GENDER AS A MODERATOR OF THE RELATION BETWEEN RACE-RELATED STRESS AND MENTAL HEALTH SYMPTOMS FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS

The present study tested gender as a moderator of the relationship between race-related stress and mental health symptoms among African American adults. Because African American women are exposed to stressors associated with race and gender, we hypothesized that African American women would have higher levels of race-related stress and more severe mental health outcomes related to experiences of race-related stress compared to African American men. Multivariate analyses revealed that African American men had higher stress appraisals for institutional racism than did women. No significant gender differences were found for cultural and individual racism. Moderated regression analyses revealed that increases in stress appraisals for individual racism were associated with increases in anxiety and obsessive-compulsive symptoms for African American women. Race-related stress had no significant effects on mental health symptoms for African American men. The findings suggest that gender is an important factor in determining the impact of race-related stress on mental health.     

Summation: Further assessment of a configural theory

Rats received Pavlovian conditioning in which food was signalled by a visual stimulus, A+, an auditory stimulus, B+, and a compound composed of different visual and auditory stimuli, CD+. Test trials were then given with the compound AB. Experiments 1 and 2A revealed stronger responding during AB than during CD. In Experiment 2B, there was no evidence of a summation of responding during AB when A+ B+ training was conducted in the absence of CD+ trials. A further failure to observe abnormally strong responding during ABwas found in Experiment 3 for which the training trials with A+ B+ CD+ were accompanied by trials in which C and D were separately paired with food. The results are explained in terms of a configural theory of conditioning, which assumes that responding during a compound is determined by generalization from its components, as well as from other compounds to which it is similar.     

How to Argue Against Active Euthanasia

Most arguments against active euthanasia, as do most arguments in applied ethics generally, take place within the framework of what can broadly be referred to as a modern, as opposed to an ancient, approach to moral theory. In this paper, I argue that this fact works to the disadvantage of opponents of active euthanasia, and that if there is a successful argument against active euthanasia, it will be of the latter sort. In Part I, I attempt to clarify thedistinction between modern and ancient approaches with which I am concerned. In Part II, I attempt to show that any argument against active euthanasia that is of the first sort is bound to fail. In Part III, I propose an argument against active euthanasia of the second sort that I believe has a better chance for success. In Part IV, I consider some objections that can be raised against this argument and attempt to show how they can be overcome.     

Response error and processing biases in confidence judgment

Previous studies showed that random error can explain overconfidence effects typically observed in the literature. One of these studies concluded that, after accounting for random error effects in the data, there is little support for cognitive‐processing biases in confidence elicitation. In this paper, we investigate more closely the random error explanation for overconfidence. We generated data from four models of confidence and then estimated the magnitude of random error in the data. Our results show that, in addition to the true magnitude of random error specified in the simulations, the error estimates are influenced by important cognitive‐processing biases in the confidence elicitation process. We found that random error in the response process can account for the degree of overconfidence found in calibration studies, even when that overconfidence is actually caused by other factors. Thus, the error models say little about whether cognitive biases are present in the confidence elicitation process. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.