Subjective Well-Being Predictors of Academic Citizenship Behavior

Two studies tested the hypothesis that SWB predicts unique variance in academic citizenship attitudes, even while accounting for personality traits. In Study 1, participants (n?=?2,566) completed an online questionnaire assessing their positive and negative affect, ACBs and personality. The results indicated that positive affect predicted consideration, civic virtue, and conscientiousness, whereas negative affect predicted citizenship conscientiousness and sportsmanship while controlling for personality. In Study 2, participants (n?=?260) completed measures of life satisfaction, ACBs and personality. The results showed that life satisfaction predicted all ACBs while controlling for personality. Based on these results, it can be concluded that SWB is an important predictor of ACBs. Implications for the selection of student aids in academic settings are discussed.     

Husserl's debate with Heidegger in the margins of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics

Husserl received from Martin Heidegger a copy of his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics in the summer of 1929 not long before Husserl had determined to reread Heidegger's writings in order to arrive at a definitive position on Heidegger's philosophy. With this in view, Husserl reread and made extensive marginal comments in Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. This essay by the translator of the remarks in KPM offers some historical background and comment on the importance of the remarks in KPM and attempts to describe Husserl's counterposition to Heidegger on six issues that divided the two major twentieth century philosophers.     

自我损耗、情绪动机对冲动决策的影响

以大学生为被试,探讨自我损耗、情绪动机对冲动决策的影响。采用2×2×2的混合实验设计,组内变量为自我损耗,组间变量为情绪动机方向和强度,使用双任务范式操作自我损耗,使用情绪动机图片启动被试的情绪动机,使用延迟折扣任务的指标k值测量冲动决策。结果发现,高趋近动机的k值大于低趋近动机,高回避动机的k值大于低回避动机。结果表明,自我损耗、情绪动机对冲动决策有明显影响。     

控制和外界客体社会效价对身体拥有感的影响

研究采用运动橡胶手错觉范式,操纵了“控制”和“社会效价”两个变量,通过行为实验探讨了控制和社会效价对身体拥有感的影响。结果发现,与“被动控制”条件相比,“主动控制”条件产生了更强的拥有感; 与“不利”条件相比,“有利”条件产生了更强的拥有感。且“控制”和“社会效价”的交互作用显著:无论哪种控制条件,有利条件下的拥有感都显著高于不利条件下的拥有感; 无论哪种效价条件,主动控制条件下的拥有感均显著高于被动控制条件下的拥有感。该结果表明,控制和社会效价是产生身体拥有感的条件。研究结果为提高假肢佩戴者对假肢的心理接纳程度提供了有益的训练途径。     

The ethics of separating conjoined twins: two arguments against

I argue that the separation of conjoined twins in infancy or early childhood is unethical (rare exceptions aside). Cases may be divided into three types: both twins suffer from lethal abnormalities, only one twin has a lethal abnormality, or neither twin does. In the first kind of case, there is no reason to separate, since both twins will die regardless of treatment. In the third kind of case, I argue that separation at an early age is unethical because the twins are likely to achieve an irreplaceably good quality of life—the goods of conjoinment—that separation takes away. Evaluation of this possibility requires maturation past early childhood. Regarding the second type, I point out that with conceivable but unrecorded exceptions, these cases will consistently involve sacrifice separation. I present an argument that sacrifice separation is unethical, but in some cases a moral dilemma may exist in which separation and refraining from separation are both unethical. Perhaps in such cases a decision can be made on non-moral grounds; however, the possibility of such a decision serves not to mitigate but to underscore the fact that the separation is unethical. My conclusion, which applies to all three types of cases, is that it is unethical to separate conjoined twins before their developing personalities give some reliable indication as to whether they desire separation and whether they will achieve those goods of conjoinment.     

