Outcome expectations and use of smokeless tobacco (snus): A cross‐sectional study among young Norwegian snus users

Wiium, N. & Aarø, L.E. (2011). Outcome expectations and use of smokeless tobacco (snus): A cross‐sectional study among young Norwegian snus users. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 52, 64–70. In this study, measures of outcome expectancies related to use of snus (wet snuff) were used to predict reported frequency of snus use. Data stem from a nation‐wide survey in Norway among 16‐ to 20‐year‐olds. Only users of snus were included in the statistical analyses (n = 589). The main outcome measure, frequency of snus use, was measured as a categorical variable – occasional, weekly and daily use. Four dimensions of outcome expectancies (mood regulation, smoking control, weight control and negative health outcomes) were measured and confirmed in a confirmatory factor analysis. Informants tended to believe that snus use is harmful to health, but still they supported the idea of snus as a way to control own cigarette smoking. In a SEM model, two of the four dimensions of outcome expectancies turned out to be particularly significant predictors of frequency of snus use – mood regulation and smoking control. No significant interactions with gender were found. Males scored higher than females on “mood regulation”, and “smoking control”, while females scored higher than males on “negative health outcomes”. If more smokers were convinced that snus use is a less harmful alternative, more of them might start using snus, not only because there is some association between health outcome expectancies and snus use, but also because snus use by many is perceived as a remedy to stop smoking and as a way to gain some of the mood regulation benefits which are usually associated with smoking.     

Sinking Cohen's Flagship — or Why People with Expensive Tastes Should not be Compensated

G. A. Cohen argues that egalitarians should compensate for expensive tastes or for the fact that they are expensive. Ronald Dworkin, by contrast, regards most expensive tastes as unworthy of compensation — only if a person disidentifies with his own such tastes (i.e. wishes he did not have them) is compensation appropriate. Dworkinians appeal, inter alia, to the so‐called ‘first‐person’ or ‘continuity’ test. According to the continuity test, an appropriate standard of interpersonal comparison reflects people's own assessment of their relative standing: Person A can only legitimately demand compensation from person B if he regards himself as worse off, all things considered, than B. The typical bearer of expensive tastes does not regard herself as being worse off than others with less expensive tastes. Hence, in the typical case, pace Cohen, compensation for expensive tastes is inappropriate. The article scrutinizes this rationale for not compensating for expensive tastes. Especially, we try to bolster the continuity test by relating it to Dworkin's distinction between integrated and detached values, pointing out that an argument for the continuity test can be built on the assumption that equality has integrated value. In brief, the point is that a metric of equality should be assessed, partly, in virtue of its consequences for related ideals. One of these is the kind of justificatory community promoted by the continuity test. We defend this view against an objection to the effect that equality is a detached value. We conclude that the continuity test constitutes a strong foothold for the resourcist egalitarian reluctance to compensate people for their expensive tastes.     

Depression and cognitive sequelae registered within the first year among young Danish TBI survivors

The aim of the study was to determine the proportion of depression and cognitive sequelae among young (15-30 years) Danish TBI survivors referred to interdisciplinary evaluation through a nationwide government-initiated health initiative. The cross-sectional study is based on data from the “Danish register for young adults with acquired brain injury” on TBI survivors included from October 2013 to December 2016. The main measures were Major depression inventory, Trail making test A and B, Fluency, Word learning with selective reminding, Matrix reasoning, Coding and Glasgow outcome scale - extended (GOS-E). During the study period, 131 young TBI survivors were referred to one of five national outpatient clinics. Ninety-six had complete data and of these 14.6% fulfilled the ICD-10 diagnostic criteria for depression and 34.4% had cognitive sequelae. An association was found between depression and cognitive sequelae (p = 0.004). Patients with both depression and cognitive sequelae (n = 10) had a significantly lower mean score on GOS-E (p = 0.0001). Depression and cognitive sequelae were frequent and associated with a poorer global functional outcome among young TBI survivors referred within a year after trauma. This finding and the notion that only 20% of the expected TBI population was referred to this nationwide health initiative indicate an unacknowledged need for interdisciplinary follow-up.     

Moral Taint: On the Transfer of the Implications of Moral Culpability

Suppose two people are about to drown. We are in a position to save only one, so the other will have to die. One of the two has just culpably killed an innocent person, but has no intention of killing anybody else and there is no reason to expect that he will. Everything else being equal, should we give them an equal chance of being saved by flipping a coin? In this paper I argue that we should not. I argue that the implications of a person's moral culpability for (recent or prospective) harm to a particular victim should transfer to other conflict situations in which the wrongdoer might find him or herself. This requires establishing the extent to which a person's contributing to harming another person — and his moral culpability for that harm — impinges on our decision making in situations where it is possible only to assist either the wrongdoer or some other person that is not his victim.