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Varelius J 《Science and engineering ethics》2009,15(1):39-50
It has been suggested that, in addition to individual level decision-making, informed consent procedures could be used in
collective decision-making too. One of the main criticisms directed at this suggestion concerns decision-making power. It
is maintained that consent is a veto power concept and that, as such, it is not appropriate for collective decision-making.
This paper examines this objection to collective informed consent. It argues that veto power informed consent can have some
uses in the collective level and that when it is not appropriate the decision power a concerned party ought to have in connection
with an arrangement should be made relative to the interest she has at stake in it. It concludes that the objection examined
does not undermine collective informed consent.
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Jukka VareliusEmail: |
2.
Objective Explanations of Individual Well-being 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
J. Varelius 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2004,5(1):73-91
Empirical research on questions pertaining to individual well-being is informed by the researchers' philosophical conception
of the nature of well-being and, consequently, the adequacy of such research is partly determined by the plausibility of this
conception. Philosophical theories of human well-being divide into subjective and objective. Subjective theories make our
well-being dependent on our attitudes of favour and disfavour. Objective theories deny this dependency. This article discusses
objective theories of individual well-being from the point of view of their explanatory power and argues that these theories
are unable to provide an acceptable account of the prudential goodness of what they consider to be good for human beings.
The article concludes by discussing some implications of its main argument to empirical research on questions pertaining to
individual well-being.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
3.
Varelius J 《Science and engineering ethics》2008,14(1):65-76
Services of ethics consultants are nowadays commonly used in such various spheres of life as engineering, public administration, business, law, health care, journalism, and scientific research. It has however been maintained that use of ethics consultants is incompatible with personal autonomy; in moral matters individuals should be allowed to make their own decisions. The problem this criticism refers to can be conceived of as a conflict between the professional autonomy of ethics experts and the autonomy of the persons they serve. This paper addresses this conflict and maintains that when the nature of both ethics consultation and individual autonomy is properly understood, the professional autonomy of ethics experts is compatible with the autonomy of the persons they assist. 相似文献
4.
Jukka Varelius 《Res Publica》2014,20(4):345-357
The expiration of intellectual property rights has been seen to amount to a problem for non-consequentialist theories of intellectual property. In this article, I assess whether the difficulty is real. I maintain that, as things are at least, there is no sufficient reason to believe that the termination of intellectual property rights is an insurmountable problem for non-consequentialist theories of intellectual property rights. 相似文献
5.
Varelius J 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2003,24(5):363-379
Among the different approaches to questions of biomedical ethics, there is a view that stresses the importance of a patient’s
right to make her own decisions in evaluative questions concerning her own well-being. This approach, the autonomy-based approach
to biomedical ethics, has usually led to the adoption of a subjective theory of well-being on the basis of its commitment
to the value of autonomy and to the view that well-being is always relative to a subject. In this article, it is argued that
these two commitments need not lead to subjectivism concerning the nature of well-being.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
6.
Jukka Varelius 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2016,19(3):635-648
When it is considered to be in their best interests, withholding and withdrawing life-supporting treatment from non-competent physically ill or injured patients – non-voluntary passive euthanasia, as it has been called – is generally accepted. A central reason in support of the procedures relates to the perceived manner of death they involve: in non-voluntary passive euthanasia death is seen to come about naturally. When a non-competent psychiatric patient attempts to kill herself, the mental health care providers treating her are obligated to try to stop her. Yet it has been suggested that death by suicide can be a part of the natural course of a severe mental illness. Accordingly, if the perceived naturalness of the deaths occurring in connection with non-voluntary passive euthanasia speaks for their moral permissibility, it could be taken that a similar reason can support the moral acceptability of the suicidal deaths of non-competent psychiatric patients. In this article, I consider whether the suicidal death of a non-competent psychiatric patient would necessarily be less natural than those of physically ill or injured patients who die as a result of non-voluntary passive euthanasia. I argue that it would not. 相似文献
7.
Jukka Varelius 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2013,16(3):559-574
Opponents of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide often maintain that the procedures ought not to be accepted because ending an innocent human life would both be morally wrong in itself and have unfortunate consequences. A gravely suffering patient can grant that ending his life would involve such harm but still insist that he would have reason to continue living only if there were something to him in his abstaining from ending his life. Though relatively rarely, the notion of meaning of life has figured in recent medical ethical debate on voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. And in current philosophical discussion on meaning of life outside the medical ethical debate on voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide several authors have argued that being moral and having a meaningful existence are connected to each other. In this article, I assess whether his intentionally refraining from causing the harm related to voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide would involve something to such a patient in the sense that it would promote the meaningfulness of his life. 相似文献
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