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Does ‘Ought’ Conversationally Implicate ‘Can’? 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Bart Streumer 《European Journal of Philosophy》2003,11(2):219-228
2.
Bart Streumer 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(1):79-86
Ulrike Heuer argues that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action that this person cannot perform, as long
as this person can take efficient steps towards performing this action. In this reply, I first argue that Heuer’s examples
fail to undermine my claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person
will perform this action. I then argue that, on a plausible interpretation of what ‘efficient steps’ are, Heuer’s claim is
consistent with my claim. I end by showing that Heuer fails to undermine the arguments I gave for my claim. 相似文献
3.
Bart Streumer 《Philosophical Studies》2011,154(3):325-348
4.
Philosophia - I have elsewhere given three arguments for the claim that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action only if this person can perform this action. Henne, Semler, Chituc,... 相似文献
5.
Bart Streumer 《Erkenntnis》2007,66(3):353-374
What is the relation between entailment and reasons for belief? In this paper, I discuss several answers to this question,
and I argue that these answers all face problems. I then propose the following answer: for all propositions p
1,…,p
n and q, if the conjunction of p
1,…, and p
n entails q, then there is a reason against a person’s both believing that p
1,…, and that p
n and believing the negation of q. I argue that this answer avoids the problems that the other answers to this question face, and that it does not face any
other problems either. I end by showing what the relation between deductive logic, reasons for belief and reasoning is if
this answer is correct. 相似文献
6.
Bart Streumer 《Philosophical Studies》2007,136(3):351-384
Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform
this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue
that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason
for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then give three arguments
for the truth of the latter claim, which are also arguments for the truth of the former claim as I interpret it. 相似文献
7.
Bart Streumer 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2016,24(4):537-546
Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini argues that we can believe the error theory. In this reply, I explain why I still think we cannot. 相似文献
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