false-uniqueness phenomenon: fear and estimates of social consensus

An examination of the social perception literature yields little evidence for the false-uniqueness phenomenon (Valins & Nisbett, 1972), the perception that one's attributes are more unique than is the case. In contrast, the tendency for individuals to project their own characteristics onto other people and assume that more people are like themselves is a robust phenomenon. One reason researchers may not have found false uniqueness is that they have not looked at the accuracy of consensus estimates. A close look at the results of Tabachnik, Crocker, and Alloy (1983) and Sanders and Mullen (1983), who did assess accuracy, suggests that people possessing undesirable attributes over-estimate consensus, whereas people holding desirable attributes underestimate consensus. The latter pattern is a form of false uniqueness. In this study we looked at the accuracy of social consensus estimates in the context of psychological fears. A sample of subjects filled out an abbreviated version of a fear survey and made estimates of consensus. The results showed that both high- and low-fear respondents overestimated the incidence of high fear among their peers, but high-fear subjects were more inaccurate in their estimates. A false-uniqueness effect was found on the part of low-fear subjects, as they tended to underestimate the incidence of low fear among their peers. These findings are consistent with a motivational interpretation that emphasizes the individual's need to justify or normalize stigmatized behavior and to bolster perceived self-competence.     

Social support versus companionship: effects on life stress, loneliness, and evaluations by others

In recent years, much interest has focused on delineating and contrasting specific functions of social relationships that contribute to psychological well-being. Five studies contrasted the roles of companionship and social support in buffering the effects of life stress, in influencing feelings of loneliness and social satisfaction, and in affecting others' judgments. Study 1 analyzed data from a community survey and found that companionship had a main effect on psychological well-being and a buffering effect on minor life stress, whereas social support had only a buffering effect on major life stress. Studies 2, 3, and 4 analyzed data from two college student samples and a different community survey to evaluate how companionship and social support contributed to relationship satisfaction and feelings of loneliness. The results of these studies indicated that companionship was the strongest predictor of these dimensions of social satisfaction. Study 5 used an experimental design to test the hypothesis that a deficit of companionship elicits more negative reactions from others than does a deficit of social support. This hypothesis received partial support. Considered together, the results of these studies suggest that companionship plays a more important and more varied role in sustaining emotional well-being than previous studies have acknowledged.     

Linking person and context in the daily stress process

In this study we combined daily diary data with interview data to investigate individual differences in the impact of stressful daily events on mood. Using a sample of 96 women in an urban community, we examined perceived neighborhood quality and major life events as possibly potentiating the effects of stressful daily events, and we viewed social supports as potentially buffering this daily process. Results confirmed that the presence of chronic ecologic stress (neighborhood perceptions) exacerbated the immediate effects of stressful daily events on mood and also increased the likelihood of enduring effects of daily stressors on next day's mood. Contrary to expectations, previous exposure to major life events decreased the impact of stressful daily events. The availability of social supports, although not buffering the impact of stressful daily events on mood, did mitigate the enduring effects of these events on next day's mood. This study also presents a method for analyzing daily time-series data, while correcting for potential problems of autocorrelated error terms. As such, this study represents a significant advance over previous analytic approaches to time-series data in the study of the stress process.     

Left sidedness and sleep difficulty: the alinormal syndrome

Four indexes of laterality: handedness, footedness, eyedness, and earedness, were assessed in a sample of 1274 subjects. Left- and right-sided groups were compared on two aspects of self-reported sleep difficulty: trouble falling asleep and frequent night wakenings. The incidence of sleep difficulty was found to be elevated in the left-sided groups. The results are discussed in terms of a possible complex of behavioral deviations from the statistical norm, called the alinormal syndrome.     

Contextual mood priming following left and right hemisphere damage

This research examined the influence of mood-congruent and mood-incongruent contexts on recognizing affective prosody after brain damage. Predictions stemmed from an associative network theory of learning and memory. Thirty-three male subjects, 11 each in right hemisphere damaged (RHD), left hemisphere damaged (LHD), and normal control groups judged moods from the prosody of semantically neutral phrases. In one task, the prosodic stimulus phrases were judged in isolation. In another task, the phrases were preceded by short paragraphs which were either congruent or incongruent in emotional tone with the prosodic stimuli. These paragraphs were designed to prime specific mood choices. As anticipated, LHD subjects' prosodic mood recognition was more accurate when given congruent rather than incongruent affective contexts. Congruent contexts facilitated, and incongruent contexts disrupted, their prosodic mood judgments to the same extent as normals. RHD subjects showed a partial context decrement. They were less accurate than normal or LHD subjects in the congruent condition, and were unaffected by incongruent contexts. When given congruent biasing paragraphs, however, RHD subjects did experience facilitation on a par with that found for the other groups, indicating spared sensitivity to certain contextual factors. The distinction between automatic and effortful processes is offered as a potential explanation for the RHD group's pattern of performance.