The Effect of Evidential Impact on Perceptual Probabilistic Judgments

In a series of three behavioral experiments, we found a systematic distortion of probability judgments concerning elementary visual stimuli. Participants were briefly shown a set of figures that had two features (e.g., a geometric shape and a color) with two possible values each (e.g., triangle or circle and black or white). A figure was then drawn, and participants were informed about the value of one of its features (e.g., that the figure was a “circle”) and had to predict the value of the other feature (e.g., whether the figure was “black” or “white”). We repeated this procedure for various sets of figures and, by varying the statistical association between features in the sets, we manipulated the probability of a feature given the evidence of another (e.g., the posterior probability of hypothesis “black” given the evidence “circle”) as well as the support provided by a feature to another (e.g., the impact, or confirmation, of evidence “circle” on the hypothesis “black”). Results indicated that participants’ judgments were deeply affected by impact, although they only should have depended on the probability distributions over the features, and that the dissociation between evidential impact and posterior probability increased the number of errors. The implications of these findings for lower and higher level cognitive models are discussed.     

The depiction of car light beams in a child born completely blind

A 12-year-old child (DI) who was completely blind from birth, made a series of tactual (raised-lines) drawings of cars. Among them, there was the depiction of a 'fast car at night' in which DI drew beams of light projecting out of the car. We analyse this drawing, and the preceding ones. We argue that the way in which cars and light beams were depicted by DI cannot be fully and solely explained by graphic imprecision, executive or motor deficiencies, or by rote or verbal learning. Instead, we propose that the most plausible explanation is that DI's depiction of light in a fast car at night reflects the child's na?ve knowledge of light propagation, and that this knowledge was gained through perceiving light as radiant heat.     

Reducing prejudice via direct and extended cross-group friendship

One of the most exciting developments in intergroup contact theory is the idea that a certain type of contact, cross-group friendship, might be particularly effective at reducing prejudice. In this chapter we review research on two types of cross-group friendship. Direct cross-group friendship refers to friendships that develop between members of different groups. Extended cross-group friendship, on the other hand, refers to vicarious experience of cross-group friendship, the mere knowledge that other ingroup members have cross-group friends. We consider the relationship between both types of cross-group friendship and prejudice and the processes that mediate and moderate these relationships. The research highlights the respective strengths and weaknesses of direct and extended cross-group friendship and illustrates how they might be practically combined in efforts to improve intergroup relations.     

Cognitive and emotional characteristics of New Religious Movement members: New questions and data on the mental health issue

The common assumption that members of so-called “cults” and New Religious Movements (NRMs) have mental health problems is usually countered by empirical research suggesting a normal personality profile. Going further than the normality–pathology distinction, we investigated affective-relational (parental and adult attachment) and cognitive (need for closure) needs, world assumptions, and past and present depression as reported by members (N?=?113) of a variety of NRMs in Belgium that are somewhat socially contested. Comparisons were made with data from the general population. Results suggest a fragile past (insecure attachment history, high need for closure, and depressive tendencies) but a positive present (positive world assumptions, security in adult attachment, no depression) and an optimistic future, at least on the basis of self-perceptions. Overall, the pattern of results fit well with what we know from psychology of conversion in general.     

The relationship between the need for closure and deviant bias: an investigation of generality and process

The need for closure predicts an evaluative bias against people whose opinions or behaviors deviate from those of other members of their social groups. In the present study, we investigated whether the relationship between the need for closure and deviant bias generalized to nonsocial stimuli, and we examined the process underlying this relationship. Sixty-one undergraduate students completed measures of the need for closure, the need for structure, intolerance for ambiguity, and the ability to be decisive and achieve cognitive structure. They then rated their liking for letters of the Latin alphabet ("A" & "B") whose locations were consistent and inconsistent with relevant categories ("A circle" and "B circle"). Participants liked category-inconsistent letters less than category-consistent letters. Measures related to the need for structure and closed-mindedness correlated positively with this deviant bias, whereas measures related to the ability to be decisive and achieve cognitive structure did not. These results imply that the relationship between the need for closure and deviant bias is a relatively basic and pervasive effect that is not unique to social deviance and is driven by the need for structure and closed-mindedness. Implications for social and nonsocial stimuli are discussed.     

