My point is valid,yours is not: myside bias in reasoning about abortion

The study explores whether people are more inclined to accept a conclusion that confirms their prior beliefs and reject one they personally object to even when both follow the same logic. Most of the prior research in this area has relied on the informal reasoning paradigm; in this study, however, we applied a formal reasoning paradigm to distinguish between cognitive and motivational mechanisms leading to myside bias in reasoning on value-laden topics (in this case abortions). Slovak and Polish (N?=?387) participants indicated their attitudes toward abortion and then evaluated logical syllogisms with neutral, pro-choice, or pro-life content. We analysed whether participants’ prior attitudes influenced their ability to solve these logically identical reasoning tasks and found that prior attitudes were the strongest predictor of myside bias in evaluating both valid and invalid syllogisms, even after controlling for logical validity (the ability to solve neutral syllogisms) and previous experience of logic.     

Dopaminergic medication alters auditory distractor processing in Parkinson's disease

Parkinson's disease (PD) patients show signs of cognitive impairment, such as executive dysfunction, working memory problems and attentional disturbances, even in the early stages of the disease. Though motor symptoms of the disease are often successfully addressed by dopaminergic medication, it still remains unclear, how dopaminergic therapy affects cognitive function. The main objective of this study was to assess the effect of dopaminergic medication on visual and auditory attentional processing. 14 PD patients and 13 matched healthy controls performed a three-stimulus auditory and visual oddball task while their EEG was recorded. The patients performed the task twice, once on- and once off-medication. While the results showed no significant differences between PD patients and controls, they did reveal a significant increase in P3 amplitude on- vs. off-medication specific to processing of auditory distractors and no other stimuli. These results indicate significant effect of dopaminergic therapy on processing of distracting auditory stimuli. With a lack of between group differences the effect could reflect either 1) improved recruitment of attentional resources to auditory distractors; 2) reduced ability for cognitive inhibition of auditory distractors; 3) increased response to distractor stimuli resulting in impaired cognitive performance; or 4) hindered ability to discriminate between auditory distractors and targets. Further studies are needed to differentiate between these possibilities.     

Review of Time,memory, institution: Merleau-Ponty’s New Ontology of Self by David Morris and Kym Maclaren (eds.), Ohio University Press, 2015, 297 pp., IBSN 9780821421086, $64.00

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences -     

Apostolic Administrator Dr Mihael Toroš and his Connections with the Communist Authorities in Slovenia between 1947 and 1953

Abstract

This article presents the work of Apostolic Administrator Dr Mihael Toro? in the western border areas of Slovenia after the annexation of the Primorska region to Yugoslavia in 1947. When he became administrator his parishes were in ruins. He wanted to rebuild religious life, but this was impossible without the help of the communist authorities. However, the authorities used him to cause a rift in the Catholic Church in Slovenia. He and his priests were given material goods and other benefits to show others how profitable cooperating with the authorities was. In return Toro? had to declare his loyalty to the state in public. After a few years he realised that he was being exploited and he distanced himself from the authorities. His connections with the authorities were criticised by the Vatican, but he achieved a good deal for the Catholic Church in Slovenia (a magazine, a boys' seminary) by cooperating.     

O,Holy Simplicity! registering a religion in Slovenia

A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics by Hans Küng. London: SCM Press, 1997, xvii + 315 pp. Paperback, £14.95.

Methodism in Russia and the Baltic States: History and Renewal edited by S. T. Kimbrough, Jr. Nashville: Abingdon, 1995, 253 pp. Paperback.     

Logic of paradoxes in classical set theories

According to Cantor (Mathematische Annalen 21:545–586, 1883; Cantor’s letter to Dedekind, 1899) a set is any multitude which can be thought of as one (“jedes Viele, welches sich als Eines denken läßt”) without contradiction—a consistent multitude. Other multitudes are inconsistent or paradoxical. Set theoretical paradoxes have common root—lack of understanding why some multitudes are not sets. Why some multitudes of objects of thought cannot themselves be objects of thought? Moreover, it is a logical truth that such multitudes do exist. However we do not understand this logical truth so well as we understand, for example, the logical truth ${\forall x \, x = x}$ . In this paper we formulate a logical truth which we call the productivity principle. Rusell (Proc Lond Math Soc 4(2):29–53, 1906) was the first one to formulate this principle, but in a restricted form and with a different purpose. The principle explicates a logical mechanism that lies behind paradoxical multitudes, and is understandable as well as any simple logical truth. However, it does not explain the concept of set. It only sets logical bounds of the concept within the framework of the classical two valued ${\in}$ -language. The principle behaves as a logical regulator of any theory we formulate to explain and describe sets. It provides tools to identify paradoxical classes inside the theory. We show how the known paradoxical classes follow from the productivity principle and how the principle gives us a uniform way to generate new paradoxical classes. In the case of ZFC set theory the productivity principle shows that the limitation of size principles are of a restrictive nature and that they do not explain which classes are sets. The productivity principle, as a logical regulator, can have a definite heuristic role in the development of a consistent set theory. We sketch such a theory—the cumulative cardinal theory of sets. The theory is based on the idea of cardinality of collecting objects into sets. Its development is guided by means of the productivity principle in such a way that its consistency seems plausible. Moreover, the theory inherits good properties from cardinal conception and from cumulative conception of sets. Because of the cardinality principle it can easily justify the replacement axiom, and because of the cumulative property it can easily justify the power set axiom and the union axiom. It would be possible to prove that the cumulative cardinal theory of sets is equivalent to the Morse–Kelley set theory. In this way we provide a natural and plausibly consistent axiomatization for the Morse–Kelley set theory.     

Personal identity and the otherness of one’s own body

Locke claims that a person’s identity over time consists in the unity of consciousness, not in the sameness of the body. Similarly, the phenomenological approach refuses to see the criteria of identity as residing in some externally observable bodily features. Nevertheless, it does not accept the idea that personal identity has to consist either in consciousness or in the body. We are self-aware as bodily beings. After providing a brief reassessment of Locke and the post-Lockean discussion, the article draws on phenomenological arguments that show the body as lived, that is, lived as one’s own body, but also possibly as “other” or “strange.” Against what has been claimed in recent writing, especially in literature on Merleau-Ponty, the author argues that the “mineness” of the body and its “alterity” are not two mutually exclusive features. In the final part of the article, the author suggests that the becoming strange of one’s own body may legitimately be considered as a prominent experience of what it means to be a person.

     

Some aspects of explanation in Boškovič

Bo?kovi?'s explanatory procedure and his concept of explanation represents a certain departure from Newton's causal theory and his theory of explanation. Apart from particular elements of causal explanation, Bo?kovi? developed an alternative, non‐causal explanatory strategy. In this paper two different elements of this strategy are discussed: (i) the micro‐reductive explanatory strategy based on Bo?kovi?'s idea of determination, and (ii) a type of explanation of a theory by means of a more general law, through a thought‐experiment. In addition, an outline of the proposed (iii) ‘argument theory’ of explanation in his mature period is made. These aspects are considered with respect to the realist and anti‐realist elements in Bo?kovi?'s epistemology.