Phenotypic plasticity and archetype: a response to common objections to the biological theory of archetype and instinct

Since Jung’s death in 1961, scholars have attempted to integrate growing biological science data into Jungian concepts such as the collective unconscious, instincts and the archetypes. This enterprise has been challenging due to persistent false dichotomies of gene and environment occasionally arising. Recent works by Roesler (2022a, 2022b) for example, have raised objections to the biological theory of archetypes, but the objections are plagued by such dichotomies. The concept of phenotypic plasticity, however, helps to both avoid this problem as well as bridge the gap between competing theories into a more integrated model with solid biological foundations.     

No attentional bias for pictoral stimuli in spider-fearful subjects

A number of experiments have shown that (spider) fearful subjects direct their attention to fear-relevant words, even when these words are irrelevant to the completion of a target task (e.g., color naming). The present study examined whether subjects with an intense fear of spiders also display such attentional bias for a fear-relevant pictoral stimulus. Female spider-fearful (n=13) and control subjects (n=13) saw neutral patterns (i.e., horizontal and vertical bars). One pattern served as target for a reaction time, while the other pattern served as nontarget. Targets and nontargets were accompanied by either fear-relevant or neutral pictoral material (i.e., a picture of a spider or a picture of a flower, respectively). The fear-relevant picture did not selectively delibate reaction time performance of spider-fearful subjects. Thus, no evidence was found for an attentional bias for fear-relevant pictoral material in subjects with an intense fear of spiders. Instead, fearful subjects exhibited a general inhibition of performance which became stronger over trials. This suggests that the fear-relevant picture induced a state of anxious arousal or defensive withdrawal that interfered with reaction time performance on both fear-relevant and neutral trials.     

The intuitive personologist revisited: A critique of dialectical person perception

A critical examination of dialectical person perception as advanced by Lamiell, Foss, Trierweiler, and Leffel, (1983) reveals some important problems both in its empirical basis and in the underlying model of the intuitive personologist. The present article discusses these problems and suggests some alternative conceptions of the intuitive personologist.     

Antecedents of fathers’ perception of child behavior at child age 12 months

This study investigates whether fathers’ adverse childhood experiences (ACE) and attachment style reported during pregnancy predict fathers’ perception of child behavior assessed 12 months postpartum, expressed by the Parenting Stress Index (PSI), Child Domain. Prospective fathers (N = 835) were recruited to “The Little in Norway (LiN) study” (Moe & Smith) at nine well-baby clinics in Norway, with data collection composed of five time points during pregnancy and two time points postpartum (6 and 12 months). The main analyses included linear regression, path-analysis modeling, and intraclass correlation based on mixed effects modeling. First, linear regression analyses showed that neither fathers’ ACE nor attachment style significantly predicted perceived child behavior postpartum directly. Furthermore, path analyses showed that ACE and less secure attachment style (especially avoidant attachment) measured early in pregnancy strongly predicted negatively perceived child behavior, mediated by fathers’ mental health symptoms during pregnancy and partner disharmony postpartum. Second, intraclass correlation analyses showed that fathers’ perceived child behavior showed substantial stability between 6 and 12 months postpartum. Family interventions beginning in pregnancy may be most beneficial given that fathers’ early experiences and perceptions of attachment in pregnancy were associated with later partner disharmony and stress.     

Who is Afraid of Figure of Speech?

Aristotle's illustrations of the fallacy of Figure of Speech (or Form of Expression) are none too convincing. They are tied to Aristotle's theory of categories and to peculiarities of Greek grammar that fail to hold appeal for a contemporary readership. Yet, upon closer inspection, Figure of Speech shows many points of contact with views and problems that inhabit 20th-century analytical philosophy. In the paper, some Aristotelian examples will be analyzed to gain a better understanding of this fallacy. The case of the Third Man argument and some modern cases lend plausibility to the claim that Figure of Speech is of more interest as a type of fallacy than has generally been assumed. Finally, a case is made for the view that Figure of Speech, though listed among the fallacies dependent upon language, is not properly classified as a fallacy of ambiguity. More likely, it should be looked upon as a type of non sequitur. This has important consequences for the profile of dialogue associated with this fallacy.     

Implicit but not explicit self-esteem predicts future depressive symptomatology

To date, research on the predictive validity of implicit self-esteem for depressive relapse is very sparse. In the present study, we assessed implicit self-esteem using the Name Letter Preference Task and explicit self-esteem using the Rosenberg self-esteem scale in a group of currently depressed patients, formerly depressed individuals, and never depressed controls. In addition, we examined the predictive validity of explicit, implicit, and the interaction of explicit and implicit self-esteem in predicting future symptoms of depression in formerly depressed individuals and never depressed controls. The results showed that currently depressed individuals reported a lower explicit self-esteem as compared to formerly depressed individuals and never depressed controls. In line with previous research, all groups showed a positive implicit self-esteem not different from each other. Furthermore, after controlling for initial depressive symptomatology, implicit but not explicit self-esteem significantly predicted depressive symptoms at six months follow-up. Although implicit self-esteem assessed with the Name Letter Preference Test was not different between formerly depressed individuals and never depressed controls, the findings suggest it is an interesting variable in the study of vulnerability for depression relapse.