Contractualism,Person-Affecting Wrongness and the Non-identity Problem

A number of theorists have argued that Scanlon's contractualist theory both "gets around" and "solves" the non-identity problem. They argue that it gets around the problem because hypothetical deliberation on general moral principles excludes the considerations that lead to the problem. They argue that it solves the problem because violating a contractualist moral principle in one's treatment of another wrongs that particular other, grounding a person-affecting moral claim. In this paper, I agree with the first claim but note that all it shows is that the act is impersonally wrong. I then dispute the second claim. On Scanlon's contractualist view, one wrongs a particular other if one treats the other in a way that is unjustifiable to that other on reasons she could not reasonably reject. We should think of person-affecting wronging in terms of the reasons had by the actual agent and the actual person affected by the agent's action. In non-identity cases, interpersonal justifiability is therefore shaped both by the reason to reject the treatment provided by the bad suffered and the reason to affirm the treatment provided by the goods had as a result of existing. I argue it would be reasonable for the actual person to find the treatment justifiable, and so I conclude that Scanlon's contractualist metaethics does not provide a narrow person-affecting solution to the non-identity problem on its own terms. I conclude that the two claims represent a tension within Scanlon's contractualist theory itself.     

Violence,research, and non-identity in the psychiatric clinic

Violence in psychiatric clinics has been a consistent problem since the birth of modern psychiatry. In this paper, I examine current efforts to understand and reduce both violence and coercive responses to violence in psychiatry, arguing that these efforts are destined to fall short. By and large, scholarship on psychiatric violence reduction has focused on identifying discrete factors that are statistically associated with violence, such as patient demographics and clinical qualities, in an effort to quantify risk and predict violent acts before they happen. Using the work of Horkheimer and Adorno, I characterize the theoretical orientation of such efforts as identity thinking. I then argue that these approaches lead to epistemic imperceptiveness and a subtle form of conceptual restraint on patients. I suggest a reorientation in psychiatric research, away from identity thinking and toward a more productive and just approach to the problem of violence in psychiatric clinics.     

Narrative,Self-Realization,and the Shape of a Life

Velleman, MacIntyre, and others have argued for the compositional view that lives can be other than equally good for the person who lives them even though they contain all and only the same moments, and that this is explained by their narrative structure. I argue instead for explanation by self-realization, partly by interpreting Siegfried Sassoon’s exemplary life-narrative. I decide between the two explanations by distinguishing the various features of the radial concept of narrative, and showing, for each, either that self-realization is just as good an account, or that we should prefer the self-realization account, of the composition it is supposed to explain. I conclude that, if the shape of a life matters, it matters because some shapes are self-realizations, not because they are narratives.     

The joy of Desire: Understanding Levinas’s Desire of the Other as gift

In this paper, I argue that if we understand Levinas’s Desire of the Other as gift, we can understand it as joyful—that is, as celebratory. After presenting Levinas’s conception of Desire, I consider his claim, found in Otherwise than Being, that the self is a hostage to the Other, and I contend that, paradoxical as it may seem, being a hostage to the Other is actually liberating. Then, drawing on insights Richard Kearney offers in Reimagining the Sacred, I argue for understanding Desire as a gift that is the condition of possibility for joy. If I offer hospitality to the Other, I thereby accept the gift that makes joy possible, and this joy is not egoistic but is the proper response to the gift. Finally, I ask whether Desire can be joyful in practice, given that the pure gift is an originary condition and never a historical one, and I conclude that imperfect joy remains possible. Moreover, this imperfect joy is better than any solitary enjoyment I might experience in the total absence of the Other.     

Words that reveal: Jean-Yves Lacoste and the experience of God

Much of the contemporary discussion of religion seems to do away with the very possibility of revelation. In this article, I use Lacoste’s phenomenology of la parole to rethink a theology of revelation in terms of God’s personal self-giving in experience. After examining Lacoste’s views of the relationship between philosophy and theology, his liturgical reduction and what this means for an understanding of experience and knowledge, and his thought of la parole more broadly, I give critical consideration to how he thinks the possibility of God’s address to humanity. Lacoste maintains that God’s presence in experience may be known through affection, and, indeed, that the word may so move us that we are able to recognise that presence. He uses the notion of self-evidence rather than the usual phenomenological category of evidence to evince the reasonableness of this response. I argue that while Lacoste accords due deference to a traditional understanding of revelation as the repetition or unfolding of a word addressed to us in the past, his thought also allows us to think revelation as a contemporary event, the hermeneutics of which allow us to know God in ways that are new.