Eye movements disrupt spatial but not visual mental imagery

It has long been known that eye movements are functionally involved in the generation and maintenance of mental images. Indeed, a number of studies demonstrated that voluntary eye movements interfere with mental imagery tasks (e.g., Laeng and Teodorescu in Cogn Sci 26:207–231, 2002). However, mental imagery is conceived as a multifarious cognitive function with at least two components, a spatial component and a visual component. The present study investigated the question of whether eye movements disrupt mental imagery in general or only its spatial component. We present data on healthy young adults, who performed visual and spatial imagery tasks concurrently with a smooth pursuit. In line with previous literature, results revealed that eye movements had a strong disruptive effect on spatial imagery. Moreover, we crucially demonstrated that eye movements had no disruptive effect when participants visualized the depictive aspects of an object. Therefore, we suggest that eye movements serve to a greater extent the spatial than the visual component of mental imagery.     

Positive and extensive intergroup contact in the past buffers against the disproportionate impact of negative contact in the present

Negative (vs positive) intergroup contact may have a disproportionately large impact on intergroup relations because of valence‐salience effects, whereby negative contact causes higher category salience (Paolini, Harwood, & Rubin, 2010). One correlational and three experimental studies in three conflict areas (Northern Ireland, Arizona's border area, and Cyprus; Ns = 405, 83, 76, and 91) tested the moderation of these valence‐salience effects by individuals' histories of outgroup contact. Consistent with a perceived fit principle valence‐salience effects of face‐to‐face, television‐mediated, and imagined contact held among individuals with negative or limited histories of outgroup contact; these effects were significantly reduced or nonsignificant among individuals with positive or extensive past outgroup contact. These moderation effects suggest that positive and diverse intergroup contact in the past buffers against the harmful effects of negative contact experiences in the present, thus limiting the potential for negative spiralling of intergroup relations. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Feelings of control restore distorted time perception of emotionally charged events

Humans perceive time with millisecond precision. However, when experiencing negative or fearful events, time appears to slow down and aversive events are judged to last longer than neutral or positive events of equal duration. Feelings of control have been shown to attenuate increases in arousal triggered by anxiety-provoking events. Here, we tested whether feelings of control can go as far as influencing people’s perception of the world, by modulating the perceived duration of aversive events. Observers judged the duration of images depicting positive or negative content, and we manipulated the amount of control experienced by participants. Crucially, participants never had any real control over events. All control was illusory. Results showed that when participants experienced low levels of control, negative images were judged as lasting longer than positive images. However, when participants illusorily experienced high levels of control, they no longer experienced aversive negative images as lasting longer than positive images.     

Preschoolers’ Anticipation of Sadness for Excluded Peers,Sympathy, and Prosocial Behavior

We investigated the relations between anticipation of sadness for excluded peers, sympathy, and prosocial behavior in a sample of 127 Italian preschoolers (M_age?=?4.84?years, SD?=?0.85). Children attributed emotions to hypothetical excluded peers who exhibited withdrawn versus aggressive behavior, and these attributions were coded for the presence and intensity of sadness. Teachers rated children’s sympathy and prosocial behavior via questionnaire. In general, children attributed more sadness to the withdrawn excluded peer than the aggressive excluded peer. A path analysis revealed that those who anticipated higher levels of sadness for the withdrawn excluded peer were rated higher in sympathy and, in turn, higher in prosocial behavior. Attributing high levels of sadness to withdrawn excluded peers—who portray relatively heightened need—may be an early social-emotional characteristic of children who are more sympathetic and more likely to channel other-oriented concerns into prosocial actions.