排序方式: 共有3条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
1
1.
Feest U 《Journal of the history of the behavioral sciences》2005,41(2):131-149
I offer an analysis of operationism in psychology, which is rooted in an historical study of the investigative practices of two of its early proponents (S. S. Stevens and E. C. Tolman). According to this analysis, early psychological operationists emphasized the importance of experimental operations and called for scientists to specify what kinds of operations were to count as empirical indicators for the referents of their concepts. While such specifications were referred to as "definitions," I show that such definitions were not taken to constitute a priori knowledge or be analytically true. Rather, they served the pragmatic function of enabling scientists to do research on a purported phenomenon. I argue that historical and philosophical discussions of problems with operationism have conflated it, both conceptually and historically, with positivism, and I raise the question of what are the "real" issues behind the debate about operationism. 相似文献
2.
We provide an overview of three ways in which the expression “Historical epistemology” (HE) is often understood: (1) HE as
a study of the history of higher-order epistemic concepts such as objectivity, observation, experimentation, or probability;
(2) HE as a study of the historical trajectories of the objects of research, such as the electron, DNA, or phlogiston; (3)
HE as the long-term study of scientific developments. After laying out various ways in which these agendas touch on current
debates within both epistemology and philosophy of science (e.g., skepticism, realism, rationality of scientific change),
we conclude by highlighting three topics as especially worthy of further philosophical investigation. The first concerns the
methods, aims and systematic ambitions of the history of epistemology. The second concerns the ways in versions of HE can
be connected to versions of naturalized and social epistemologies. The third concerns the philosophy of history, and in particular
the level of analysis at which a historical analysis should aim. 相似文献
3.
Uljana Feest 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(3):391-411
This paper provides an interpretation of Hans-J?rg Rheinberger’s notions of epistemic things and historical epistemology. I argue that Rheinberger’s approach articulates a unique contribution to current debates about integrated HPS, and I propose
some modifications and extensions of this contribution. Drawing on examples from memory research, I show that Rheinberger
is right to highlight a particular feature of many objects of empirical research (“epistemic things”)—especially in the contexts
of exploratory experimentation—namely our lack of knowledge about them. I argue that this analysis needs to be supplemented
with an account of what scientists do know, and in particular, how they are able to attribute rudimentary empirical contours to objects of research. These contours
are closely connected to paradigmatic research designs, which in turn are tied to basic methodological rules for the exploration
of the purported phenomena. I suggest that we engage with such rules in order to develop our own normative (epistemological)
categories, and I tie this proposal to the idea of a methodological naturalism in philosophy of science. 相似文献
1