排序方式: 共有8条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1
1.
Philosophical Studies - 相似文献
2.
3.
4.
Derek Parfit's combined‐spectrum argument seems to conflict with epistemicism, a viable theory of vagueness. While Parfit argues for the indeterminacy of personhood, epistemicism denies indeterminacy. But, we argue, the linguistically based determinacy that epistemicism supports lacks the sort of normative or ontological significance that concerns Parfit. Thus, we reformulate his argument to make it consistent with epistemicism. We also dispute Roy Sorensen's suggestion that Parfit's argument relies on an assumption that fuels resistance to epistemicism, namely, that ‘the magnitude of a modification must be proportional to its effect.’ 相似文献
5.
Philosophical Studies - 相似文献
6.
Torin Alter 《Philosophical Studies》2007,134(2):235-253
Zombies make trouble for physicalism. Intuitively, they seem conceivable, and many take this to support their metaphysical
possibility – a result that, most agree, would refute physicalism. John Hawthorne (2002) [Philosophical Studies 109, 17–52] and David Braddon-Mitchell (2003) [The Journal of Philosophy 100, 111–135] have developed a novel response to this argument: phenomenal concepts have a conditional structure – they refer
to non-physical states if such states exist and otherwise to physical states – and this explains the zombie intuition. I argue
that this strategy fails. The considerations Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell adduce in support of their analysis in fact do
no such thing. Further, their main argument for the analysis is self-defeating: exactly similar reasoning would undermine
the view it is meant to establish. Finally, on closer inspection the conditional analysis is incompatible with the zombie
intuition. Thus, not only is the analysis incapable of explaining the intuition: the intuition’s plausibility indicates that
the analysis is incorrect. I also suggest that the allure of the conditional-analysis strategy may derive from a questionable
view about what explaining the intuition would require.
An erratum to this article is available at . 相似文献
7.
Do I have a special reason to care about my future, as opposed to yours? We reject the common belief that I do. Putting our thesis paradoxically, we say that nothing matters in survival: nothing in our continued existence justifies any special self-concern. Such an “extreme” view is standardly tied to ideas about the metaphysics of persons, but not by us. After rejecting various arguments against our thesis, we conclude that simplicity decides in its favor. Throughout the essay we honor Jim Rachels, whose final days exemplified his own unselfish morality as well as the “neutralist” ideal we espouse. As an appendix, we include the last original work to be published by James Rachels, in which he criticizes Sidgwick’s most famous defense of egoism. 相似文献
8.
Torin Alter 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(4):582-584
Book Information The Semantics of Media. By Jeff Ross. Dordrecht, Kluwer. 1997. Pp. vii + 137. £56.75. 相似文献
1