Individual Marital Therapy: A Critical Reappraisal

The belief that individual marital therapy (IMT) is an ineffective form of treatment for marriage problems and markedly inferior to the conjoint approaches has become almost an article of faith in family therapy circles. This position was originally advanced in the influential reviews of the research literature conducted by Gurman and Kniskern, and their conclusions have been cited in numerous other articles. This paper re-reviews the research studies purportedly supporting this conclusion and finds almost all of them to be invalidated by gross flaws in design and implementation. It is argued that from the highly inadequate evidence available, no conclusions can be reached concerning either the absolute or relative effectiveness of IMT.     

Assessing Conversational Cognition Levels of Cognitive Theory and Associated Methodological Requirements

Despite the prominence of cognitively oriented research in interpersonal communication, relatively little is known about the interplay of cognitive and communicative processes during conversation. For interpersonal communication scholars or at least those interested in interaction, the study of cognition is most useful if it reveals how interactants produce, monitor, modify, and process messages while engaged in conversation. The failure to collect data about in-process conversational cognition is partially due to excessive reliance on what have been identified as “implementation level” cognitive theories and models. Such theories are primarily concerned with specifying cognitive “architectures” and provide little guidance about how cognition is adapted to conversational tasks. However, a dearth of methodological creativity is also partially to blame for the lack of data about in-process conversational cognition. On encountering the admittedly formidable methodological difficulties of collecting data about conversational cognition, researchers have tended to rely on traditional but inadequate methods, or worse, have simply ignored theoretical questions pertinent to cognition in-process. This article suggests that claims about cognition can be made at four levels—biological, implementation, algorithmic, and rational—but that theoretical claims about conversational cognition can most usefully be pursued at the rational and algorithmic levels. In an effort to promote more research at these levels, criteria for studying conversational cognition are proposed, and promising methods are reviewed.     

COUNSELING THE CULTURALLY DIFFERENT CLIENT: A BLACK-WHITE COLLABORATIVE VIEW

Uncovering the Value Impositions of Social Scientists – A Prelude to Change and Understanding in Counseling and Education.     

The counselor as metaphysician

Despite their scientific temper of mind, counselors should be interested in metaphysics because of its concern with, among other things, the problem of distinguishing the real from the not-real—obviously, a vital issue to every counselor and client. This article sketches the scope of metaphysical inquiry as this discipline is understood in the traditional philosophical sense. The authors also illustrate the significance of metaphysics for counseling by presenting the principal tenets of one metaphysical position—personalistic idealism—and by delineating some implications for counseling that flow from an adherence to this metaphysical view.     

MORAL DELIBERATION AND OPERATIVE RIGHTS: A RESPONSE TO MARY MAGADA‐WARD AND CYNTHIA GAYMAN

Abstract: The aim of this article is to show how intimately connected Beth J. Singer's theory of operative rights is with her understanding of the deliberative process. I thus argue against Cynthia Gayman's effort to set in contrast Singer's theory of rights and Dewey's characteristic emphasis on reflective morality. Since I take the value of Singer's approach to be most evident in its relevance to the abortion debate as an ongoing deliberation, I question whether Mary Magada‐Ward sufficiently appreciates the dialogical and deliberative emphases of Singer's stance. My goal, however, is not so much to argue against either Gayman or Magada‐Ward as it is to argue for taking Singer's position even more seriously than either author does. In particular, I want to highlight the finely nuanced character of Singer's philosophical intervention in the debate regarding abortion, especially stressing certain features that Gayman and Magada‐Ward overlook.