The development of ethnic identity and ethnic role taking skills in children from different school settings

The current studies were designed to investigate the influence of variations in type of school setting on the development of role-taking skills and ethnic identity. We were interested in groups of school children in grades 1 to 5 inclusive from three different types of language programs: (1) instruction in the native language (English in this case); (2) total instruction in a second language (French); and (3) partial instruction in a second language (French). All children were native-English speaking, and came from perdominantly middle class families with monolingual English-speaking parents. The children from each program were equated at each grade level on age, and verbal and non-verbal I.Q. It was expected that (1) children in the second language programs would develop identity with their native language reference group later and less consistently than children in the native language programs; because (2) the second language children would identify more with the second language ethnic group; (3) the second language children would be able to understand at an earlier grade level than the native language group the principle of reciprocity in role-taking; and (4) these difference would be more pronounced for the totally than for the partially immersed second language children. The children were required to rate a number of ethnic dolls on a 20 point rating scale according to (1) how much each would be desired as a personal friend, (2) how much each would be desired as a friend for a member of another specific ethnic group, and (3) how similar each doll was to the child. The results indicated general support for hypotheses (1), (2) and (4), particularly among the primary school samples (1, 2), but a lack of support for hypothesis (3). These results demonstrate the influence of socio-cultural factors on the development of ethnic identity and ethnic role-taking skills.     

Movin’ on up: higher-level requirements and inferential justification

Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer “no” and internalists tend to answer “yes”. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that her premises support her conclusion. Against many internalists, I argue that this higher-level awareness needn’t be doxastic or justified. I also argue that the required higher-level awareness needn’t be caused in some appropriate way, e.g. by a reliable or properly functioning faculty. I suspect that this weaker higher-level requirement is overlooked because, at first glance, it seems absurd to allow nondoxastic, unjustified, and unreliably-caused higher-level awareness to contribute to inferential justification. One of the central goals of this paper is to explain how such weak awareness can make an essential contribution to inferential justification.     

Moore,Brentano, and Scanlon: a defense of indefinability

Philosophical Studies - Mooreans claim that intrinsic goodness is a conceptual primitive. Fitting-attitude theorists object: they say that goodness should be defined in terms of what it is fitting...     

Implications of Individual Differences in Subjective Happiness for Perceiving,Interpreting, and Thinking About Life Events

Both anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that characteristically happy and unhappy individuals seem to differ in the ways in which they respond to life events and daily situations. This paper reports two questionnaire studies and a laboratory study testing the hypothesis that happy people perceive, interpret, and think about the same events in more positive ways than do unhappy ones. The results of Study 1 showed that students nominated by their peers as very happy reported experiencing similar types of both positive and negative life events, as did peer-nominated unhappy students. However, self-rated happy students tended to think about both types of events more favorably and adaptively—e.g., by seeing humor in adversity and emphasizing recent improvement in their lives. This pattern of results was conceptually replicated in Study 2 using hypothetical events. In Study 3, self-rated happy students interacted with a female confederate in the laboratory, then watched a series of videotapes depicting a fellow (but unfamiliar) student in three different situations. Happy individuals liked the person they met, and recalled her in more favorable terms, more than did unhappy ones. The same pattern of results, albeit weaker, was found for liking of the videotaped target. Implications of our findings for the question of how happiness (or unhappiness) is maintained are discussed.